Pakistan has approximately 60 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, although the figure could be higher, according to a report by the Congressional Research Service.
The CRS, which is the research arm of the United States Congress, made the observations in its latest report on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.
The report has been authored by two of CRS's nuclear nonproliferation specialists -- Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. The report states that Pakistan "continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles -- steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad's nuclear arsenal."
The two analysts said "Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 US-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear."
But it argued that in the absence of Islamabad's public, detailed nuclear doctrine, its 'minimum credible deterrent was widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action'.
On March 10, 2009, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Maples told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapons stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems."
This was reiterated by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who said at a May 14 Congressional hearing that there is 'evidence' that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal.
The CRS analysts, in the report prepared for US lawmakers, who periodically call for such studies when they have concerns or want in-depth information of a particular issue or programme, seemed to debunk the contention by Pakistani officials that Islamabad has already determined the arsenal size needed for minimum nuclear deterrence and that they will not engage in an arms race with India.
The report said, "Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India's nuclear arsenal," and that it is likely that "Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts."
According to the authors, while India had stated that it needs only a 'credible minimum deterrent,' New Delhi "has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."
The report points out that "furthermore, both the agreement and associated 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to exempt India from some of its export guidelines will renew New Delhi's access to the international uranium markets."
The CRS analysts have made the same point that several nonproliferation experts, including Robert Einhorn, who is now the top nonproliferation adviser to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Gary Samore, the nonproliferation czar at the White House National Security Council made when they worked feverishly to scuttle the US-India nuclear deal. "This access will result in more indigenous Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India's newly safeguarded reactors."
The report said that "in addition to making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons."
For example, it cited Peter Lavoy, now deputy director of National Intelligence for Analysis in the Obama Administration, who two years ago had argued that India's efforts to improve its conventional military capabilities could enable New Delhi to achieve 'technical superiority' in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as precision targeting, providing India with 'the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan.'
According to Lavoy, this could result in Pakistan responding by 'lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons.'
The CRS report also informed the lawmakers that in terms of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, besides the surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistani army, it was widely believed that the US-provided F-16 fighter aircraft to the Pakistani ar force had been modified to be able to deliver nuclear weapons.
It said that although concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia, "the US government maintains that the sales of additional F-16s to Pakistan will neither affect the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology as this level of capability or higher already exists in other countries in the region."
The Defense Security and Cooperation Agency of the Pentagon has also justified the sale of F-16s to Pakistan saying "release of these systems would not significantly reduce India's quantitative or qualitative military advantage."
The report also addressed the plethora of concerns expressed by members of the Congress regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and related material and the danger of it getting into the hands of terrorists, particularly after the nuclear black-market proliferation by eminent scientist A Q Khan.
Kerr and Nikitin acknowledged in their study that "a number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programmes have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent year."
But they pointed out that "instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question," and noted how observers "fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls."
"While US and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards," the analysts predicted.
The report cited Mullen's concern about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons during a speech over a year ago. "Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan," Mullen said, "I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern."
The report cited similar concerns by General David H Petraeus, Commander US Central Command, who in hid testimony before the Congress less than a year ago, said, "Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organisations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks."
It also said that Leon Panetta, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also had acknowledged in a speech in May that the United States does not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons-related sites, while Mullen had stated, 'We're limited in what we actually know".
Thus, the report said, "The main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders."
