'India And China Have Arrived At A Nash Equilibrium'

'The Chinese military cannot advance much in Ladakh, even if they want to.'
'Similarly, in Arunachal Pradesh, they can rename a village or two, intrude here or there, but cannot do much more realistically.'

The BRICS Summit comes at a crucial time when India is managing a delicate balancing act in its relations with the United States on one side and China on the other.

Lending weight to the summit is the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinpiang. This is Xi's first visit to India since 2019, following the Galwan clashes that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel.

BRICS, which was formed in 2006, with its first summit taking place in 2009, initially consisted of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the first letters of the names lending itself to the organisation's name).

Over the intervening years, BRICS has expanded to include, besides the original five, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Kanti Bajpai, professor at Ashoka University, Sonepat, and professor emeritus at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, authored the book, India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends and has written numerous articles on India's foreign policy and global relations.

Dr Bajpai spoke with Rediff Senior Contributor Amberish K Diwanji on the BRICS Summit, India's foreign relations, and Xi's visit to India.

What can we expect from the BRICS Summit? Or should we simply not have too many expectations?

There is little to really expect because BRICS summits are just performances. No one really expects anything other than boiler plate statements.

But the point to note is that the summit is taking place and it does send a message to America; that there is safety in numbers.

The summit taking place lets everyone, especially the Americans, know that Washington DC should not take either China or India, or any other member country, for granted.

But beyond that, it is difficult to think of one actual achievement of BRICS since it was set up.

Are you saying that BRICS is at a dead end?

One positive outcome of BRICS is that trade has grown, but here also, the fact is that the growth is largely with one single country: China. Everyone within BRICS is trading more with China.

If there is one gain in which BRICS has achieved some success, it is in the agreement to trade in their local currencies and fast-payments across borders, for the countries to pay for their trade in their own currency.

This kind of payment between members is positive, and reduces the dependence on the US dollar. But again, one must be careful in this move towards de-dollarisation.

One doesn't want to incur the wrath of Washington and get into more trouble. India has tried to slow down BRICS, particularly on this de-dollarisation move and most of all has opposed a BRICS currency.

You said BRICS has achieved little. What went wrong?

I think BRICS has become too large, and thus incoherent. China wanted expansion and pushed ahead with it. To be fair, New Delhi was right in hesitating, and in seeking to make haste slowly.

But Beijing pushed for expansion, it was supported by many of the other members, and in doing so, they brought themselves and BRICS incoherence. To put it bluntly, it was a foolish move!

Now we have so many members at odds with each other. When BRICS started, there was already India and China, two countries that had major disagreements and differences with each other.

We have Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of whom are at war with each other, we have the United Arab Emirates that has difficulties with other Gulf States and in particular Iran. So now BRICS has even more internal troubles.

India will face difficulties when New Delhi tries to reconcile the joint statement with all the other countries and their different perspectives (at the conclusion of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi).

What about India parlaying with Iran and China on one side, but also seeking to grow our ties with the US? Is this a bit of an overstretch?

The stretching metaphor is good. We have a minuscule ministry of external affairs with about 900 officials, and then we are hosting all these big, splashy summits.

I don't think the MEA can cope with all the tasks on its plate. And then we have to cope with all these contradictions within the group quite apart from the summitry itself.

One of the biggest worries is the rumours swirling about of an upcoming US-Russia-China summit to resolve global issues. If that does happen, it would make BRICS a laughing stock and be another slap in the face of India.

We have already been sidelined in the Gulf, where the US turned to Pakistan as a mediator, which then roped in Saudi Arabia and Turkiye to broker a military alliance for the region and a regional mediating group.

US-India relations are no longer what they were. That makes a difference.

The US has changed the game. At a recent event, I had spoken about the 4 Cs that are of concern to the US today. They are:

i. Commerce: India simply cannot compensate for China when it comes to commerce with US. Our purchases from the US are not sufficient and our trade surplus has become a problem for the Americans.

ii. Computers chips: we are nowhere in this sector.

iii. Computer programming in AI, where again we matter little.

iv. Critical minerals, which India lacks and China has in abundance.

The fifth C would be containment. The US in longer interested in a diplomatic-military containing of China, which was what built the earlier US-India ties.

The fact is that we are not a major player in any geopolitical grouping. We are reaching out to the Canadians and the Europeans, but they are also grappling with degrees of strategic confusion.

BRICS is neither here nor there. It is merely miring us in contradictions.

Reports and analysis are saying that Xi's visit to India marks a reset. Does this mean that we have accept the territorial losses that we suffered during the Galwan clashes in eastern Ladakh?

India and China are talking about the gains of an early and substantial harvest on the border issue.

[Note: In talks between India and China in August 2026, the two sides released an 8-point outcome, reaffirming their commitment to peace and tranquillity, and said the two sides would 'advance discussions on an Early and Substantial Harvest of boundary delimitation and Border Management'. What this 'early harvest' means was left undefined.]

