Once the OS layer is opened to the State, it doesn't close, notes Lieutenant General Prakash Katoch (retd).
In yesteryears, phone-tapping in India at the political level emerged in the media periodically. When Zail Singh was President, media reports claimed his phones were tapped throughout his presidency.
Chinese covert spyware in laptops, cell phones, apps and even CCTV cameras in India are well known, compromising national security and user privacy by illegally collecting and transmitting data to third-party servers in foreign locations.
Some devices from Chinese manufacturers have been found to have pre-installed apps or firmware that can monitor text messages, call histories, and location data without user permission, sending information to servers in China.
The primary concern is data of millions of Indians transmitted to Chinese servers while under China's national intelligence law, private companies must share information with national intelligence agencies.
According to a survey in October 2024, 25% Indian households have one or two Made in China gadgets while 54% households have more than three.
After Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel in 2017, India imported Pegasus, a very sophisticated covert spyware, developed by Israel's NSO Group, which can remotely infiltrate smartphones (both iOS and Android) without the user's knowledge; transforming the infected device into a 24-hour surveillance tool, giving the operator extensive access to personal and location data.
After Israel remotely exploded thousands of Hezbollah pagers in Lebanon on September 17, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said there was 'a piece of Israel in every phone'.
Personal privacy has been the bane of Indians, whether by design or default. Crores of Indians' personal data, from Aadhaar to health records, have been exposed.
In 2023 alone, the ICMR data leak compromised information of over 810 million Indians, raising serious doubts about the government's ability to protect personal data.
The latest government move, after SIM binding, was mandating the Sanchar Sathi app on every new phone permanently.
Users could not delete it. This is a first. India never before required an unremovable state app on every device.
Sanchar Saathi was supposedly a lost phone tracker, but if it was embedded on your device it became the Sanchar Snoop.
Next could be a mandatory digital ID app. Digiyatra forcefully installed on each device? An app that disables VPNs or tracks your app and browser history?
An app that sends copies of your messages to the government periodically? Once the OS layer is opened to the State, it doesn't close.
The Data Protection Law is aimed at making private companies more accountable and the Indian government unaccountable?
Notably, the Department of Telecom forced the order without any public consultation -- another step away from democracy towards dictatorship?
Amid severe criticism, Jyotiraditya Scindia, the Union minister for communications, told reporters that the app would be 'optional'.
'You can activate or deactivate call monitoring as per your wish. If you want to keep it on your phone, keep it. If you want to delete it, then do so,' Scindia said.
But it can't be deleted, according to multiple sources. The government's 'coverup man' Sambit Patra said, the app had 'so far helped detect and disconnect about 1.75 crore fraudulent mobile connections, trace close to 26 lakh stolen/missing phones, and recover 7.5 lakh phones.'
Can Patra explain why so many fraudulent phones have been allowed to function all these years and if this app is the only way to trace them, why is it optional?
Moreover, what were Scindia and Patra waffling about when the government's statement on the Press Information Bureau web site said the directions had to be complied with, asking phone makers to ensure that the app remains pre-installed and that it cannot be disabled?
Lieutenant General Prakash Katoch (retd), PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC is a former Special Forces officer.
He is a third generation army officer and participated in the 1971 India-Pakistan War and in Operation Bluestar.
He commanded a Special Forces Battalion in Sri Lanka, a Brigade on the Siachen Glacier, a Division in Ladakh and a Strike Corps in the South Western Theatre.
These are the general's personal views.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff
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