The Rediff Special/Kanti Bajpai

The US has finally accorded India its due

The scorecard on Prime Minister Inder Gujral's visit to the US will only become clear with time. At first blush, though, there would seem to have been only gains. These gains are not dramatic. They are difficult to describe in strictly material terms. But they are not insignificant. Five are crucial.

First, in spite of some shrill voices raised at home, the prime minister actually met President Clinton -- and this after Mr Gujral's own initial reluctance. Good diplomatic sense finally prevailed. In addition, Mr Gujral's fortnight statement on nationalism not being coterminous with anti-Americanism is something that should have been said a long time ago and is a refreshing counter to chose who reflexively equate the two.

Second, on the US side, it seems clear that Washington has perceptibly ratcheted up the relationship with India. It is at least trying to do so. In the Clinton administration, there have been at least four high level contacts between the two sides: the Rao-Clinton meeting, Mrs Clinton's first visit to India, her trip to Calcutta on the occasion of Mother Teresa's death, and Gujral's summit with Clinton. If the US president makes an official visit to India next year or the year after, that will make five high level exchanges since 1992.

Secretary of State Albright and others are slated to come before the presidential visit. It is doubtful that the US and India have ever had such contact. The effect of these visits is somewhat ineffable, but one gain is that they are getting public opinion in India accustomed to confabulations with America. Another gain is the signal that India is being accorded its due, that regular high level exchanges with it are normal diplomacy of the US, as is the case with Washington's interactions with China or Russia or Japan.

Third, while there were no breakthroughs (none were expected) at either the personal or political level, there were no snafus of any consequence -- which is a gain of sorts! There was no repeat of the disastrous Nehru-Kennedy meeting of 1961. Gujral is not Nehru and Clinton is not Kennedy, but the difference in age and temperament are reminiscent of Nehru-Kennedy. Yet at a personal level, the Gujral-Clinton session seems to have avoided any damage. Politically, too, there do not appear to have been any serious post-talks differences in interpretation.

Fourth, something was gained in terms of India's candidacy for the UN Security Council seat. Mr Gujral's speech in the UN surely has left no doubt that India is in the fray for Permanent Membership. There has been some doubt as to whether and how strongly New Delhi would enter the contest. Some have argued that India can't win, especially without US endorsement, that the price of American support was too high, and that it was therefore not worth throwing India's hat into the ring. The visit came at a crucial moment.

As a result of his face-to-face meeting with Mr Clinton, Mr Gujral will surely have got a better and more direct appreciation of US thinking, one that is not simply mediated through the ministry of external affairs which is quite divided on the issue of whether to campaign for the seat or not.

Mr Gujral helped India's UN case by making two key moves. His first move was to state unequivocally on American soil that India had no plans to go nuclear. This will help disarm those in the US who oppose India's case for a UN seat. His second move was meeting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief of Pakistan, and, in spite of sniping by Sharief, resolutely avoiding a public spat with him. The latter is vital, because a significant section of US opinion feels that India's road to the UN seat lies through Islamabad.

Mr Gujral's measured and responsible speech in the General Assembly combined with his willingness to meet Nawaz Sharief showed that India is capable of rising above the petty subcontinental politics which have been so enervating for the UN for five decades. This will make it more difficult for Pakistan to mount a credible anti-India campaign.

Incidentally, the firing along the India-Pakistan border, must be seen in this context. Islamabad very much wants to stir things up along the border in order to sabotage India's chance at the UN. It may well be Pakistan's last roll of the dice.

Fifth, Mr Gujral indicated a new Indian sensibility in foreign policy. By stating that India would not make the bomb (even though it would keep its option open), by agreeing publicly to join the US in an ongoing dialogue on nuclear issues, and by sticking with the talks with Pakistan, he made three key gestures towards Washington's concerns.

In return, he expects at least three things. He would like the US to refrain from publicly criticising India on its nuclear programme, its CTBT stand, its approach to the fissile material cut-off talks. At the same time, he would like US involvement in fixing India's ailing and inefficient nuclear industry. He also wants US technology controls to be eased.

Dealmaking can be a completely cynical and unprincipled business. But it need not be so. There are deals and then there are deals, as Americans would say! Accommodation and flexibility within an overall strategic plan is good sense and morally defensible.

Perhaps the most important thing Mr Gujral has done is to implicitly signal to both the US and the Indian public that a foreign policy which is more alert than in the past to swaps and exchanges is on the anvil. This does not mean selling Indian interests for a pot or two of gold; rather it is responsible behaviour in a complex and difficult world with new challenges and opportunities.

Dr Kanti Bajpai teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

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