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G Parthasarathy

Nothing suggests that Musharraf is going to cool his passion for Jehad in Kashmir

The attack on the Red Fort in Delhi by the Lashkar e Tayiba is an "internal affair" of India said General Parvez Musharraf. One wonders if the good General would voice the same views if strikes were launched against the headquarters of the Lashkar at Murdhike near Lahore.

The extension of the Ramzan cease-fire has been widely welcomed both in India and by the international community. But, as the cease-fire enters its second month there are a growing number of voices now being heard that it would be unwise to make the security forces in Jammu & Kashmir "sitting ducks" even as Jehadi groups, comprising mainly Pakistani nationals, regroup and prepare themselves for increased activity once the Himalayan snows melt. More importantly, the sixty four thousand dollar question on whether General Musharraf will end support for his Jehadis remains unanswered. In seeking an answer to this question, it is important to understand the implications of some recent developments in Pakistan on its domestic and foreign policies.

The exile of Nawaz Sharif and the treatment he is receiving from his Saudi hosts have created new problems for the military regime. Sharif has been given all the honours due to a visiting head of government by the Saudi royalty. Not only do provincial governors receive him personally when visiting places like Medina, but he has also been very warmly received both by King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah. Muslim League functionaries in Saudi Arabia are in regular touch with him.

In these circumstances, Musharraf has been compelled to postpone a scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia and has to settle for being able to visit Oman, Jordan and Lebanon. The Saudis would, however, not be averse to accommodating Musharraf's sensitivities by agreeing to a brief stopover by him.

Apart from the personal interest that President Bill Clinton has taken in Sharif's welfare, the Saudi monarchy still holds him in high esteem. The Saudi leadership cannot easily forget that Nawaz Sharif did after all arrange for the visit of the Crown Prince to Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities in Kahuta -- making him the first leader of an Islamic country to visit the facilities producing what some Pakistanis including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto have described as Pakistan's "Islamic Bomb". All this cannot but be noticed by people in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Karachi. And there is precious little that Musharrraf could do about Saudi Arabian policies and priorities, given the fact that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been supplying petroleum products on easy, deferred payment terms to Pakistan ever since the nuclear tests of May 1998.

The sudden release of Nawaz Sharif has seriously eroded Musharraf's credibility in the eyes of the Islamic groupings that are generally natural allies of the military-intelligence establishment. The Jamat Islami leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed has called on the armed forces establishment to remove Musharraf and threatened a countrywide agitation. Groupings like the Tanzeemul Ikhwan led by Maulana Mohammad Akram Awan have threatened to march on Islamabad demanding the immediate introduction of the Shariat. Showing a measure of panic, Musharraf sent his Minister for Religious Affairs Dr Mahmood Ghazi and the home secretary and inspector general of police in Punjab to plead with Maulana Akram to call off the proposed march. Pakistan's Interior Minister is planning to meet leaders of religious groupings shortly in an effort to buy peace.

Having entered into an adversarial relationship with mainstream political parties like the Muslim League, the People's Party, the Awami National Party and the MQM, Musharraf is in no position to challenge the writ and influence of the religious parties that are committed to Jehad in Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine and elsewhere. More importantly, Musharraf is known to be close to hardline retired army officials like former ISI Chiefs Hamid Gul and Javed Nasir, who strongly believe that Pakistan's strategic objectives can be best achieved by "bleeding" India in Kashmir and elsewhere.

Musharraf himself also appears to believe that the resort to Jehad and military pressure on India is a desirable policy option. It was, after all, only a few days ago that he claimed that the Kargil intrusion had been a great success and that the Indian army was getting tired and worn out by having to tackle the continuing insurgency in Kashmir. Thus, while Pakistan has made noises about exercising "restraint" along the Line of Control it has not taken any steps to reduce support for the activities of Jehadi groups. The level of violence in Jammu and Kashmir remains unacceptably high, with the security forces taking higher casualties during the first month of the cease-fire than they had taken earlier. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that Musharraf is going to show any inclination to cool his passion for Jehad in Kashmir.

With the Clinton Administration now in a lame duck state, Musharraf will obviously play for time to see if as a fellow soldier, General Colin Powell will show greater regard for him than the Clinton Administration was prepared to manifest. Thus, while Musharraf will make moves that he will claim are conciliatory, it is doubtful that he will be either prepared to meaningfully reduce the level of violence in Jammu and Kashmir or talk to India in realistic terms in the next few months. In view of these developments, it would be highly counterproductive for India to rush into a dialogue with Pakistan even as violence continues. But, at the same time, New Delhi has to take measures to respond to the yearning for peace amongst people in Kashmir.

The proposed visit of the Hurriyat leaders to Pakistan will be meaningful and make the Hurriyat a credible grouping, only if they make it clear to Musharraf and others that for any peace process to be meaningful, violence would have to end and Pakistani Jehadi groups would have to withdraw their militants from the valley. In the meantime, preparations need to be initiated to strike at the foreign militants in their hideouts should violence and cross border support for terrorism continue. New Delhi should not tolerate incidents like those on December 22 when armed militants entered the Jamia Masjid in Srinagar and acted provocatively, with the security forces looking on. The carrying of weapons in public should be regarded as a violation of the cease-fire and dealt with accordingly.

Given the mentality of the Punjabi dominated military establishment in Pakistan, it would be unrealistic to expect any meaningful changes in policy unless the strategic costs of continuing its present policies exceed any expected benefits. New Delhi should not relent in its diplomatic and other efforts to raise the national strategic costs for Pakistan as long as it persists in its present policies. We should reach out to sections of opinion in both POK and the Northern Areas to address the need for portions of Jammu and Kashmir across the Line of Control being provided a measure of autonomy akin to that provided to J&K under the Indian Constitution, before other issues are considered.

Further, under no circumstances should the Hurriyat be allowed to create an impression internationally that they alone can speak for the Kashmiri people. As former Foreign Secretary M K Rasgotra recently noted, many so called "leaders" of the Hurriyat enjoy a following at best at "Mohalla" level. The main utility of the Hurriyat leaders, like that of Jerry Adams and the Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, is that they serve as a conduit for conveying the yearning and imperatives for peace to terrorists who carry guns and their mentors.

India is going to face a number of diplomatic and internal security challenges in the coming weeks and months, as it strives to respond to the yearning for peace in Kashmir, even as Pakistani backed Jehadis seek to undermine the peace process. But, New Delhi should never forget that while the outside world may commend our "restraint" and "statesmanship", both our adversaries and our friends often regard nations that fail to act decisively in the face of continuous provocation as weak and soft .

G Parthasarathy