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HOME | NEWS | COLUMNISTS | MAJOR GENERAL ASHOK K MEHTA |
June 3, 2000
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Major General Ashok K Mehta
India has to take the initiativeBecause of press censorship, reports about the war in Jaffna are conflicting: While the LTTE claims it has overrun Palaly air base and is pounding Kankesanturai harbour, the Sri Lankan government insists its forces are holding out. Exaggerated claims by the Tigers are part of a psychological war and disinformation is an adjunct of the information war. On both counts, the government is losing. Loud hailers and Voice of Tigers radio have been asking the Sri Lankan Army to surrender as they are cut off. They are also telling the soldiers they will be treated with honour and handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the only neutral organisation enjoying the confidence of both sides. The new peninsula war is far from over. It is exactly one month since Elephant Pass fell. The Tigers were expected to capture all of Jaffna, including the air and naval bases, by now. But the Sri Lankan Army, beefed up with new Pakistani multi-barrelled rocket launchers, Israeli jets and new overall force commander Major General Janaka Perera, are making a stand. The LTTE has made multiple thrusts: Along the A9 highway, the Nagarkovil-Point Pedro axis, across Jaffna lagoon, and have even infiltrated the town. The advance towards Jaffna town has slowed as fighting in built-up areas entails fighting from house to house, resulting in collateral damage, which the Tigers want to avoid. Therefore the preference for military targets like the air base and harbour, which make Eelam a geographical reality. Maximum military gain is the best possible bargaining position for the LTTE. Their military objective is unarguably all of Jaffna peninsula with the army either surrendering or evacuating from its positions. The Tigers are unlikely to massacre their captives for fear of a Sinhalese backlash against the Tamils in the rest of the country. Equally importantly, to be seen by the international community as reasonable and civilised freedom-fighters, not the barbaric terrorist organisation they are known to be. On the other hand, any humiliation for the army like the torture and killing of its soldiers and some Sinhalese fear could lead to a Kosovo in Jaffna. The LTTE's victories on the battlefield have fuelled speculation that Eelam is round the corner and that India's staying out is tacit approval for a realignment of the military balance in favour of the LTTE, which would facilitate genuine autonomy for Tamils within a united Sri Lanka. The only contentious issue is how much land does the LTTE need to capture without crossing (in the Sinhalese perception) the Eelam threshold? For that would make it impossible for the government to negotiate at all, let alone concede an acceptable devolution package. Is it Jaffna town, all of the Jaffna peninsula or Trincomalee too? On the other hand, the LTTE's appetite for military conquest makes anything short of Eelam unrealistic. An immediate ceasefire may rob the LTTE of a possible victory. But if delayed beyond a point, Jaffna could spin out of control. On account of the humanitarian disaster accompanying the war, there is a flurry of diplomatic activity to get the two sides to cease fighting and start talking. The Norwegians, whose peace mission was disrupted by the fall of Elephant Pass, are back in Colombo. In a turnaround, Sri Lanka is now saying it is ready for unconditional talks. But the LTTE, which made the offer first, is unlikely to accept now. After a long spell of silence, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the media that India is monitoring the situation and would act if necessary, only hours before the Sri Lankan foreign minister had noted in an interview to an Indian magazine that India would be sucked in by events. After ruling out any military involvement, India will only be drawn in for humanitarian assistance and mediation. But for this, the assent of both sides is a prerequisite. The LTTE is hardly likely to give its consent either for evacuation of the army or for an Indian role in the peace process. India is a catalyst to the buildup of diplomatic pressure on the LTTE (with which it has no leverage) to accept the ceasefire and join the Norway-brokered negotiations. Since it is the author of the statement that the Norwegian mediation is not a workable solution, India will have to take the initiative in finding one. Brokering a ceasefire will be as difficult as getting an agreement on the parameters of mediation. The LTTE has to have some incentive to accept the ceasefire, especially when it feels it is on the verge of victory. For the LTTE, winning the war is easier than winning peace.
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