'They are not abandoning their ideology. They now believe it is better to pursue their goals through the Constitution rather than from the barrel of a gun -- even if the ideology itself remains intact.'
'Maoists are beginning to grapple with the young population's understanding of our country that they can actually get things done through the democratic process, through constitutional means. That, for us, is the biggest win.'

Key Points
- 'In an intelligence operation the work should be done quietly; only the work should make the sound -- not the people. Never the people.'
- 'The first thing is the intellectual engagement -- the kind they expect and respect. Devuji is an intellectual.'
- 'It was not simply a police success that they could not regain their control over the people here.'
When Thippiri Tirupati -- better known in Maoist circles as Devuji -- walked out of the forests last month, it was the kind of moment that intelligence officials rarely speak about publicly. Devuji was no ordinary cadre.
As the military chief of the CPI (Maoist), he oversaw a movement that, at its height, drew on roughly 70,000 cadres spread across several Left Wing Extremism-affected states.
His surrender came amid a wider, unmistakable pattern of attrition: Senior Maoists have been laying down arms with growing frequency across Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Odisha, as a combination of security pressure, targeted surrenders, and years of state-driven development has steadily hollowed out the movement's operational strength.
It was Badugula Sumathi, chief of the Telangana police's Special Intelligence Branch, who quietly orchestrated Devuji's exit -- a process that, she says, took more than two years of careful, disciplined engagement.
In this interview with Prasanna D Zore/Rediff, the Indian Police Service officer speaks about the reasons why one of the most ideologically committed Maoists surrendered.
'It has been a very, very difficult task'
How long did it take to convince Devuji? How difficult was it, and how did you overcome the challenges?
It is a statecraft -- an intelligence craft -- and the methods cannot be disclosed. But yes, it has been a very, very difficult task. That much I can say.
Negotiations of this nature are long-term. How long was this in the works?
More than two years. We had to understand his psyche -- what he was doing, how he was organising things, what kind of activities he had carried out. Only then could we move ahead.
Negotiations of this nature require enormous patience. How did your team sustain trust and dialogue over such a prolonged period?
The first thing is the intellectual engagement -- the kind they expect and respect. Devuji is an intellectual. He was also the military chief of a banned organisation with roughly 70,000 cadres spread across several states. And if you include the part-time cadres, the numbers go even further.
He rose from the Radical Students Union (formed in the 1970s in the undivided Andhra Pradesh), and he is not the sort who keeps one foot outside the party. He was wholly inside it -- a deeply committed (Maoist) cadre. That is precisely what made this (surrender) so difficult. I cannot say more than that.
His surrender has been described as historic. From your perspective, what does this moment signify for the Maoist movement in an ideological sense?
They are not abandoning their ideology. That has to be understood clearly. He is not negating Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
What they have come to realise is that operating from deep forests, with weapons, has made them unable to engage with the communication revolution that is happening all around them. And that very communication revolution is what they would need if they want to propagate their ideology at all -- their old methods of secrecy and using the barrel of the gun cannot survive in a democratic country.
More than that, they are beginning to grapple with this young population's understanding of our country -- they have perhaps realised that the aspirations of today's youth are so different (than the world view of the Maoists) that they can actually get things done through the democratic process, through constitutional means.
That, for us, is the biggest win. They now believe it is better to pursue their goals through the Constitution rather than from the barrel of a gun -- even if the ideology itself remains intact.
With Ganpati now the only major Maoist leader still underground, how do you see Devuji's surrender reshaping the psychological landscape of the movement?
Denial -- that is the first effect. Devuji had been out of the party's inner circle for a long time. Technically, there was a period when he could have been declared general secretary, had he secured the support of three or four politburo members. He was the most prospective candidate.
That this man has surrendered will cause significant disorientation within whatever remains of the leadership.
'Ideologically, these people are deeply committed'
Did Devuji surrender because he was convinced about his personal safety -- that he would not be harmed in an encounter?
No, no. He was ideologically prepared. That is what I am saying. Ideologically, these people are deeply committed. Physical fear alone cannot explain a surrender of this nature. It was a deeper reckoning than that. But I cannot speak to the specifics of the engagement.
Operations like this are rarely the work of one person. How important was the collective effort -- your team, other institutions, perhaps even local communities?
This I will say clearly. In an intelligence operation the work should be done quietly; only the work should make the sound -- not the people. Never the people.
This state has had a very well-established, time-tested LWE policy since 1998. I am not a singular factor in this. I am one part of something much larger that has been built over decades.
To get out a leader (with the ideological commitment of Devuji's to surrender) of this stature out requires a certain set of qualities.
First, a deep understanding of the ideology (of the Maoist movement).
Second, an understanding of the movement and its philosophy.
Third, an appreciation of how this leadership rose through the ranks and file, what impact it had, and how you can penetrate that through tact. All of that takes enormous professionalism. Nothing else.
'He has committed to working as a citizen of India which means he will abide by the Constitution'
Did Devuji and those who surrendered with him take an oath to the Constitution? Are they formally committing to joing the mainstream?
He has committed to working through legal means as a citizen of India which means he will abide by the Constitution of India. He has also said he will not remain in isolation -- he intends to be politically active. As for intelligence agencies, they will continue to do their work. That is simply how it functions.
There are reports from Maharashtra that Sonu may contest elections. Is Devuji considering something similar?
I cannot speak on their behalf -- not for Devuji, not for anyone else. He will be free like any other citizen. Chandranna (Pulluri Prasad Rao, alias Chandranna, a top CPI (Maoist) Central Committee member and key logistics leader, surrendered to the Telangana police on October 28, 2025, after 45 years underground) lives freely at his own place.
Intelligence agencies cannot keep physical tabs on everyone permanently; you have to find your own ways of understanding and monitoring. That is the nature of the work.
You have overseen the surrender of more than 591 Maoists over the last two years. How has this experience shaped your understanding of conflict resolution and the human dimension behind a long-running insurgency like this -- one that now seems to be on its last legs?
If you look at this movement in the context of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana -- from where I come -- it survived for two main reasons. One was the rise of an intellectual class that stood with people who had a questioning spirit. In this part of the country, the questioning spirit is very naturally embedded.
When the peasantry raised its voice against various atrocities, educated people from here (the undivided Andhra Pradesh) stood beside them, understood these as social questions that demanded action, and adopted MLM (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) as their framework for addressing them.
Now, how did this conflict effectively end in Telangana by 2006 -- when it was largely dismantled and they could not regain a foothold? It was not simply a police success that they could not regain their control over the people here. That is important to say.
Policing and intelligence played a role, but the bigger story was the saturation of development in these areas, understanding the rights of the people and political consciousness among the people here (undivided Andhra Pradesh).
Sweeping reforms in Andhra Pradesh like reservation for women in panchayats, the tribal battalion, connecting every hamlet and village with roads -- even very small settlements were constituted as separate panchayats.
Voting improved, women had power, and the political process genuinely began to function in places where it had never functioned before.
When that happens -- when development reaches saturation -- the police State naturally recedes. We moved to the background and let the process work.
It was a combination of political will, bureaucratic leadership, and a genuine socio-cultural understanding of the people of this region. That combination, if replicated in the remaining struggle areas, will do what force alone never could.
For all these years it has been Telugu leadership going into those areas and trying to improve lives through a borrowed ideology. What you will see now -- and this is something I believe strongly -- is leadership emerging from within these communities, from the tribal communities themselves.
Their own people in positions of political awareness and power will ultimately address their issues far better than any outsider ever could.







