'Kashmir will not be the centre piece of our discussion'

Indian economic reforms that have taken place, has opened up a vast new potential for us to engage with India on economic trade investment that we did not have before.

We think that with the end of the Cold War, we have a similar opportunity to engage India on issues that we simply were unable to discuss in the past for reasons that are, I think, clear and obvious to those who have looked at our relations. We are moving in a new direction with US foreign policy as a result of the end of the Cold War.

It's clear that India is also looking at its foreign policy in a new fashion than they have in the past. The Gujral Doctrine, which -- first moved forward by then foreign minister Gujral, of India's place in the region and its relations with its small neighbours, is a very welcomed development, welcomed by those in the region and those outside the region.

We also think that the fact that there is movement in India and Chinese relations provides some opportunity perhaps for India, to see its concerns about its Chinese neighbour lessened. This could allow them over time, to see their national security requirements somewhat different than they do today.

We have got experience in this. Our national security requirements are not what they were 10 years ago. The Soviet Union is no more. We don't have to build up, any longer, our nuclear weapons; we're building down; not as fast as some, including Stansfield Turner, perhaps might want, but the direction is south, not north, with our nuclear arsenals.

The same applies to the Indo-Pak dialogue. We're under no illusions that this is going to be a quick result in terms of the Indo-Pak talks that have taken place, even if this third suspended round gets started again. They've got to move from procedure to substance, and they're not there yet. But again, over time, if they are able to address that -- the Indians -- address that set of security concerns, that, too, could lead them to arrive at different conclusions about their national security requirements than where they are now. That may lead them, at some point, to say that the CTBT is something that they could look at again.

Now, whether or not it will be possible to do all that by the time we get to CTB ratification debate -- unlikely. But perhaps continuing a restraint and willingness to discuss this will be some of the hopeful, helpful signs that will allow us to move forward on CTBT. So that's the reason why we are pursuing this now, because we see some opportunities out there.

Are you seeking an enhanced security relationship with India? And if so, how do you think the Chinese will view that?

I am not going to speculate as to what this dialogue could lead to. I think we are going to be talking about a wide range of issues, and I just can't tell you right now what it would lead to.

We are not going out with that purpose in mind at all.

And indeed, we have completely independent relations that are unlinked with these two governments. So that I don't see an enhanced security relationship necessarily coming out of this. I do think that we are going to be talking more intensely about all the issues, including security issues, than we have in the past with the Indians.

I don't think that is either on our minds or on the Indians's minds, about a security relationship or enhancement there.

I mentioned earlier that our military-to-military relations have improved with several countries in the region, including with India. We have an annual exchange of defence and military officials. In fact, I just came to this meeting from the meeting we were having at the Pentagon with the annual exchange with Pakistani defense and military leaders. They have their defence secretary here now. That's continuing. We have had increased numbers of high-level military visitors to India. General Ralston was there not long ago.

We are looking for ways to increase our conventional security arrangements, including UN peace keeping, where India has a great deal of experience, and we want to do more with them on that.We are having some military training exercises of a relatively minor nature, but all this is towards increasing some sense of military with each other. But I don't think that either country has any interest at this stage of going much beyond where we are now in terms of any kind of security relationship.

Preposition of military equipment, which you really need down in that region of the world.

I'm not sure about pre- positioning. But the other items that you mentioned are certainly things that we'll be looking at, although, quite frankly, I've been told that basically right now our dance card is full with respect to those kinds of visits, exercises and the rest. And both defence establishments are relatively happy with the level at which we are doing that now.

There may be some room for extensions.

Apart from the CTBT that he mentioned, apart from that perspective, will you be considering this question over non-proliferation issues?

I'm sure that there will be others. I mean, the range of our concerns and -- let me mention this. We intend to talk about what we're doing with in the discussions in New Delhi, what we're doing with respect to our being responsive to what is clearly an international desire for the major nuclear powers to reduce and move toward elimination of their nuclear weapons and Start II. Discussions about Start III will clearly be shared with the Indians.

We know the strong Indian desire for formal negotiations, a time-balanced framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We are going to talk about what we are doing and we think we've got a pretty good story to tell, that is an unfinished story.

That story is going to continue because we are not done yet with seeing how we can reduce to lower numbers that we are today.

We want to talk also about the global, non-proliferation regime, not just CTBT, but fissile material cut-off. Quite frankly, it continues to be our view that India and indeed Pakistan -- we'll talk to them about these issues too -- their security concerns can be better met within an international regime which says no more nuclear testing and no more production of fissible material. We think that is a better regime to be a part of than to be outside of.

I just want to make one comment. Obviously, we care a lot about those issues. The United States government is clear about its concern about these issues. But one of the objectives of this process that we are about to embark upon is to move beyond those issues and reach other topics so that the relationship isn't as nuclear centric today as it may have been in the past.

Is Kashmir going to be one of the subjects, and it is certainly not going to be the central issue. Would you clarify that?

I think the clarification is relatively straightforward. We have made it clear in every possible way that the United States is not going to mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan, that we 'do not seek to interfere' were the words that President Clinton used in New York.

The issue of Kashmir is clearly one that is central to the current Indo-Pak dialogue. It is the one, as we all know, that is the stumbling block, at this stage, to the progress being made in the third round of the Indo-Pak talks. It is that sense that it is central. The two parties understand that it is central. But it is not something that will be a centerpiece of our discussions, either with Undersecretary Pickering's' visit or with -- Secretary Albright's or with President Clinton's. We have only said that we will be willing to assist in this if asked by both parties.

But one only has to read the newspapers to see that the issue right now that is providing most difficulty in moving ahead in the Indo-Pak dialogue is Kashmir. This is simply a fact. And I think that is the context in which any reference to 'central' would be. But it is certainly not going to be the central part of the discussion that will be taking place in the next few days, with Undersecretary Pickering's visit there.

When you raise the issue of Kashmir with the Indians, do you raise it in terms of human rights or otherwise?

We raise the issue of Kashmir in the context of the Indo-Pak talks. And our view on Kashmir is oft-stated and well known by both parties. We think that they need time and space to deal with this along the lines of the commitment that the two prime ministers have made. So that's where we are right now.

But every year you come down very hard on them in your human rights report. I have been there several times myself and I'd say it is rather astonishing the level of abuse that goes on there, officially sanctioned abuse. And I would think given your -- this administration's stand on human rights, you would have something a little more substantive to say about it, either in private or in an anonymous session like this.

We will be issuing our human rights reports annually, as we always do.

Again, our view right now is the best way to see progress on that issue is for the parties themselves to deal with it, as they are attempting to do and as we are encouraging them to do.

This secretary of state is unusually well-informed about this issue, and she takes a historic interest and an intellectual interest in the Kashmir problem that dates from her father's activities and his book on the subject. And so I think it's fair to say that she has an unusual interest in this subject; will probably, in the course of events, talk about it with representatives of both governments. And I would predict that it covers all the range of issues, including that concern. There's no way you cannot raise that concern when talking about it.

So that's all I would say about it, that the secretary of state is an academic, and she has an intellectual interest in it, and it's one of the unsolved crisis of the post-war period.

Does she plan to go to Kashmir?

I haven't discussed that with her. I don't know.

Is she perceived as being anti-India, based on her father's criticism of Indian policy in March 1957?

Not by me!

In India...

I don't know. You'll have to ask the Indians.