NEWSLINKS
US EDITION
COLUMNISTS
DIARY
SPECIALS
INTERVIEWS
CAPITAL BUZZ
REDIFF POLL
THE STATES
ELECTIONS
ARCHIVES
SEARCH REDIFF

Search the Internet          Tips

Recent Columns

A kingdom under      siege Can infiltration be      be checked? The death squads of      J&K Op Parakram: the      balance shifts Why is the IAF      out of sync?

Beyond the lull

War, people would say, has been averted for the time being, perhaps for good. During the Kargil incursion, the prime minister had similarly, and needlessly, said that we would not cross the Line of Control. The military thinks the window of opportunity may have closed for now, but will reopen after the monsoons by mid-September. It, therefore, hopes the assembly election in Jammu & Kashmir and the Amarnath Yatra will be completed successfully, though elections in Pakistan would be round the corner.

The usable military capability against Pakistan has never been more compact, complete, and consummate. But does the Indian leadership doubt that?

Many believe that the reasons for which India deployed its armed forces in December last year have been met. More than coercive diplomacy, the threat of the use of force has worked, though diplomacy has played a significant part in mobilising international opinion on India's side.

Though many Westerners think India was playacting, the fact is that India was prepared and ready to go to war on at least two occasions -- in early January and in mid-June; the latter was the closest call.

The armed forces were demonstrably ready for war. Not since 1971 was the stage management so comprehensive. Soldiers are still raring to go to end the decade-long bleeding war in J&K. For them the half-shut window is half-open. They are likely to stay in their trenches till at least the end of the year.

Each time the armed forces were on the verge of striking across the borders, General Pervez Musharraf, squeezed by the US, made conciliatory speeches promising to end cross-border infiltration and terrorism. On May 27, he even agreed to do this permanently.

The strategic thought emerging in the wake of some military and diplomatic de-escalation is: Has Musharraf called India's bluff of a limited war and permanently blunted India's conventional superiority by his willingness to use nuclear weapons just when India was threatening to call Musharraf's bluff of nuclear blackmail? In short, has Musharraf turned the tables?

These questions have now been addressed squarely, but not conclusively. The debate on limited war below the nuclear threshold has not ended, though Pakistan is already claiming victory.

The role of the international community, principally the US, has been profound in shaping events in the region. The Western world has consistently and zealously promoted the idea of a nuclear flashpoint to get India and Pakistan to establish a nuclear risk reduction regime while beginning a sustained dialogue on J&K as well as meeting their non-proliferation agenda.

Pakistan has consistently subscribed to this idea and publicly articulated its intention of using the nuclear deterrent in case it is attacked. Western acquiescence in Pakistan's nuclear blackmail is as intriguing as their strategy on travel advisories and evacuation of diplomatic staff -- a new form of economic sanctions.

The Western scare strategy worked and was instrumental in forcing de-escalation. From India's point of view, the G-8 and EU statements, like during Kargil, put the onus on Pakistan to stop cross-border infiltration.

It is clear that while in the past India or Pakistan could start hostilities and the international community would intercede and force a truce in 14 to 18 days' time, now, because both sides have nuclear weapons, they won't allow a shooting match to start in the first place. But let us not forget that Operation Parakram, India's biggest ever military mobilisation, has yielded. Pakistan is required to end infiltration permanently, dismantle terrorist infrastructure visibly and to India's satisfaction.

On the ground, since May 27, Musharraf's second command performance on television, infiltration has come down significantly despite the political leadership sounding like the Tower of Babel.

Based on this favourable trend, the leave of soldiers has been opened and important military courses are to resume. Even while restarting essential routine, the army is keeping its powder dry. It knows that the leadership is unlikely to give it the go-ahead to cross the LoC. But it is banking on Musharraf to do something for the balloon to go up.

Three new facts have emerged: one, that infiltration has not only not ended, but that there is confusion over Musharraf's stated commitment on it. Two, the US is not the guarantor of the commitment made by Musharraf, but only the communicator of so-called good tidings. Three, there is no mention about the future of terrorist training camps and the dismantling of their structures.

So the issue of cross-border terrorism is wide open with infiltration, continuing, albeit on a reduced scale. The US distancing itself from making Musharraf act on his words, at least for the time being, is a nuanced response to the sign of changing times and interests.

India has noted George Bush and Colin Powell's periodic comments on the need for Musharraf to do more and to India's satisfaction in ending cross-border terrorism permanently. So why is the US now suggesting that it is not a guarantor?

One reason could be Musharraf's delicate standing within the army and his relations with the extremists. The US has drawn a blank on its war against Al Qaeda inside Pakistan in which Musharraf and his army are key players. While balancing Pakistan and India for now, the US is certainly tilted towards the former, though all three are part of the coalition against terror.

The litmus test of Musharraf's sincerity in ending infiltration will be during the elections in J&K. Terrorism in J&K is the result of foreign and indigenous terrorist groups housed in the state, but perennially re-supplied with new blood from across the LoC. If infiltration were to end permanently, the security forces would, over a period of time, be able to account for over the 2,500 to 3,000 terrorists already inside J&K.

This is sizeable material for mischief. Musharraf can easily afford to switch off the tap for two to three months without undermining Pakistan's capability to wage terrorism.

Heading the list of lessons midstream of the standoff -- such as it has turned out -- is the apparent reduction in autonomy for India to go beyond the threat of war, though the gains from an offensive-defensive deployment have been impressive.

The role of world players in circumscribing India's options has turned out to be much greater than estimated earlier. The future of limited war, even in J&K, is in doubt. Pakistan will probably get away with the idea that its nuclear deterrent has staved off India's superior conventional forces.

It is on the nuclear issue that more work needs to be done. A certain ambiguity on nuclear deterrence in the absence of a nuclear stability regime has exacerbated the elements of uncertainty to India's disadvantage. The no-first-use policy in the context of Pakistan requires a rethink.

India's strategic forces command, national command authority and nuclear doctrine ought to be finalised and exchanged with Pakistan and China. Conventional capability, especially clandestine and precision forces, has to be beefed up. Defence management reforms were initiated after Kargil. Once Parakram is over, restructuring capabilities in defence diplomacy and public relations will be called for.

Major General (retd) Ashok K Mehta