China and India have said the first task of the groups (involved in the border talks) would be to agree on their respective terms of reference. But we don't know what it will be.

I believe that India and China have arrived at a 'Nash equilibrium' in their relations with each other.

[A Nash equilibrium is a stable state in a game involving two or more players where no player has an incentive to change their chosen strategy, assuming that every other player keeps their strategy unchanged.]

Any further military or diplomatic moves by either India or China are not going to improve the situation.

Take Ladakh, for instance. The Chinese military cannot advance much in Ladakh, even if they want to.

Similarly, in Arunachal Pradesh, they can rename a village or two, intrude here or there, but cannot do much more realistically. Climate, terrain, and supply lines make it very difficult.

Likewise, we cannot change the Line of Actual Control militarily. In Arunachal, there is really no reason for India to do anything, except perhaps to reclaim the village of Longju (which was lost to China in 1962).

The Galwan clash and the loss of lives were an undeniable tragedy, and yes, China has taken a slice here and there, but in the scale of wars, it was very limited.

The same can be said about diplomatic negotiations -- after 45 years of talks, since 1981, neither side can persuade the other to give up anything substantial.

So, when we speak of 'early harvest', what exactly are we speaking about?

Both governments know that there is little prospect of any progress in the talks but it looks good on the world stage and it reminds the US that India and China could come together if Washington continues to press them.

But is this salami slicing a part of China's policy? They attack, slice of a bit of territory, then have talks while still holding territory.

What they do is certainly not nice. The Nash equilibrium is not to be accepted mechanically. There will be scraps, especially in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.

China also wants to remind everyone, including the US and India, that they are a big and powerful nation.

And if they can make trouble for India, the biggest country in Asia (after China), then what hope do others have? It sends a message to Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, all of whom have various territorial disputes with China.

One good reason to prick India occasionally in Ladakh and Arunachal is to remind everyone in Asia that they (China) are the biggest and everyone better watch out!

Coming back to BRICS, it is the economic realm that India and China can make a difference.

If (Prime Minister Narendra) Modi and Xi can wrap up a deal in critical minerals, API (active pharmaceutical ingredients), tunnel boring equipment, intermediate engineering goods, or even the return of Chinese engineers... that would be great.

I mean one doesn't expect them to make such an announcement at the BRICS Summit itself, but probably a few months later. You cannot upstage the other countries by making big bilateral announcements!

India still remains dependent on China for trade. How does that affect our strategic autonomy?

We have stood up to China on the big issues such as the border and relations with the US. We have not agreed to the border issues on their terms, we continue to have good relations with the US, and we are not a part of BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), though we are no longer criticising BRI.

On the whole, we have stood up to the Chinese (on strategic issues).

But on economic issues, we have given way. India cannot transcend middle level growth path without massive investments, intermediate capital goods, and key resources like critical minerals.

And the only reliable source at huge scale and the right price is China. No one else in the world. India's growth of 6% (of GDP) is not good enough and China is the only economic power that can get us out of the middle income situation.

We have to do business with China, especially since the US is now playing tough.

Any other factors at play?

Galwan and Doklam apart, let us remember that Modi has never been anti-China. He may have said things here and there as part of an election campaign, but as chief minister of Gujarat, he invited Chinese leaders and visited China.

He knows Chinese leaders more than any other Indian leaders present and past, including (Jawaharlal) Nehru.

Modi may not be an economist, but he understands that we cannot grow without China.

Let us also remember that at the Shangrila Dialogue (in 2018), he said India seeks an open Indo-Pacific that excludes no one. This was seen as holding out an olive branch to China.

There are concerns about China building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. The recent floods in Nepal have also raised concerns about the leverage that China may have.

The water dispute is very evocative in India. What happened in Nepal recently is extremely tragic, but there is no evidence so far that China caused it.

The issue is whether China informed Nepal, or owned up to the scale of the problem.

I believe the India-China water concern is an issue that has been exaggerated. The Indian government has publicly acknowledged that on the Brahmaputra river, most of the water comes from Indian sources such as feeder rivers or rains.

This idea that China can turn off a tap is not the case.

China is building new dams and it needs to be watched. Some flow may be lost, and China needs to acknowledge this. China is building a south to north water scheme, to draw water from its south to the north.

This is in three sectors -- the east, middle, and the west, which is the Brahmaputra sector. They have completed the eastern and middle.

The Brahmaputra work is the most difficult because of the nature of the terrain.

They have not made much progress. To divert water to the north would require them to first take the water uphill and then north, which is a huge engineering feat.

It is probably not possible, given China's engineering capabilities and in any case may not involve the Brahmaputra.

Having said that, there is no doubt that China should keep India informed of river projects, as India is the downstream state.

Just as India should inform Bangladesh or Pakistan, which are downstream to rivers from India.

Under international law, upstream states are entitled to do pretty much whatever they want with the water.

India has been reluctant to speak with Bangladesh and Pakistan; we should be careful that China doesn't behave in the same manner with us.

However, their recent statement is that they will continue to exchange information with us.

Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff