The ATC institutional shortcomings, including the single air corridor, absence of secondary radar and only 1,000 feet being maintained as separation minima.
Spahn said the Airports Authority of India's contention that International Civil Aviation Organisation standards were 'sufficient to ensure safe, efficient and smooth flow of air traffic,' was not correct since these standards were not accurate.
He said the popular press was filled with stories of many near misses at the Indira Gandhi international airport. These near misses have reportedly involved airplanes from many different countries, he stated. He said the combination of problems at the IGI airport have obviously not produced a safe flying environment. ''The airports here are not as safe as they should be,'' he added.
He said though the airport has reportedly increased the vertical separation to 2,000 feet, opened a second air corridor to the west of New Delhi and accelerated plans to install secondary radar, it was too late to save those who died in the collision.
As the Kazakh government has noted, the Delhi ATC's failure to advise the IL-76 crew of the Saudi aircraft approaching until just 68 seconds before the collision and the failure to warn them that there was just 1,000 feet separating the aircraft, prevented the Kazakh aircraft from using its weather radar to spot the Saudi Boeing.
The AAI had argued that the 1,000 feet separation was routine and that there was no reason to warn either aircraft of the small gap between them because it would have interfered with the work of the busy crew.
If this were true, Spahn asked, why had the Delhi approach and Delhi west controllers discussed the crossing of the Saudi and the Kazakh aircraft more than sixteen minutes before the collision, even before the Saudi aircraft took off. He pointed out that, ten minutes later, the matter was broached again.
If information about such aircraft was routine, why did Delhi approach specifically advise the Kazakh aircraft that the Saudi jumbo was approaching just 68 seconds before the collision; also, why did Delhi approach direct the Kazakh aircraft crew to report on the presence of the Saudi aircraft during what the AAI described as a "busy" and "onerous" time for the crew, the Kazakh counsel asked.
An American aircraft flying close had seen that both aircraft were in a thick cloud when the collision occurred, he said. One of these pilot's affidavits indicated that it was a cumulus cloud, which is often turbulent, he said, also pointing out that another affidavit described the cloud as quite large.
This affidavit was significant because it appeared that the Kazakh aircraft was flying near the top of the clouds -- where most turbulence occurs, he contended.
Besides, the Air Accidents Investigations Bureau report also indicated the existence of a cloud. The report concludes that "both aircraft faced increased turbulence levels just before the collision," the Kazakh government counsel said.
He rejected criticism that the radioman -- the only crewman to communicate with the ATC -- had not translated the ATC's statements into Russian because all the crewmen understood English.
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