United States Senator Richard Lugar, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the India Nuclear Agreement, delivered his floor statement on the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy and US-IAEA Additional Protocol Implementation Act of 2006.
Following are extracts the text of the speech:
Mr President, today the Senate begins consideration of legislation on the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. This agreement is the most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by President Bush.
By concluding this pact and the far-reaching set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, the President has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to enhance the core strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new diplomatic options and improve global stability.
The Committee on Foreign Relations undertook an extensive review of this agreement.
We held four public hearings with testimony from 17 witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
We received a classified briefing from Undersecretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the Congressional Research Service, the State Department, and the National Security Council. I submitted 174 written questions for the record to the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the answers on the Committee website.
The agreement allows India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors from the United States - benefits that were previously denied to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. This pact is a lasting incentive for India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United States in stopping proliferation.
The bill before us is an important step toward implementing the nuclear agreement with India, but we should understand that it is not the final step in the process. This legislation sets the rules for subsequent Congressional consideration of a so-called "123 Agreement" between the U.S. and India. A "123 Agreement" is the term for a peaceful nuclear cooperation pact with a foreign country under the conditions outlined in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Our legislation does not restrict nor does it predetermine Congressional action on the forthcoming 123 Agreement. Unlike the Administration's original legislative proposal, this bill preserves Congressional prerogatives with regard to consideration of a future 123 Agreement. Under the Administration's original proposal, the 123 Agreement would have entered into force 90 days after submission unless both houses of Congress voted against it, and with majorities that could overcome a likely Presidential veto.
I am pleased the Administration changed course on this matter and agreed to submit the 123 Agreement with India to Congress under normal procedures. This means that both the House and the Senate must cast a positive vote of support before the 123 Agreement can enter into force. In our view, this better protects Congress' role in the process and ensures Congressional views will be taken into consideration.
I thank Senator Biden for his close cooperation on developing this important bill. It reflects our shared views and concerns. He and his staff were valuable partners in the drafting of this legislation, and the final product is much improved because of their efforts. Together, we have constructed a bill that allows the US to seize an important strategic opportunity, while ensuring a strong Congressional oversight role, reinforcing U.S. non-proliferation efforts, and maintaining our responsibilities under the NPT. I also want to thank all Members of the Foreign Relations Committee for their support, and the work of their staffs, in crafting a bill that received the overwhelming support of the Committee last June.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS:
For the benefit of Senators, I offer the following section-by-section analysis.
Section 101 identifies the bill as the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act. Sections 102 and 103 of the Lugar-Biden bill include sense of the Congress provisions on U.S.-India relations and policy declarations.
These provisions give voice to a set of important policy issues involving bilateral relations, democratic values, nuclear non-proliferation regimes, fissile material production in South Asia, and support for IAEA safeguards and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. All of these concerns are reinforced by the bill's comprehensive reporting requirements.
Section 104 provides waiver authority from provisions in the Atomic Energy Act and removes the prohibition on cooperating with India due to its 1998 weapons tests and its existing weapons program. At the same time, Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which is preserved under the Lugar-Biden bill, terminates nuclear cooperation if India conducts a nuclear test, proliferates nuclear weapons or materials, or breaks its agreements with the IAEA or the United States.
Section 105 of our proposal adopts all of the Administration's requirements to ensure that India is meeting its non-proliferation commitments. In addition, we require that decisions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group enabling nuclear trade with India are made by consensus and consistent with its rules. Our aim is to ensure that this multilateral organization will continue to play a vital role in global non-proliferation efforts.
Section 106 prohibits exports of equipment, materials or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water. The provision allows narrow exceptions for the export of these items from the United States to India if they are for proliferation-resistant activities that involve the United States or have the sponsorship of a recognized international body like the IAEA. This provision is consistent with the Administration's policy regarding such transfers. It would allow cooperation in sensitive nuclear areas only if such cooperation could be implemented with no risk of proliferation.
Section 107 requires the creation of a system to ensure that no items exported to India are diverted to any uses that are not peaceful. This section seeks to ensure U.S. compliance with our NPT obligations.
Section 108 requires annual Presidential certifications that India is meeting its commitments under the July 2005 Joint Statement, its Separation Plan, New Dehli's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA, the 123 Agreement, and applicable U.S. laws regarding U.S. exports to India. The President must also certify on an annual basis that U.S. trade with India in these areas remains in the national security interests of the United States.
Section 109 requires that no action be undertaken under this act that could violate any U.S. obligation under the NPT. Section 110 explicitly stipulates that if India conducts a nuclear test, U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation is terminated. Finally, Sections 111 and 112 clarify India's Missile Technology Control Regime status under U.S. law and various terms used in the bill.
The US-Indian agreement resulted from a delicately balanced negotiation. Neither side got everything it wanted. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration and the Indian Government came to the conclusion that the agreement was in the national security interest of both countries. I urge Senators to vote in favor of this legislation without conditions that would kill the agreement.
I would also note that Senator Biden and I included an important piece of non-proliferation legislation in the bill as Title II. In 2004, the Senate ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, but Congress did not pass implementing legislation that is required for the treaty to go into effect. President Bush has called on the Senate to act on this important matter, and the Committee voted unanimously in favor of this bill in March.
COMMITTEE MARK-UP:
Mr President, the Committee approved this legislation with a bipartisan vote of 16 - 2. Furthermore, fifteen members of the Committee asked to be named as original cosponsors. Since that time, additional Senators have requested to be added as cosponsors.
Due to the fact that the legislation was an original bill, the Parliamentarian ruled that cosponsors were not permitted. This is unfortunate because the amount of support our legislation has received is impressive. I appreciate the strong support of Senators Biden, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Dodd, Kerry, Nelson, Obama, Cornyn, Bayh, Hutchison, DeWine, and Lott.
During our markup, the Committee rejected an amendment offered by Senator Feingold. Under the amendment, the President would have had to determine with absolute certainty that no US nuclear fuel exports to India could increase its production of fissile materials for weapons.
New Delhi would rightly see this as moving the goalposts -- an unacceptable unilateral alteration of the pact. If the Feingold amendment or others like it are included in the final legislation, they would effectively kill the US-India Agreement.
I would have preferred that the US-India agreement had included a commitment by New Delhi to stop making nuclear bomb materials, but negotiations did not yield that result. Instead, the Bush Administration won an important commitment to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Such a multilateral approach is the best way to reduce nuclear tensions and threats associated with an arms race in South Asia.
The Lugar-Biden bill declares it the policy of the United States to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. Our bill also includes an annual reporting requirement detailing: "United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty."
Mr President, I will oppose amendments that delay or impose additional conditions on the agreement before it can enter into force. The Senate will not advance U.S. national security in this case by making the perfect the enemy of the good. We should not hold up the significant nonproliferation gains afforded by this initiative in order to seek a fissile material cap that India has indicated it will not consider absent similar commitments by Pakistan and China.
The United States and India have engaged in initial discussions on a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), to be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. We should press for rapid progress in that context.
SECTION 106:
The Indian Government has expressed concern about Section 106 of our bill. This section prohibits the export of any equipment, materials or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent fuel, or the production of heavy water. These technologies are not purely civilian in nature. They are considered critical elements to a modern nuclear weapons program.
This provision in our bill is entirely consistent with President Bush's policy announcement on this matter at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004. In his speech, the President said:
"The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons."
President Bush also said that, "enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."
In response to questions for the record that I submitted, Undersecretaries of State Bob Joseph and Nick Burns amplified this administration policy as it applies to the nuclear agreement with India. They said:
"For the United States, 'full civil nuclear cooperation' with India means trade in most civil nuclear technologies, including fuel and reactors. But we do not intend to provide enrichment or reprocessing technology to India. As the President said in February 2004, 'enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.' We do not currently provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to any country. We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to in any way assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with provisions of U.S. law."
Undersecretaries Burns and Joseph also answered that:
"We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any state. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology."
This answer is especially significant, since the phrase "full civil nuclear energy cooperation" is the phrase taken directly from the July 2005 Joint Statement.
In response to a question for the record that I submitted to Secretary Rice, she responded:
"The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy water production equipment or technology to India, and the draft bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement accordingly makes no provisions for such transfers."
Our Committee bill, S. 3709, does not break any new ground in this area. This is not a new subject. The answers to these questions have been on the Committee's website for months. Nothing in this bill deviates from the President's policy, and we even go one step further by allowing the flexibility to export those items from the United States for proliferation-resistant activities with the U.S. or under international cooperation. I support Section 106, and I think it is important that we take the strong and definitive statements made by President Bush, Secretary Rice, Undersecretary of State Nick Burns, and Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph and put them into law.
SECTION 107 - END-USE MONITORING:
The Indian Government has also expressed concern about Section 107, which requires an end-use monitoring program to be carried out with respect to U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold or leased to India. Some have argued that this provision is not needed because IAEA safeguards would verify the use of any U.S. exports to India. IAEA safeguards only apply, however, to nuclear materials, not to nuclear technology. Sensitive technology of the kind the United States might export to India that can be used in India's civilian nuclear program could also advance India's nuclear weapons program. This type of end-use system is not without precedent, as Congress required similar record-keeping for nuclear cooperation with China.
An end-use monitoring program can provide increased confidence in India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. It also would further ensure United States compliance with Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The provision is not intended to cast doubt on the sincerity of India's July 18 Joint Statement commitments or its March and May 2006 separation documents. Rather, the Committee believes that by building and establishing a special program with India, the resulting coordination between India and U.S. regulatory agencies can provide a basis for even greater cooperation and commerce between the two nations.
Section 107 would confirm that only authorized recipients are receiving nuclear technology; that the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities; that the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not be retransferred without the prior consent of the United States; and that facilities, equipment, or materials derived through the use of transferred technology will not be transferred without the prior consent of the United States.
This section also requires that, in the absence of IAEA safeguards, the U.S. and India must arrange a bilateral system to ensure that safeguards in India remain on U.S. exports and re-exports in perpetuity.
Section 107 requirements could be met by applying to India those measures already governing atomic energy cooperation under the 123 agreement with China. Under Secretary Joseph testified before the Committee that, while the 123 agreement with India will not provide for full-scope safeguards, it "will allow for appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods provided for civilian purposes remain within the civilian sector." So nothing in section 107 would be inconsistent with what may be concluded in the 123 agreement with India itself.
IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL:
Title II of the bill includes the Committee's IAEA Additional Protocol Implementing Legislation. This title permits the Additional Protocol the U.S. has concluded with the IAEA to go into effect.
In President Bush's 2004 speech at the National Defense University, he called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol with the IAEA. He said:
"We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to its ratification."
The Committee on Foreign Relations voted unanimously to approve a resolution of ratification on the U.S. Additional Protocol on March 4, 2004, and the full Senate approved it on March 31 by unanimous consent.
Unfortunately the Additional Protocol is not self-executing. Congress must adopt implementing legislation for the United States to submit its instruments of ratification. In other words, implementing legislation must be passed before the Additional Protocol can go into effect. The Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously approved the implementing legislation on March 4, 2006, but efforts to pass the legislation in the full Senate have been unsuccessful due to holds placed by several Senators.
At a time when the Administration and the Congress are demanding that India conclude such an Additional Protocol as part of our overall nuclear arrangements with India, Congress must muster the political will to act on the implementing legislation. Our credibility as the leader of global non-proliferation efforts is at stake. Along with many other nations, we are asking the IAEA to perform critical functions aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. An effective IAEA is very much in the national security interest of the United States.
Some Senators expressed concern that the Additional Protocol and the implementing legislation will make it possible, even likely, that international inspectors will learn secrets about our nuclear weapons program. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the Administration has assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in our country is very low. Moreover, even if an inspection under the Additional Protocol is requested, the United States has the full right, through the National Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection if we determined that it could be potentially harmful to U.S. national security interests.
On July 26, 2006, National Security Advisor, Steve Hadley, expressed the Administration's support for the language in Title II. He wrote: "The Administration urges both Houses of Congress to act to complete expeditious action on implementing legislation to enable the United States to meet its obligations under the Additional Protocol." More recently, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, John Rood, testified at his confirmation hearing that the Administration strongly supports the Additional Protocol and that it is important that the United States pass implementing legislation.
I am pleased to report that a compromise was reached between the Administration, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and those Senators who expressed concerns about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing legislation. This is an important step for U.S. nonproliferation policy, and I thank all of the parties involved in the discussions for their support of our efforts.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to approve the U.S.-India agreement. This legislation will allow the United States to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation while safeguarding U.S. national security and nonproliferation efforts, as well as Congressional prerogatives. It is an opportunity to build a vital strategic partnership with a nation that shares our democratic values and will exert increasing influence on the world stage. We should move forward now.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
