The Rediff Special/Lt Gen Kuldeep Singh Brar (retd)
It is known fact that the US has, in its own way,
prevented transfer of nuclear technology to India, but this has
perhaps proved to be a silver lining for India as it has had to
achieve self reliance on its own; after all, we have the raw materials,
a well developed R&D organisation, as well as the necessary
talent and expertise in this field and do not need to seek outside
assistance as in the case of Pakistan.
If that be so, what is
stopping us? Besides, the proponents of the second view feel that
we can ill afford to wait till we have lost millions of people
in cities such as Bombay, Delhi and Ahmedabad, before we embark
on demolishing the perpetrator of the crime. It would be too late
and the country would, by then, be in the grip of severe panic.
They do not suggest that the missiles be deployed in their hides
as doing so would, obviously, invite destruction even before the
outbreak of hostilities through pre-emptive strikes or sabotage,
but at least they must be in a state of readiness to be moved to
their battle locations much earlier than the time frame which
seems acceptable to those of the former view; and this can only
be possible if we advance from the status of a 'nuclear capable
'to a' nuclear weapon' State before a nation such as Pakistan
decides to call our bluff or even gets emboldened enough to start
a nuclear exchange, as a result of misinformation on our actual
capabilities.
What, however, is a common factor between both viewpoints is that
we need to address ourselves with the urgency of the hour to the
connected organisational and functional aspects which need to
be put into gear. Manoj Joshi, in his article on the subject has
already deliberated on some of these and so has Brahma Chellaney,
a journalist, in one of his recent articles in The Times of India.
To club these together, and add a few more, I feel the government
needs to address itself to the following if India is to achieve
a worthwhile degree of nuclear deterrence:
- Come out with a transparent and unambiguous nuclear policy
and make its intentions known of going ahead in achieving a 'nuclear
weapon State' capability rather than dilly-dallying on aspects
such as putting the Agni project on hold one day and reviving
it some months later. Such actions are demoralising for both the
scientists involved and the armed forces.
- Simultaneously, continue with its efforts towards global
de-nuclearisation and total elimination of nuclear weapons and
arsenals. Additionally, declare its resolve and give an assurance
to the world community on a 'no first strike' commitment. This
should evoke a similar response from Pakistan and China, hopefully.
- Creation of an awareness at the highest levels in government
that a subject such as this can not be dealt with by others than
those with expertise at the decision-making as well as the advisory
levels. This would imply the formation of a National Security
Council without further delay and, alongside, an advisory body
of experts drawn from a panel of bureaucrats, scientists, military
analysts, and senior officers of the armed forces (both, serving
and retired). There is a need to have a closely integrated civilian-defence
action group working together rather than the 'veil of secrecy'
that presently exists.
- The setting up of a National Command Authority which
would take appropriate and crucial decisions at the moment of
crisis. The NCA must be duplicated to be able to act in the event
of an emergency situation such as a major catastrophe wherein
the actual NCA is no longer functional.
As a corollary to the above, a number of well dispersed, underground,
fully secure Operations Rooms must be prepared and provided with
modern, sophisticated communications so that, in the event of
a surprise nuclear strike, these act as National Command Posts.
Clearcut authority will also need to be delegated to those
manning the NCP for ordering nuclear retaliation, adhering to
the principle of graduated response, within acceptable limits,
and standing operating procedures will need to be laid
down the chain of command.
There will be some critics who will argue that there is no need
for any of the above and ask 'What is wrong with the existing
system wherein the Cabinet Committee of Political Affairs
already exists as the highest policy-making body at the time of
a crisis?' My simple answer to them is that the CCPA has neither
the time nor the expertise to give their valuable time to this issue
as they have hundreds of other issues to look into, many of which
are mundane and routine in nature, and far removed from the subject
discussed here.
In writing this article, my aim is not to promote a
hawkish attitude but to face the realities of the situation so
that the nation is not once again caught off guard, as happened
in 1962. Whereas every effort needs to be made to improve relations
with our neighbours and to 'preserve peace rather than promote
war', India can ill afford to ignore its national interests and
security threats and it is high time that an issue of this importance
is given due weightage and opened to debate by the media, rather
than concentrating on issues such as 'scams' and political in-fighting.
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