'India's ties with Israel have to do with defence and general technology.'
'The war changes nothing in what India and Israel hope to get from the relationship.'
'It's not as though India will get significantly more benefits from Iran if India abandons Israel at this time.'

Key Points
- 'In the US, this war is important -- but not in the way outsiders assume. It's not dominating everyday attention.'
- 'Most Americans are far more focused on domestic issues, unless and until something hits them directly -- like fuel prices or troop deployments.'
- 'The US's tolerance for market disruption may be higher than Iran believes it to be.'
- 'The US will see further pressure on the dollar's primacy, with an at least temporarily depleted military having an amplifying effect on that.'
Dr K V Bapa Rao, a University of Southern California PhD in computer science and an IIT Madras alumnus, worked for about 35 years in computer science, in various capacities as software developer, US Department of Defense researcher, search technologist and computer science instructor at the University of Southern California and the California State University. He has lived in Los Angeles for decades.
Aside from his professional activities, Dr Rao has been a lifelong interested observer and student of India, the United States, and the overlapping space between them.
He has an abiding interest in bridging the knowledge and information gap between the West and grassroots India.
He has been involved in enrichment of education in rural schools in the Telugu states, and has authored computer science articles in Telugu, as well as literary articles, short stories and translations.
Dr Rao has published several articles examining Indian society and politics from his unique perspective, notably on outlookindia.com, and in India Currents published out of San Francisco.
In the 1990s, he co-hosted a regular India-focused radio program on KPFA, Berkeley.
"Even when the desired outcomes of a war are clearly defined, once a war starts, the outcomes are uncertain, there are unintended consequences, and the costs are too high all around," Dr Rao tells Rajeev Srinivasan in the first of a two-part interview:
From a US perspective, what is the real domestic impact of the Iran war -- are Americans obsessing over it, largely indifferent, or even able to locate Iran on a map?
In the US, this war is important -- but not in the way outsiders assume. It's not dominating everyday attention. Most Americans are far more focused on domestic issues, unless and until something hits them directly -- like fuel prices or troop deployments.
There's also a deeper pattern: The US engages intensely at the policy level, but unevenly at the public level. That creates a kind of disconnect -- decisions with global consequences, but limited sustained public scrutiny.
In policy and political circles, there is a complex and often vituperative partisan debate going on about the merits of the war, including the place of what are portrayed as Jewish interests in American policymaking.
What is the endgame of the war? Will it drag on indefinitely, or is there a viable off-ramp -- and could a neutral third party like India broker a negotiated settlement?
The idea of an 'off-ramp' depends on whether the major players see more risk in continuing than in pausing. That's not entirely obvious yet, though it must be said that the US administration is very sensitive to the impact on the markets and Iran knows it.
But the costs and risks to the US and beyond of the US unilaterally declaring an end to the war are very high. Not excluding Iran deciding to exit the NPT and become a nuclear power as North Korea did.
So I believe the US's tolerance for market disruption may be higher than Iran believes it to be. But I agree that achieving some sort of domestic political consensus on absorbing pain is a tough challenge, so I'm just going to waffle and say my crystal ball just broke.
As for mediation -- countries like India could play a role, but not as primary brokers. The core issues involve actors with very deep stakes and very low trust.
External mediation works best when both sides want a face-saving exit. India's strength is more as a credible, non-threatening back-channel interlocutor who can help lower the temperature for a time, for example for humanitarian purposes.
India has neither shown any interest in being a formal broker nor does it have any institutional experience in this domain.
'US will see pressure on dollar supremacy'

Who is likely to be hurt most and who could benefit from the war's ripple effects, both globally and specifically for the US and India?
We should recognise at the outset that humans on both sides of the war are hurting a lot physically -- as in being killed, maimed and dislocated. Also true of those in bystander countries. It helps to see this as the baseline for all hurt experienced by those that are more distant from the scene.
And, as a general rule, war brings no assured benefits to anyone. Even when the desired outcomes of a war are clearly defined, once a war starts, the outcomes are uncertain, there are unintended consequences, and the costs are too high all around.
In complex, system-level conflicts like this, almost everyone loses -- but not at the same time, and not to the same degree.
Some actors may benefit tactically -- higher energy prices, defense contracts -- but strategically, the system becomes less predictable, and that hurts long-term growth everywhere.
The US will see further pressure on the dollar's primacy, with an at least temporarily depleted military having an amplifying effect on that. That will have deep and probably lasting negative effects on the economy. As I hinted, wealth and growth will decline.
India will face short term pain, and may even lose a point or two in its growth rate.
But the long-term growth projections would, in the first place, necessarily have to account for disruptive events like this; there is no meaning to growth projections that rely on the entire world being stable for prolonged periods of time.
I would say India's mettle will be tested, whether that translates to long-term hurt or strengthening is the question.
I feel fairly confident in saying that the growth rates for India may change, but the fact of the growth itself is a constant.

How are India's deepening strategic ties with Israel helping or hurting it in the context of this war?
India's ties with Israel have to do with defence and general technology, outsourcing Israeli manufacturing to India and so forth. India wants a boost in technology and Israel wants a place to expand its manufacturing base.
Objectively, the war changes nothing in what India and Israel hope to get from the relationship. On the other hand, it's not as though India will get significantly more benefits from Iran if India abandons Israel at this time.
There are internal political dynamics in India that have the potential to cause disruption because of the war and the ties with Israel, so that's an added risk to be managed.
This relationship is objectively a constant, but it is subject to India's internal political currents.

'India now has to deal with drones, cyber tools, AI, psywar etc'
Does the conflict mark a genuine step-change in warfare -- with drones, missiles and their defences now centre-stage, plus cyber, psychological and AI dimensions -- and what does this mean for India's defence posture?
If it is not a step change, it is a very steep accelerated change. From drone warfare in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war some 5 years ago, to the Ukraine war, and now to the Iran war, we are seeing a huge role for cheap, mass-produced drones that evens the odds significantly for smaller powers like Iran or Ukraine.
Turns out that being corrupt, economically and socially stressed and engaged in war is no obstacle to building up a formidable and resilient manufacturing base for cheap but effective military drones, both in the case of Ukraine and Iran.
- ALSO READ: Drones Are What India Needs For Future Wars
What's changing is not just technology but its accessibility. Capabilities that once belonged only to major powers are now available to smaller States and even non-State actors.
That lowers the barrier to entry for conflict. Even as we speak, we have seen the introduction of drones into northeastern India by foreign mercenaries.
Clearly there are implications that are not just for external warfare but also internal security.
This creates a world where deterrence becomes harder, because more actors can impose costs without exposing themselves fully.
The psychological front, where brains are intentionally reprogrammed with false or biased information at scale, presents its own challenges to India.
AI plays a major role in this. I'll give you an example: Recall when Modi spoke to Israel's parliament, he said that Indian Jews who emigrated to Israel have told him that India is their motherland while Israel is their fatherland.
It was reported in India, and indeed all over the global media as Modi saying that he himself considers Israel to be his fatherland. In preparing for this chat, I discovered that AI is trained with this distortion as well.
India's challenges and the resolve of its major adversaries are constants, the means by which those challenges are expressed are changing with the times, so India now has to deal with drones, cyber tools, AI, psywar etc.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff







