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Angrez gaye, aulaad chhad ke

Today, six days before the end of the extended 'non-initiation of combat operations' by the Indian security forces, I thought of Mannu Mudalaiyar, whose 32-year-old son Dhanasekhar was among the hostages of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane. On December 30, 1999, Mudalaiyar had said: "Dhanasekhar's wife has been ailing and his mother very upset about the hijacking... [but] the government should not yield to the unreasonable demands and blackmailing of the hijackers though I fully realise that any untoward incident in the aircraft could be at the cost of my dear son." Supporting him was R P Rajagopalan, whose brother was also aboard the aircraft: "I fully agree that the hijackers should not be able to get away with demands detriment to the country's security." However, the very next day, the worst that could have been done to sap the morale of our security forces and to endanger the lives of people living not only in Kashmir but also in Tripura, Delhi or Cochin, was executed by the halwai of Race Course Road.

Umm... no, I retract that. The release of Masood Azhar is not the worst event in modern Indian history; that prize must go to the unilateral cease-fire in J&K (puh-lease, don't even think that I considered the obliteration of the disputed structure). Azhar's manoeuvres could still have been contained IF the men who are responsible for the security of India knew exactly what their role is, and, if they had the self-confidence to react as a situation demanded. They don't anymore. And I'm not talking about the top brass. The thing to remember is, in any pyramid organisation, only those who are politically adept -- those who have "people skills," "communication skills," etc -- rise to top management positions. These are also those who stop facing the bullets and start worrying about the flak. And so we have Lt Gen J R Mukherjee's public demonstration of remorse over the firing incidents at Haigam and Maisuma, virtually admitting to a mistake, which, if it was indeed one, has yet to be established by the court of inquiry.

I'm talking about the foot-soldier engaged in counter-insurgency operations -- the one who has become cannon fodder, the one who's regarded as a necessary but expendable ingredient that makes our sick system and may make the cease-fire work. He's the ordinary lad from Gurdaspur or Kolhapur who more often doesn't know a word of English; the one who depends entirely on his more-educated platoon leader, who, in turn, must believe that he receives a focused Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (haha!). The jawan, captain, major or lieutenant involved in CI ops, whether of the army or the paramilitary, has a fairly decent chance of survival if he's blessed with a decentralised execution (eg, no orders from people who travel to Kupwara only in choppers for occasional photo ops); can engage in an aggressive, *continuous* reconnaissance; can have flexible plans, both logistic and operational. For those in the killing fields, defensive does not work. Because, in a CI environment, the terrorist has the advantage of the initiative. It is the terrorist who decides when, where and how, while the soldier's at the receiving end. The only way to negate this disadvantage is by the soldier's being -- and thanks to Putty Man Advani, I've come to puke at this word -- pro-active, quick-reacting and *unpredictable*.

CI ops are a deadly game of wits. A soldier has to alarm the terrorist before the latter unnerves him. Fast and lighting reactions are required wherever and whenever there's a shadow of doubt. Even if the result is zero, at least the quick action helps in unsettling the enemy, which also leads to the enemy's not taking the security forces for granted. Secondly, since the terrorist is almost always hiding amongst the common people, treating *everyone* with suspicion keeps the soldier on his toes. That may cause harassment/inconvenience to the public but it's the price one has to pay when the security forces are fighting an invisible enemy. A delay of a fraction of a second could result in a soldier's losing his life -- a price too high to pay for mere convenience of citizens (who could be terrorist sympathisers, anyway).

Time is not on the side of the soldier. He lives only if he a. reacts swiftly when the hair on his nape bristle and, b. prevents situations where the hair on his nape would bristle. The first situation is, of course, beyond his control, but the latter can be contained and entails cordon-and-search and search-and-destroy missions -- which form the backbone of CI ops. The five essential elements that compose the substance of any CI strategy on a day-to-day basis are: identify the enemy and its reasons for existence; co-ordinate the resources and personnel of all sections of the establishment against it; contain the enemy and wear it down tactically; isolate and frustrate it in every way, politically and militarily; and, finally, destroy it. "Identifying," "co-ordinating," "isolating," etc, are *continuous* processes -- finished only when the soldier has "destroyed." To be successful, CI needs to be a political/military strategy co-ordinating governmental, judicial, economic, social and psychological agencies and dimensions. And therein lies the rub.

At this point, I want an answer from those who cheer on the exalted halwai of Raisina Hills: