The call ended at 1.47 a.m. As Singh listened to the call, the terrorists shared the news of Hemant Karkare's death. For them, the death of the ATS chief, who they knew as someone who ran operations against terrorists, was a big victory.
At around 2 am a deputy director of the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), Subodh Jaiswal joined the ATS technical staff. Together, they put to use all their technical know-how to intercept the communication between the terrorists.
The terrorists were speaking in Punjabi Urdu. The Mumbai ATS only had one officer, Parambir Singh, who knew the language well. But he was camping at the Oberoi, coordinating the police action there.
Jaiswal's arrival at the ATS office gave the technical staff the much-needed moral boost. Until a few months back Jaiswal was serving as an additional commissioner in the Mumbai ATS and knew all of them well.
Being from Punjab, Jaiswal was also well versed with the language and was able to catch the idiom the terrorists were using. For the next two days, along with the ATS staff, Jaiswal intercepted and recorded over six-and-a-half hours of telephonic conversation between the terrorists and their handlers.
Hundreds of miles away from the Byculla based headquarters of the Mumbai ATS, the operations room of the IB situated in a sprawling complex at Sardar Patel Marg in Delhi was buzzing with activity.
Parallel to the interceptions being made by the Mumbai ATS, the IB was doing its own interceptions. The three Indian cell numbers which the terrorists had first used after landing in Mumbai were already under the IB's watch. Ironically, these numbers had been provided to the LeT activists by undercover security personnel who had managed to infiltrate the ranks of the LeT in India.
The LeT operatives in India had sent these numbers to their masters in Pakistan. The Indian intelligence agencies believed that since these numbers were under observation they would know in advance what the terrorists were up to. But the ten terrorists switched on these numbers only after landing at Badhwar Park a little after 8.15 pm. By then it was too late.
Time: 2.48 am, Taj Mahal Hotel
Terrorist: Salaam ailekum.
Handler: Wailekum as-salaam. Achha tumhare hotel mein wazir hai teen -- kisi kamre mein teen wazir hain aur ek cabinet secretary hai. Jo saari cabinet ka secretary nahi hota, woh bhi hain tumhare hotel mein. (Listen, there are three ministers in your hotel -- in some room -- and one cabinet secretary).
Terrorist: Oye, oye, oye! Badi khush-khabri sunai hai (Oh, that's great news!)
Handler: Yeh teen-chaar bande dhoond lo, fir jo marzi manwa lo India se. (Find out these three-four men, then you can make India agree to anything).
Terrorist: Inshallah, bas dua karo Allah se. (Allah willing, just pray to Allah.)
Handler: Aur grenade feko. Bahar shayad navy aa gayi hai. Khidki se fire karo aur grenade feko. (Throw grenades. Probably there is Indian Navy outside. Fire and throw grenades from the window.)
[The phone call ends.]