'Tensions and dialogue are likely to go hand-in-hand with China.'
'The goal should be to cultivate power so that one can negotiate from a position of strength.'
"The events of 2020 added greater impetus to India's deepening engagement with the US, Japan, France, and Australia. The evolution of the Quad since April 2020 is a case in point. So while Beijing did somewhat gain tactically, it seems to have lost ground strategically," points out Manoj Kewalramani, author of Smokeless War - China's Quest for Geopolitical Dominance and a leading Indian observer of Chinese politics, foreign policy and approaches to new technologies.
"Competition and volatility have become the defining characteristics of the India-China relationship, and this state of affairs is likely to persist for some time to come," he says in the concluding part of his interview with Rediff.com's Archana Masih on what lies ahead for India-China ties.
- Part 1 of the Interview: 'Modi-Xi Meeting In Kazan Won't Solve Ladakh Standoff'
What did China intend to gain by initiating the military standoff in Ladakh in 2020? And has it achieved anything?
That's a really difficult question to answer because Beijing has never really clarified its objectives. I think one obvious goal was to retard the development of Indian infrastructure.
If you recall, immediately after the Galwan Valley clash, the Chinese side accused (external link) the Indian side of 'unilaterally and continuously' building roads, bridges and other facilities. It had added that China had 'lodged representations and protests on multiple occasions but India has gone even further to cross the LAC and made provocations.'
To a certain extent, I would argue that Beijing has stymied Indian infrastructure development in the region. In addition, the increased threat perception with regard to the land boundary with China also places significant strain on Indian resources.
There are difficult decisions to make in terms of allocation and strategic focus.
But in doing so, it has reinforced the view that China is India's principal adversary. For instance, former Army chief General M M Naravane is on record (external link), saying that the PLA's aggression in Eastern Ladakh was 'not a bad thing', as it forced India from 'shying away from calling out China as the No. 1 threat.'
Consequently, there is a greater policy push across the Indian national security establishment to bridge the asymmetry in capabilities along the boundary with China.
The events of 2020 also added greater impetus to India's deepening engagement with the US, Japan, France, and Australia. The evolution of the Quad since April 2020 is a case in point.
So while Beijing did somewhat gain tactically, it seems to have lost ground strategically.
How have these four-and-a-half years pushed India-China relations backwards? Considering the trust deficit even if a reset were to take place, how long would it take to cover lost ground in terms of getting the relations on even keel?
If you look at my earlier response to the question of normalisation, that addresses the first part of your question.
On the issue of a reset, look, I am of the view that competition and volatility have become the defining characteristics of the India-China relationship, and this state of affairs is likely to persist for some time to come.
In the near term, however, I do not think that we should be expecting stability and predictability. There are three structural factors behind this.
First, both countries are rising powers. Over the past three decades, India and China have witnessed simultaneous expansion in their respective interests and capabilities. This has led to greater friction with regard to legacy issues, such as the land boundary, and new domains, such as the Indian Ocean Region, Taiwan or the South China Sea.
Second, while both countries have experienced a simultaneous rise, the pace of this growth has been sharply uneven, favouring China. Consequently, structurally, there now exists a deep power asymmetry between the two countries. This gap is unlikely to be bridged anytime soon. Coupled with this, Beijing's self-perception as a major power, greater risk-tolerance with regard to use of force and efforts to build a new Asian order add to volatility in ties with India.
Finally, the nature of Sino-US strategic competition impacts India-China ties. China increasingly views the world through the prism of its competition with the US. This often strips other actors of agency.
In other words, it is increasingly viewing India as an extension of American power in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at containing China's rise. Its approach to India in this regard has been to inhibit its rise and use coercion to achieve acquiescence to China's primacy.
This has instead resulted in India seeking a deeper relationship with the US, which in turn further fuels Beijing's anxieties. Breaking this cycle requires China to accept that Asia's future lies in multipolarity.
Given all this, in order to arrive at some sort of a new modus vivendi, India must work to significantly expand capabilities while engaging with China. One cannot wish away a geographic neighbour, particularly one that is a key driver of the global economy. This will be a long-drawn process, as I have argued in a recent paper (external link).
What lessons, in your opinion, has India learnt from this standoff?
There are four lessons that I would draw.
First, we need to sustain high rates of economic growth. A slowing economy or a shift in paradigm away from growth to redistribution will adversely impact the ability to channelise resources that are essential to cultivating national power.
Second, India needs to expand and better allocate its defence spending and streamline the acquisitions process. Enhancing firepower and deterrence capabilities are critical given the heightened threats.
Third, tensions and dialogue are likely to go hand-in-hand with China. The goal should be to cultivate power so that one can negotiate from a position of strength.
Fourth, assuaging Beijing's anxieties about the US or India's other external engagements should not be the goal of Indian policy. Instead, Indian policy should focus on leveraging external partnerships to build strength across domains. This can help shift the calculus of relative balance of power vis-a-vis China.
China has violated key bilateral agreements with India and as former foreign secretary Shyam Saran pointed out that China has watered down past agreements with India since 2012, keeping that in view, can India trust China?
I don't think this is an issue of trust. For guarantees on paper to be adhered to, they need to be backed by force and modalities for dialogue. That's what Indian policy should focus on.
What is your assessment of India-China relations in the short term?
We are living through a phase of intense turbulence not just in the global order but also in the India-China dyad. So my short-term prognosis is that we should expect ties to remain deeply strained for the foreseeable future.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff.com
