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The war in Nepal

Like the war in Afghanistan, much of the war against the Maoists in Nepal is being fought by the Royal Nepal Army from the air. The Maoists have melted into the mountains, avoiding contact with the RNA. They hit soft targets and fight on a ground of their choosing. This will be a long haul because unlike the Taliban the Maoists are known to have the full support of the people of Nepal.

Late in 1989, taking a break from the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, I met my former guruji, Subedar Tularam Thapa, in Pokhara, Nepal. Discussing the situation in Lanka, he predicted a Lanka-like insurgency in Nepal soon. This was four years before the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) had projected its 43 demands, which included the abolition of the monarchy and a Republican constitution. An insurgency in Nepal -- the ultimate Shangri La -- was at the time only for scenario-sketchers.

After a trek to Dang-Ghurai-Rolpa, the epicentre of the Maoist insurrection, I wrote on May 31, 1996: "The uprising is much more than a mere law-and-order problem, though restricted to Rolpa for the moment." The then home minister, Khum Bahadur Khadka (who is also the current home minister) from Ghurai, was charged with soft-pedalling the issue.

The writing was on the wall. But the Maoist insurgency became a political football. The extremists continued spreading their wings throughout the kingdom, securing operational control in the far west and sections of central Nepal and gaining influence elsewhere. More than 3,000 Nepalese have been killed in the People's War. Was it possible to reduce this number?

Two questions arise: first, why was the Royal Nepal Army not used earlier to contain and squash the insurrection; and why did the Maoists choose to attack the army in Dang, the absolute provocation for the imposition of emergency and calling out the RNA. Article 115 of the Constitution of Nepal (1990) authorises His Majesty the King to do so in situations of "war or external aggression or armed revolt or economic depression..."

The army chief, General Prajwalla Shamsher Rana's visits abroad are jinxed. In July he was recalled from the UK after Maoists struck at several police posts. This time around he had to return from Germany to deal with the unprecedented situation of national emergency when an army barrack was attacked. In 1997-98, Kathmandu was seized with stories that then Major General Prajwalla Shamsher Rana was standing by to lead a formation of three brigades against the Maoists, but neither the royal assent nor a political consensus for their employment was forthcoming.

On at least two subsequent occasions, even after the government had recommended the use of the RNA, the king declined permission for their employment, though he cleared their deployment as a confidence-building measure.

So where is the power to mobilise the army in aid of the civil authority located? The constitution is unambiguous on this. While Article 119 has appointed the king as the supreme commander of the RNA, Article 118 stipulates that the king "shall perform the operation and deployment of RNA on recommendations of the government (National Defence Council)". In the past, the king had refused to oblige, as he did not wish, people say, to start a civil war as the people's will was against this. This formulation has been questioned.

The constitution confers on the king both authority and flexibility by the use of the words 'may' and 'shall' in its interpretation. But Article 118 is qualified with the imperative 'shall', not 'may', thereby taking discretion away from the king. What is even more surprising is that no prime minister has dared to question the monarch on this.

There are other reasons for the needless delay in mobilising the RNA. It is no secret that this force is the king's own army, traditionally controlled by the palace. It has been so even after the advent of multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy. The conflict between tradition and law has to be removed.

The RNA has no combat experience, is not trained for counter-guerrilla operations and does not possess the wherewithal for it, given the difficulties of terrain and lack of communication infrastructure. The last time it saw action on its soil was against Khampa rebels in the 1970s as its forebears had, against the British in 1846. On the other hand it has a very impressive record in peacekeeping and is frequently sought in the world's trouble spots.

Being seen to be too close to the palace -- despite its frugal emoluments -- makes it an elite force, especially the senior officers, who are fiercely loyal to the king. Most of them have been reluctant to be drawn in against the people's war. The previous army chief, Gen Dharampal Thapa, had opposed confronting the Maoists. He had, instead, recommended attacking the roots of insurgency -- poverty and lack of economic development.

It is a pity the generals in Nepal, many of whom are honorary generals of the Indian Army, have failed to learn any lessons from the Indian experience. They have made the classical Indian mistake of doing too little too late. The RNA has been aroused now not so much by the call of duty as by the fact that the Maoists dared to strike at them.

One other problem about the control of the RNA -- whose army is it anyway? -- is the internal politics of the ruling Nepali Congress. Former prime minister G P Koirala was forced to step down after the RNA, he said, had let him down on the Holleri police post incident, where Maoists managed to escape from a cordon established by the army.

Koirala's predecessor, K P Bhattarai, had to resign because he too was unable to bring the Maoists to book. Competing political interests are involved in bringing the Maoists to the negotiating table. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba has also failed in taming them.

The biggest losers in the battle against the Maoists have been the police. Their excesses against the Maoists (and imagined Maoists) have been extraordinary. Their grouse has been that they are ill-equipped and untrained to fight the Maoists and that the RNA has seldom come to their rescue when under attack. Nepal has a national police force besides the army. There is no intermediate police or paramilitary force like our CRPF or BSF. An armed police force is now being raised following a belated royal ordinance. A counter-insurgency brigade is also being readied in Kathmandu.

What led the Maoist high command to take on the RNA and even target their families remains a mystery. This fundamental shift in operational strategy is due to a perceived congruence of interests and strategies. Previously the thumb rule was: do not touch the army; do not spare the police. The army decimated the JVP in Sri Lanka only after the latter began harassing its families. Had Osama bin Laden not attacked America, he would have been sitting pretty in Afghanistan.

By their coordinated military strikes throughout the country, this time without sparing the RNA, the Maoists have forced the emergency and enraged the army. This would seem tactically stupid, but strategically wise. After the royal massacre in June, the monarchy, once venerated, has been exposed and discredited. Also, the experiment with democracy has turned out to be the decade of decadence that has, in the perception of the Maoists, left the field wide open for them.

Their new slogan, 'we are the future', may find resonance among the masses disillusioned with both the monarchy and democracy. Drawing the RNA into the fray at a time when the government is paralysed, police demoralised and monarchy under a cloud, is both a strategic gamble and a calculated risk.

The Maoist military command's decision to fight the army may also be related to their internal squabbling, notably the impatience of the warriors against those who advocate negotiations, and a struggle for leadership. But so incompatible are the opposing demands that a political settlement or compromise is unreachable.

Maoist military supremo Ram Bahadur Thapa has thrown the gauntlet at a reluctant Prajwalla Rana. After the imposition of emergency, little is known about the progress of operations except that the RNA has gone first for Rolpa, the heart and soul of the insurrection.

The outcome of the people's war will be decided by the people -- the amount of succour and support they will give the RNA in defeating the Maoists. They have to make a choice between the Maoists and the RNA.

Tularam Thapa, who was the first to see this war coming, has also to make the choice...

Major General Ashok K Mehta (retd)