'BJP Will Have To Show It Can Govern Bengal Without...'

'...appearing culturally coercive or administratively vindictive.'
'If it governs as a conquering force, resistance will build.'

"The BJP is no longer an external challenger knocking at the gates of Bengal's political culture. It has crossed the threshold," explains Political Scientist Dr Uday Chandra.

Dr Chandra is a field researcher of politics and society and holds a MA, MPhil and PhD in political science from Yale University.

"The BJP turned everyday governance grievances into a Hindutva critique of TMC rule," Dr Chandra tells Rediff's Archana Masih in the concluding part of a two-part interview

• Part I: 'Tamil Nadu Has Produced Most Dramatic Political Debut'

Is Mamata Banerjee's defeat due to anti-incumbency, voter fatigue, corruption -- or religious mobilisation? How much do these factors overlap?

They overlap almost completely. It would be a mistake to separate anti-incumbency from religious mobilisation.

Voters angry about corruption did not necessarily become secular anti-TMC voters. Many were persuaded to see corruption, minority appeasement, political violence, infiltration, and institutional decay as part of the same problem.

That is the BJP's achievement. It turned everyday governance grievances into a Hindutva critique of TMC rule.

Mamata's welfare schemes retained support, especially among women and poorer voters, but welfare could not fully overcome fatigue with the local party structure.

Many voters may have valued Lakshmir Bhandar and other schemes, but they or their kin may have wanted to overturn the TMC's local networks.

This is not anti-incumbency versus Hindutva, but anti-incumbency through Hindutva. Governance-related grievances became religiously inflected. Religious mobilisation became credible because it attached itself to real grievances.

Does this herald an ideological shift in West Bengal -- one that will dominate the state for decades like the TMC and Left did?

It is definitely a major ideological shift, but I would caution against seeing it as a long-term, decades-long realignment yet.

Bengal has now clearly entered the age of competitive Hindutva. That is new. The BJP is no longer an external challenger knocking at the gates of Bengal's political culture. It has crossed the threshold.

It has shown that Hindu consolidation can win a state that once prided itself on linguistic, Left, and secular political traditions.

But whether this becomes a long-term ideological order depends on actual governance. The Left ruled for three decades because it built a social coalition alongside a local institutional order.

The TMC ruled because it combined welfare, Bengali identity, minority support, and a powerful party machine.

The BJP will now have to show that it can govern Bengal without appearing culturally coercive or administratively vindictive.

If it governs as a conquering force, resistance will build. If it adapts to Bengal's food habits, language, literary culture, religious pluralism and strong regional self-respect, it may create a durable new order.

What does the BJP's performance in Assam and Bengal mean for national politics?

It is a very significant rise. Assam and Bengal together show that the BJP has consolidated the eastern flank of Indian politics. That gives Modi and Shah a major recovery narrative after the 2024 Lok Sabha setback.

Nationally, this means three things.

First, the BJP can say that 2024 was not the beginning of decline.

Second, the Opposition loses one of its most combative regional anchors now with Mamata defeated.

Third, the BJP now has a model for expanding in culturally resistant regions: Combine welfare promises, anti-corruption rhetoric, Hindu consolidation, and institutional pressure.

It will also embolden the BJP ahead of future delimitation politics after 2027. Assam's delimitation and Bengal's SIR should be read as signs of how institutional processes can reshape political competition before voting even begins.

What does the road ahead look like for Mamata Banerjee? Can she recalibrate?

Mamata Banerjee remains one of India's most resilient politicians, but this defeat would be the most serious crisis of her career.

Her challenge is not only electoral; it is organisational and generational.

She will have to decide whether TMC remains a vehicle centred almost entirely on her personal authority or becomes a more institutionalised regional party.

The BJP has weakened the aura of inevitability around her. It has also exposed the limits of a regional party structure dependent on welfare delivery from above and local strongmen below.

Mamata can regain relevance, but only through a serious reset: Clean up local corruption, rebuild minority confidence without appearing trapped in defensive minority politics, recover Bengali cultural nationalism, and bring younger leadership forward.

She will also need to make TMC the defender of Bengal's social fabric without sounding merely anti-BJP.

Her instinct will be to fight. That is her strength. But this moment requires more than combativeness. It requires reconstruction.

Who will be the front runner for chief minister?

The obvious front runner, to my mind, is Suvendu Adhikari. He is Leader of the Opposition, he defeated Mamata Banerjee in Nandigram in 2021, and he has been the BJP's most visible Bengali face in the state.

But the BJP may still surprise us. It often chooses chief ministers based on caste, region, ideological reliability, and organisational utility rather than media visibility.

It could look for someone less polarising than Suvendu if it wants to reassure Bengal after a bitter election. It may also consider a woman, a leader from north Bengal, or someone with a cleaner administrative image.

Basically, if the BJP wants to project conquest, Suvendu is the natural choice. If it wants to project reconciliation, it may choose someone else.

Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff

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