For India, China's Indian Ocean power projection, maritime domain awareness, dual-use ports, underwater surveillance, anti‑submarine‑warfare, naval exercises with Pakistan, pose considerable pressure, depleted India's strategic depth and marginalises Indian role, points out Srikanth Kondapalli.

Key Points
- China is expanding its strategic footprint across the Indian Ocean through naval deployments, diplomacy, and infrastructure projects over the past decade.
- Beijing has increased surveillance missions, submarine deployments, and dual-use port construction, raising concerns over maritime security and regional influence.
- Chinese naval missions, often justified as anti-piracy operations, are being used to conduct advanced military exercises and strategic positioning.
- India faces growing pressure as China's activities reduce its strategic depth and challenge its traditional dominance in the Indian Ocean region.
A quiet but subtle competition is brewing in the Indian Ocean region with multiple initiatives by China in strategic, diplomatic, economic and naval spheres posing ominous signals to India.
In the light of West Asia conflict, Beijing intends to use its forays to further consolidate its position.
Even before Quad and Indo-Pacific could fructify, China initiated the 'two oceans' strategy in 2009 towards the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Since then, Beijing not only launched diplomatic initiatives, but also construction of dual-use port facilities, conduct of naval exercises and sent submarines and surveillance ships to assert itself and marginalise India.
China launched an Indian Ocean Forum in 2022 and followed it up in 2024 with the China-Indian Ocean Region Centre for Maritime Cooperation and Training Centre by inviting countries other than India.
Beijing promised to build a Communist party-centric agenda of 'maritime community with shared future'.
China sent clear signals through its white papers on national defence. The 2012 white paper, for instance, called for 'joint[ly] safeguard[ing] the security of the international SLOCs "(in the Gulf of Aden)'. The 2015 white paper directed China's naval forces to conduct maritime manoeuvres and 'joint operations at sea'.
The last white paper, in 2019, directed its navy 'to safeguard China's maritime rights and interests'.
To realise the 'China Dream', Beijing is reviving the plans of 14th century Admiral Zheng He's expeditions to the Indian Ocean and 19th century Wei Yuan's Nanyang plans for forays in the South Seas.
Today, China's navy has the largest number of vessels in the world, surpassing the United States navy by over 50 vessels.
By citing piracy incidents in the Indian Ocean, China sent 46 naval contingencies so far even after such incidents receded.
China also evacuated its citizens from strife-torn Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Libya but interestingly also came close to the Houthis in the Red Sea.
Such naval missions were utilised later to conduct amphibious exercises, air-defence themes and thus suggested the objectives were beyond countering piracy.
China also sent nearly 70 surveillance ships and research vessels to the Indian, Pacific and Arctic Oceans including the Yuan Wang 5, Dongfang Hong, Xiangyang Hong, Dayang Yihao, Shenhai Yihao, Shi Yan 6 and Lanhai ships.
Many of these violate operate in the Exclusive Economic Zones of other countries and thus violate international law under Article 246 of the UNCLOS.
The purpose of these ships is to map sea-bed resources, prepare for submarine warfare, cut undersea cables to disrupt communications of the adversaries and prepare for naval contingencies.
China's surveillance ships Liaowang 1 and Dayang Yihao were operating near the United States vessels in West Asia recently.
China had also despatched submarines since 1986 to the region, with their first visit to Chittagong, Colombo and Karachi.
They also docked at Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports in 2015. It was also reported that China despatched 3 to 5 Shang-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and large Yuan class submarines. The purpose of these submarines is to disrupt trade.

Besides these, China despatches thousands of fishing boats to the region for illegal fishing, thus depleting the fish stock of the region.
During Operation Sindoor, hundreds of such boats appeared, possibly to harass the Indian Navy.
Such 'grey zone' activities are conducted to indicate China's intention to enter the region, gather intelligence, create civil-military confusion, exploit lack of preparedness by adversaries or treated as a stop-gap arrangement before full-fledged naval deployments.
Even though China had commissioned the Djibouti naval base in 2017, initially as a logistical support facility at the chokepoint of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, it is now being expanded to include submarine docking facilities.
China also initiated a number of dual-use ports or maritime facilities -- estimated to be more than a hundred across 46 countries in the region.
These are considered to be a counter to the US-led maritime world order as well as to marginalise India in the region.
These ports include Kyaukpyu and Great Coco in Myanmar, Klang, Kuantan and Kuala Linggi in Malaysia, Tanjung Priok in Indonesia, Darwin in Australia, Sonadipur in Bangladesh, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gwadar and Karachi in Pakistan, Duqm in Oman, Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania and Sokhna port in Egypt.

China is taking a leaf out of the Opium Wars of 1842 and 1856 by forcing lease of ports for long term if the host country is unable to pay loans for these ports' construction.
In the case of Hambantota, Sri Lanka was unable to pay the loans and hence leased it for 99 years.
Exploiting Colombo's weakness, China also docked its military controlled surveillance ship Yuan Wang 5 at Hambantota in 2022. Gwadar port was also taken on a 40-year lease.
China sees the US, Israel, Iran conflict as an opportunity in the longer term and hence preparing to be physically present in the region for power transition.
For India, China's Indian Ocean power projection, maritime domain awareness, permanent presence through anti-piracy missions, dual-use ports, underwater surveillance, anti‑submarine‑warfare, naval exercises with Pakistan (Sea Guardian), pose considerable pressure, depleted India's strategic depth and marginalises Indian role.
Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies at JNU.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff







