This, the Indian leadership hoped, would lead to more international awareness of the problem and negotiated settlement for an independent Bangladesh could begin.

The plan was politically bold but militarily timid. It would have led to the creation of an enclave defended by the Indian Army and the East Bengali guerilla force, the Mukti Bahini. The Pakistani army would hammer away at this enclave and achieve attrition.

Fortunately, some military planners in India's Eastern command were smarter and felt that their goal should be more ambitious. Men like Eastern Command Chief of Staff, Major General J F R Jacob, the scion of an old Jewish family of Calcutta, felt they should go not for the jugular but the very heart of the matter which in this case was Dhaka.

If Dhaka fell, argued General Jacob, the entire Pakistani army in the east would collapse. Eastern Army commander Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, bought Jacob's plan and planned a lightning advance into the heart of East Pakistan.

Instead of slogging along, smashing Pakistani fortified areas, the Indians decided to skip resistance and make full speed for Dhaka. This advance was to be helped by feints in the East and a paradrop into enemy country to prepare for the rapid advance.

In contrast, the Pakistanis had decided to fight a defensive war and were well dug in and waiting for the Indian assault. The Indian forces easily outnumbered the Pakistanis by a ratio of about 2:1.

However, according to conventional infantry wisdom, an attacking army requires a three-is-to-one superiority in numbers to attack, which India did not have.

Besides, the Pakistani army commander in the East, Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, was determined merely to delay the Indian advance. For in this war, the real battle was against time.

The longer it took the Indian to secure their limited objectives, the greater the probability of the United Nations intervening to stop the war and effect a stalemate.

Pakistan was confident that a stalemate was all that the Indians could get.

For the Indian army in the East, the main problem was the hundreds of rivers and canals crisscrossing the East Pakistani countryside. The immense practical problem of moving thousands of troops and tonnes of equipment across rivers and marshes was accomplished largely due to the efforts of the Army Corps of Engineers, and with a lot of local help.

The Indian Air Force chipped in by using helicopters to lift entire battalions across larger rivers that could not be quickly bridged by the engineers. In most places, the swiftly moving contingents quickly overcame enemy resistance and moved forward. The Pakistanis for the most part, were completely taken by surprise. Within 6 days of the war, Indian troops were deep inside East Pakistani territory and moving fast.

The Mukti Bahini section of the advancing forces played a crucial role in guiding the Indian Army through the treacherous riverine areas and providing critical intelligence. It is doubtful whether the Indian Army could have moved so fast and decisively without the help of the Bengalis.

At any rate, by the seventh day of the war, the Pakistani army high command, headquartered in Rawalpindi, was in complete panic.

Worse still, the Indian Navy had effectively blockaded West Pakistan and destroyed all Pakistani naval assets in the East. Pakistan was militarily and economically bottled up. A large part of West Pakistan's oil stocks stored in Karachi had been blown up.

In the East, aircraft from the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikrant had closed Chittagong port by sinking a number of ships near its mouth. The PAF in the East had been completely wiped out in the opening days of the war.

With air and naval superiority achieved in the East, the Indian Army had only one real adversary: Time.

Less than two weeks after the declaration of war, Indians troops were hammering at Pakistani positions outside Dhaka.

Image: Indian battle plans