The Rediff Special / J N Dixit
The armed forces have assumed the responsibility
of managing Pakistan's political crises and ensuring the
country's stability
Pakistan's military establishment had sought such a role since
Zia-ul Haq's times. But it was inhibited about pushing through
a decision in this regard due to the emotive fervour for democracy
amongst the people of Pakistan at the end of Zia's long military
rule and also due to two other reasons.
First, American friends
of the military establishment advised them to encourage this facade
of democracy while retaining real power. Secondly, the Pakistani military
leadership itself, having experienced the controversies and burdens
of direct political governance, did not wish to be enmeshed in
them again. General Aslam Beg, however, asserted as early as in
1990 that the Pakistani armed forces had a supra-governmental
role of defending not just the territorial integrity, but the
stability and the ideology of Pakistan beyond the procedural and
institutional stipulations of the existing Pakistani constitution.
Beg's successors, Janjua and Kakkar, wanted the creation of such
a council. Kakkar almost succeeded; with Benazir's increasing
dependence on the Pakistani army, to manage the disturbances in
Sindh and in operations in Punjab and Baluchistan. It was Benazir
who suggested the creation of such a council late in 1995 and
early in 1996 to defuse the impression of her not getting along
with the Pakistan armed forces and establishment gaining ground.
The profound instability and uncertainties affecting Pakistan
due to Benazir's mismanagement of affairs obviously persuaded
amry chief Jehangir Karamat to indicate to Leghari that
if he desired to stabilise the situation in Pakistan and remain
in control, the army had to be given a legitimised institutional
role in governance.
It would not be an inaccurate speculation
that Leghari must have consulted senior members of Pakistan's
supreme court, the US government and senior civil servants apart
from acting prime minister Miraj Khalid and General Karmat before
creating this council. It is interesting that despite the passage
of a fortnight since Leghari's decision to create the council,
no political party or leader in Pakistan has challenged the constitutional
validity of the armed forces being given such a role, in the Supreme
Court.
There has been criticism of the decision by the major political
parties -- Benazir's faction of the PPP and Nawaz Sharief's Muslim
League -- but their criticism has been muted. Significantly, none
of the political parties have criticised the armed forces. The
criticism has been directed only at Leghari, accusing him of political
motivation and hunger for power.
Implications of the creation of the CDNS for Pakistan would be substantive and long term. First,
the council, dominated by the armed forces, will function as a
super-cabinet, operating in tandem with the president exercising
greater authority than the elected government.
Secondly, the armed
forces now stand institutionally entrenched in the Pakistani power
structure from which it would be difficult to remove it.
Third,
the importance of electoral politics and the party system will
diminish even if Pakistan remains a democracy with a parliamentary
form of government in cosmetic terms.
Fourth, the influence of
the armed forces on foreign policy, defence policy and the economic
management of Pakistan stands revived and it will increase without
being subject to democratic monitoring.
And finally, the Pakistani
army establishment would have acquired a role which Zia-ul Haq
conceived and Aslam Beg articulated, that of being the supreme
symbol and implementor of the ideology of Pakistan, and protector
of its identity. These are the likely long-term ramifications.
In the short term, the armed forces have assumed the responsibility
of managing the political crises in Pakistan and ensuring the
country's stability.
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