India's position appears to be anchored around three red lines: Hasina's safety and the guarantee of a fair trial; assurances that Bangladeshi territory will not be used for activities hostile to India; and the restoration of an inclusive democratic process in Bangladesh.
Key Points
- India is pushing for an inclusive democratic process that addresses the Awami League's exclusion from politics.
- Hasina's return could help preserve her political influence as the Awami League faces mounting pressure inside Bangladesh.
- Back-channel negotiations indicate extradition is part of a broader strategic bargain between New Delhi and Dhaka.
New Delhi may be willing to discuss Sheikh Hasina's extradition, but not at the cost of her safety, India's security or Bangladesh's democratic future.
Back-channel negotiations over the extradition of the former Bangladesh prime minister have been under way in London for some time.
Hasina fled to India on August 5, 2024, after a violent youth-led uprising brought down her government and forced her to leave the country.
Two years later, the question is no longer simply whether Dhaka wants her back. The real question is what guarantees India can extract before agreeing to send her back -- and what Dhaka is prepared to offer in return.
Monday's meeting between Indian High Commissioner Dinesh Trivedi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman at the secretariat was therefore significant. Deputy High Commissioner Pawan Kumar Tulshidas Badhe was also present.
Hasina's extradition figured prominently in the discussions. According to reports, the possible return of those accused in the murder of Osman Hadi was also raised.
'Bangladesh hopes that India will expedite the process of extraditing Sheikh Hasina,' Prothom Alo reported, quoting a statement from the prime minister's press wing.
The timing was telling. A day earlier, Research and Analysis Wing Secretary Parag Jain, accompanied by three officials, arrived in Dhaka in the afternoon for an official visit at the invitation of Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, sources said.
The sequence suggests that the Hasina question is entering a more serious negotiating phase. India would not like to be seen as shielding Hasina but at the same time New Delhi is not negotiating from a position of surrender.
India's position appears to be anchored around three red lines: Hasina's safety and the guarantee of a fair trial; assurances that Bangladeshi territory will not be used for activities hostile to India; and the restoration of an inclusive democratic process in Bangladesh.
Hasina's safety condition is primary and most immediate. She has been one of India's closest political friends in the region. New Delhi is unlikely to hand her over merely because Dhaka demands it.
If she returns, India will want credible and enforceable assurances that she will not face physical harm, political vengeance or a judicial process designed to produce a pre-determined outcome. There has to be a fair trial.
If Tarique Rahman's government wants Hasina back to satisfy popular sentiment in the country, the responsibility for keeping her safe will ultimately be his.
There can be no ambiguity on this point. India may be prepared to facilitate her return but not her execution.
The second red line is more strategic to thwart Pakistan's attempts to return to Bangladesh. Since Hasina's departure and the emergence of the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government in August 2024, India has watched with growing unease as Bangladesh's foreign-policy orientation changed.
Pakistan Eyes Bangladesh Again
The most visible shift has been the warming of ties between Dhaka and Islamabad. In November 2025, the Pakistan navy warship PNS Saif docked at Chittagong, the first such visit since 1971.
The visit coincided with Pakistan navy chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf's trip to Bangladesh.
The symbolism was difficult to miss. For Pakistan, it was an opportunity to re-establish a strategic footprint in a country that had been at the heart of its defeat in 1971.
For India, it was a reminder that geopolitical space vacated by one government can quickly be occupied by another.
The concern is not simply diplomatic optics. Bangladesh sits on India's eastern flank, close to the sensitive north east and astride important maritime routes.
Any sustained Pakistani military or intelligence presence there will inevitably attract Indian scrutiny.
Other developments have heightened those concerns. In October 2025, reports emerged of activities by Lashkar-e-Taiba-linked operatives in Bangladesh.
Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer, described as a close associate of LeT founder Hafiz Saeed and leader of Pakistan's Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, reportedly travelled to Dhaka on October 25, 2025 and visited border districts.
His visit reportedly coincided with that of Pakistan's then joint chiefs of staff committee chairman General Sahir Shamshad Mirza who arrived in Dhaka on October 24 along with four officers.
Could India turn a blind eye to this 'coincidence'? Absolutely not. For India, the larger concern is whether Bangladesh could become a more permissive environment for Islamist radicalisation or anti-India networks.
New Delhi's message, therefore, is straightforward: Bangladesh is free to conduct its own foreign policy, but its territory cannot become a platform for activities directed against India.
India Questions Awami League Ban
The third condition is perhaps politically complicated; it is about the Awami League. India wants Bangladesh to return to an inclusive democratic framework.
That inevitably raises the question of the Awami League, a party founded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which remains banned while its leader lives in India.
For New Delhi, this creates an uncomfortable contradiction. How can any country claim to be restoring democracy while one of its principal political parties remains outside the political process?
A source familiar with India-Bangladesh affairs offered an Indian analogy: New Delhi's Bharatiya Janata Party government may be fiercely opposed to the Congress, but it does not ban the Congress from politics.
The comparison is deliberately provocative, but the underlying point is difficult to dismiss. Democracy cannot mean merely holding elections. It also requires political competition, institutional pluralism and space for opposing political forces.
Why Sheikh Hasina Wants to Return
India therefore has a broader stake in what happens next in Bangladesh. It does not necessarily need Hasina to return to power. But it does need Bangladesh to remain politically inclusive and strategically predictable.
That also brings us to the most intriguing question: Why does Hasina want to return now? The answer may lie in political arithmetic as much as diplomacy.
Back-channel negotiations take time. Security arrangements have to be negotiated. Dhaka has to calculate the domestic reaction, while New Delhi must assess the risks.
Hasina herself has to determine how much political capital she has left.
Her August 5 online address was therefore more than a commemorative address. The date marked two years since she was forced to leave Bangladesh.
It also came amid reports of clashes at universities involving supporters of the banned Awami League and rival groups.
'Whatever fate awaits me, I will return to my people,' Hasina said.
The words were carefully chosen. Hasina was not merely talking to Bangladesh. She was talking to the Awami League. The message was that she remains the party's leader, remains politically relevant and has not abandoned her claim to Bangladesh's political future.
She even acknowledged the possibility that she could be 'killed' if she returned. But she said returning to her people was her duty. At 78, Hasina understands something perhaps more clearly than anyone else: political time is running out.
The longer she remains outside Bangladesh, the harder it will be to maintain control over a party already under immense pressure.
Political parties do not remain frozen indefinitely. Cadres move on. Younger leaders emerge. Alliances change. Loyalties weaken.
For Hasina, staying away may be safer but politically more dangerous; she risks becoming a historical figure rather than a living political force.
That also explains the significance of her son Sajeeb Wazed Joy, joining the August 5 presser online from the United States.
His appearance carried a message of its own: The political family remains engaged and the question of succession has not disappeared.
Should anything happen to Hasina, Joy is the obvious figure around whom the Awami League could attempt to reorganise. That may not amount to a formal succession plan, but politically the symbolism is difficult to miss.
This is likely to define the India-Bangladesh equation in the months ahead: Quiet negotiations behind closed doors, carefully calibrated public statements and neither side revealing its full hand.
The extradition question appears to be only one part of a much larger bargain. The question now is how much Tarique Rahman can deliver without rocking his own government.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff
