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The Rediff Interview/Prakash Shah

'If we sign the CTBT, we have given up forever the right to test and acquire any weapon that may be needed'

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to divide Indians. While some feel that in the post-Pokhran era India can, and must, sign the treaty as a gesture of goodwill, others remain opposed to the pact, fearing that it will trap India's nuclear security potential in its infancy. In the coming days, this Hamletian dilemma of 'to sign or not to sign' will come up for discussion and debate as the leadership decides the course of action.

In 1996, when the CTBT draft was up for discussion at the United Nations, India's permanent representative, Prakash Shah, had eloquently argued India's position. Now retired, Shah insists that despite Pokhran, acceding to the CTBT will compromise India's security aspirations. In an exclusive interview with Amberish K Diwanji, he explains why. Excerpts:

Let's start with the basic premise. Why do you remain opposed to the CTBT even after the Pokhran blasts?

When India chose to oppose the CTBT in 1996, there were clear reasons for doing so. One, of course, was that it was not comprehensive enough. It did not cover all testing, but only explosive testing. Hence it discriminated against countries that did not have nuclear weapons by making it difficult for them to move into having nuclear weapons.

Second, we had sought that the treaty should be a step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons. When the CTBT was being negotiated, it became very clear that the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) had no intention of disarming their arms at all. Hence the objective with which the [NWS] approached the CTBT was that if they could prevent testing and prevent production through the FMCT [Fissile Material Control Treaty], they would have kept the non-nuclear-weapon states from ever acquiring such arms.

And the third major reason -- there were quite a few minor reasons, but I am only listing the major ones -- was that when the CTBT draft was finally prepared, we found that it was not in line with our national security considerations.

As India's representative to the UN, I had written to the UN secretary general and the presidents of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, saying that India would sign the CTBT if some amendments were made, but of course none of the amendments were made.

But all this was in 1996. Today the view is that after India conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998, the situation has changed.

The answer is manifold. First, three of the five nuclear-weapon states [Russia, China and the United States] have not ratified the CTBT. In fact, the US Senate rejected the treaty saying it was not in the US's national interest. Hence, the argument that just because we have carried out nuclear explosions and become a nuclear power [we] should sign the CTBT does not apply.

The second point is that these nuclear powers favoured the CTBT because they do not need to carry out nuclear tests either to acquire or perfect their weapons. The US has carried out over a thousand tests and the others have carried out several. India is the only country that has not carried out so many tests. Of the five Pokhran tests we did, only one was a weapons test. The others were technology demonstration tests.

Now if nuclear weapons are going to become part of our defence systems, as the government says, how is it that India has perfected weapons tests with just one test case while the US carried out hundreds of tests to acquire the same technology? While my knowledge is much less than our scientists, I cannot believe that a single test will give us all the knowledge needed to conduct non-explosive and sub-critical testing, which even some of the nuclear powers don't possess.

First, are you suggesting that India must carry out more tests? Second, the US carried out most of its tests during the Cold War era. Today the world is different. Hence, is your analogy of comparing what happened decades ago with India today correct?

If the scientists and the government were to come out and say that one nuclear weapon test is sufficient for the nuclear deterrent that India wishes to have, then it is a different matter. But so far, no such statement has come, either from the scientists or the government.

If you look at the so-called nuclear doctrine put forward by the government, it speaks of a 'no-first-use decision" and a 'second-strike capability'. To have a successful second-strike capability requires a wide range of nuclear arms on land, in the air and in the seas. If the scientists are willing to assure me that one land-based weapon test is sufficient to develop a successful second-strike capability on land and in the air and sea, I am willing to change my opinion. But as yet, no scientist has said so.

The US secretary of state [Madeleine Albright] has gone on record to say that [Washington] wants the CTBT signed to prevent non-nuclear-weapon states, including India, from making compact nuclear weapons. Will the scientists and the government tell us that to be a serious nuclear-weapons state, we don't need compact weapons for our security, that we are willing to stay only with 1,000pound weapons? How will we deliver such weapons? What is the relation between the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons and tests?

What are we aiming for? Are we aiming for a second-strike capability? If not, why declare that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons?

What are the options then?

First, let us ask the question why did India for so many years refuse to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And this applies to a variety of governments that have held power. We have assured in the past that while we have no intention of using nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes, we will not sign the NPT. And it is because successive governments refused to sign the CTBT that we were actually able to carry out the Pokhran tests. Hence, we should guard against signing the document.

We have already announced a moratorium on further testing. Of course, it can be asked that if we have announced a moratorium, why not legalise it by signing the CTBT. The answer is the dynamic nature of international relations. What happens 10 to 15 years from now? What if the Chinese or Pakistani nuclear weapons become more sophisticated? Then we will have to move from our current level of deterrence to a higher level for which we will need testing. If we sign the CTBT, we have given up forever, for our future generations, the right to test and acquire any weapon that may be needed in future for our national security.

No treaty is cast in stone. If in future our national security is threatened, surely we have the right to pull out of the CTBT and do what is in the nation's interest?

The same is true of the NPT, yet we did not sign it. Why?

The second point is that North Korea decided to withdraw from the NPT five years ago. Its history shows how difficult it is for a country to withdraw from a treaty, the international pressure it faced, forcing North Korea to reverse its decision. Similarly, if today Iran or Iraq decide to pull out of the NPT and the obligations the NPT imposes, it is practically impossible.

The practical way out is that you will not sign the treaty, but will follow its guidelines. I have nothing against India not going in for explosions as long as India considers it in its national interest to do so. But a time may come when it may be in our national interest to do the tests, so why bind ourselves now?

India is a country that is committed to complete disarmament. Hence, can't we take the initiative in signing a treaty rather than waiting for others?

We did sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. So we have already signed two conventions of the three types of weapons of mass destruction. And we signed the CWC and BWC [because] both are comprehensive and both apply equally to all.

We haven't signed the NPT because it discriminates against non-nuclear-weapon states. We have said, and this was repeated during the CTBT negotiations, that if negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons are to begin, we are ready to adhere to any of the treaties that can lead up to such elimination. If the CTBT is even accepted today to lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons, then I am sure we will be willing to adjust our policies.

But no such thing is happening. None of the nuclear-weapon states is even talking about giving up its nuclear arms. What is worse is that they are going back on some of their existing treaties like SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]. And the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty is in tatters with the US preparing its Theatre Missile Defence and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence which, the Russians claim, violates the ABM.

Why then do you think this idea of signing the CTBT started?

The whole issue came up after the Pokhran tests when India and the United States began talking about the new ground situation that had come up - India's nuclear weapons. But the US does not want to accept India as a nuclear-weapons state, and it has made this amply clear in its various policy statements.

India began talking, as far as I can see, to get acceptance as a nuclear-weapons state, and even after 10 rounds of talks, I think the American nuclear policy remains unchanged. This policy is, one, that India does not need nuclear weapons for its security; second, that the US will never, never accept India as a nuclear power; and third, the whole objective of the US non-proliferation regime is to ensure that India submits to the NPT and FMCT.

If after all these negotiations we are still not considered a nuclear power, what will we gain? Because then, even after signing the CTBT, we will be kept out of the nuclear suppliers club and the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime]. The Americans have made this very clear. So what is the benefit?

Many believe there will be economic gains for India through closer Indo-US ties.

Here I have major differences with people who seek a playoff between economics and politics. For a long time, all the governments of India have maintained that economic pressure to change political policies is not acceptable to India. We have consistently kept economic, political and defence policies separate. If today we succumb to pressure to gain some economic benefits, tomorrow the same tactics will be used. Other countries may say give Kashmir to Pakistan or economic sanctions will follow! No self-respecting country can accept such pressure.

Today, the only country that has specifically related economic aid to signing the CTBT is Japan. I know as a former ambassador to Japan that when Tokyo tried to use this same tactic to get India to sign the NPT, we made it very clear that you give us aid because you think it is mutually beneficial to both countries. Your aid benefits your trade, because it gives Japanese companies a chance to trade with India.

Anyway, sanctions were never placed on India for rejecting the CTBT, which happened way back in 1996. Sanctions were applied for the Pokhran tests, and can we today roll back the nuclear tests? We should tell such countries that they must remove sanctions voluntarily, or we can live with the sanctions.

You have also warned about the verification process. Can you elaborate?

When the CTBT was being negotiated, we did not pay attention to the process of verification because we had no intention of signing it. But today, since there is talk of signing the CTBT, my point is please study the verification provisions and its implications, and are we prepared to accept them? No one has spoken about the verification process, choosing to circumvent it completely.

In my opinion, the verification rules are so stringent for the non-nuclear-weapon states that they will affect our security. What is relevant is that these verification provisions were applied to Iraq under UNSCOM [UN Special Commission for Monitoring] and we now know through UNSCOM team revelations that the team actually spied on Iraq and the leadership of Iraq through low-flying aircraft.

The CTBT allows low-flying aircraft over nuclear facilities. Such low-flying aircraft will be provided by the bigger powers. Can we ensure what data will be collected, whether they will not be spying, and can we even stop it from happening? If we are in the CTBT, we can't.

Hence, my point is have we studied all these provisions and after studying them do we still want to compromise on our national security by signing the CTBT? Because once we sign the CTBT, we legally allow such verification.

Any other points you would like to make?

I am only seeking to be cautious. And my caution has been vindicated by the fact that even the US Senate rejected the CTBT for being against the US's national interest. China, a reason that India went nuclear, has not yet ratified the CTBT. Neither has Pakistan. And there is no surety that if India signs so will Pakistan. After all, even the US promised to ratify and did not! When our national interest is at stake, we can never trust anyone. Because situations change, and hence policies change.

One last point. Some Indians say that since we have announced a moratorium, signing the CTBT will only legalise the situation without making a difference. That is completely wrong. Otherwise why would the US spend so much time, money and effort in getting India to sign the CTBT? There may be no harm today, but who can say about tomorrow?

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