We started with a small force. But in 2004, we decided that we needed to increase our forces.

The official sanctioned strength in Chhattisgarh is 42,000. In Bastar, it will be not more than 20,000 -- which works out to one policeman per five to six square kilometres of thick jungle.

Does this include the special police officers?

There are 3,200 SPOs. Earlier there were more, but were thrown out later. It is a receding trend. I believe those who are educated can be recruited as regular police. They are given subsistence allowance, it's a voluntary force.

Are children and minors being recruited as SPOs?

Regarding children being taken as SPOs, this has not been recorded in most of the villages. We go by what they say. And whenever it has been brought to our attention, that this man is under-age, he has been removed. This is the fact. As of date, none of the SPOs are under age.

The number of SPOs claimed by some activists is much higher. Moreover, how much training is given to SPOs?

It's not true that the SPOs are not given training. They have been trained very efficiently.

If they do anything wrong and it comes to our knowledge, we will throw them out or chargesheet them. That is very clear to our officers now. In the beginning, nothing was clear. Most of the allegations made by activists, like Nandini Sundar, were between June and December 2005. After that things have stabilised.

But why did you recruit SPOs in the first place?

We didn't have enough people. Once the [Salwa Judam] camps came, we had two options. That time the force was so less, so the question was who will protect the camps. We couldn't send all our force to protect Salwa Judum camps.

How many Salwa Judum camps are there?

There were 35 camps, today there are 29 camps. Which works out to 90 people (SPOs) per camp. Not all of them are armed. Some of them help in the internal management of camps along with the armed police, if the camps are attacked by Naxalites.

In one of the reports the police has said, 'Salwa Judum was an achievement'.

There are two mistakes people are committing. One is quoting out of context. Secondly, what a superintendent of police and collector writes to the government is his perception.

But the government's perception was that with the low level of security, we could get some SPOs who could lead us to the Naxalite hideouts. That was our limited objective. That limited objective became very important for the Naxals. They didn't want people to help the police and lead them to their hideouts. Plus there were psychological problems... the Naxals didn't want anyone to stand up against them, when they had been dominating for so long.

Image: A paramilitary force officer frisks truckers outside Dornapal village in Chhattisgarh.
Photograph: Manpreet Romana/AFP/Getty Images

Also read: Armed might won't defeat the Naxals

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