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Why is New Delhi pussy-footing on Islamabad's involvement in the hijacking?

It was never anybody's case that New Delhi should not have released the three terrorists when it was the only option to save the lives of 150 passengers and the crew of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane. The complaint is that the government has not answered the questions wracking the people's mind. Three weeks have gone by but none is wiser than before.

There is yet not a single, coherent, authentic account to explain how the hijackers were listed on the Airlines' roster. Since it was an international flight, the nationality would have been shown against every passenger's name. Who were the hijackers? If they were foreigners, they must have obtained a visa. The exemption is for the Nepalese, not for others.

Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has said that the hijackers sneaked into the plane. It is possible. But then how did the number of passengers in the plane tally with the number of boarding cards issued? It is not possible that the one who got the boarding card did not travel himself and passed it on to a hijacker. Was it so?

Allowing the plane to fly off from Amritsar when the authorities had a warning beforehand that it might land there, is unforgivable. But why were the commandos late to arrive if they were flown from Delhi in time? Were the instructions given late? Since the matter is under investigation, one can withhold one's judgment till the report is available.

The halt at Dubai, like the one at Amritsar, was not on the hijacker's itinerary. For obvious reasons, they wanted to land in Afghanistan, preferably Kandahar, which is purely Pusthu-speaking and which does not have the smattering of other tribes as Kabul has. However, once the plane reached Dubai for refuelling, what were the efforts made to keep it there? Pakistan Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf has alleged that the Indian government did not ask the UAE authorities not to let the plane take off. Is this true?

After the plane landed at Kandahar, there was no activity, although three days had passed by then. The hijackers had made it clear, after capturing the plane over Lucknow, one hour after leaving Kathmandu, that they wanted to have direct talks with the Government of India and that they wanted the release of the 31-year-old Maulvi Masood Azhar, imprisoned ideologue of the Harkat-ul-Ansar. What was New Delhi's purpose in delaying the negotiations? Why did they not agree to Azhar's release and clinch the settlement when the plane was still in India?

These and some other questions, even if replied by the government, will not satisfy the nation. The entire episode has not been dealt with in a transparent manner. The government's credibility is in doubt. There has to be an inquiry by a commission headed by a Supreme Court or the High Court judge, serving or retired, to go into the entire gamut of hijacking and the government's response at different times.

And it was sad to note that Jaswant Singh's telephone calls to foreign ministers of several countries elicited no immediate response. President Clinton spoke on Kashmir but did not mention a word about the hijacking when the lives of some 160 men, women and children were hanging in the balance. A few countries said something through their spokesmen, more to please New Delhi than to name the instigators of hijackers. Even the tone of condemnation was cursory.

When the negotiations began, there were leisurely sessions. It is understandable that the team headed by a joint secretary could not take any decision on its own. But the communication, back and forth, was too sluggish. India lost an opportunity to put the hijackers in the wrong. For example, it could have accepted straightaway two out of the three demands, paying in cash $200 million and sending the body of Harkat-ul-Ansar chief Sajjad Afghani in a coffin. The Taleban got the credit for making the hijackers withdraw those demands.

New Delhi could not even expose the mercenary approach of the hijackers. It was essentially a war of nerves. It was only after reaching Kandahar that the hijackers, who wanted Azhar to begin with, raised their demand to the release of 35 more terrorists. Surprisingly, even before the Union Cabinet met to sanction the release of the three, the Pakistan press had already reported that only three people were sought to be released.

On December 27, four days before Jaswant Singh went to Kandahar, Air Marshal (Retd) Ayaz Ahmed Khan said in an article, 'Hijacking at Kathmandu', in a Lahore daily, The Nation, that "the ball is in India's court in the sense that New Delhi will have to accommodate the hijackers' demand of release of three of their compatriots…" Incidentally, this again shows how much Pakistan knew about the hijacking all along. By merely denying, as General Musharraf has done, or by saying that it is "India's pilot," as Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar has done, Islamabad does not absolve itself of the charge that it was an ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) show.

In retrospect, what should one say about Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman Tariq Itaf, who said within 48 hours of the hijacking: "A reliable source told us that an Indian agent is on board the plane. Soon you will know the identity of this RAW agent." Hostility towards India makes the Pakistan Foreign Office tell a white lie, without batting an eyelid.

It is, however, not understandable why New Delhi is pussy-footing on Islamabad's involvement in the hijacking. If the government has the information, as prime minister secretary Brajesh Mishra has claimed to possess, then it should let the country and the world know. The impression given by official sources is that ISI men planned the hijacking and guided negotiations all though, although the Taleban were in the forefront.

In the last stint of the Vajpayee government, the home ministry had promised to issue a White Paper on terrorism from across the border. The document, listing Pakistan's activities, was withheld after printing. Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore reportedly came in the way. The White Paper should be distributed now.

The Taleban have, no doubt, 80 to 90 per cent of Afghanistan under them. But they have only enforced their authority, not established it. They lack popular support and their legitimacy is still questioned. The much-wanted Osama bin Laden continues to enjoy their protection. They, as a Pakistan expert has said, are "recognised more as a source of terrorism -- the world's largest poppy-growing area for drug trafficking and violation of human rights -- than as an orderly, civilised state." One only hopes that New Delhi's contract with the Taleban is not followed up with something else.

The government must realise that the Taleban allowed the hijackers and the three terrorists to disappear. Whether they crossed into Quetta or not is not relevant. Both the Taleban and Islamabad will see to it that no harm comes to them. If at all Pakistan does arrest them, under pressure of the world opinion, it would be a stage-managed show. Former ISI chief of Pakistan Hamid Gul has already said: "the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan are very porous. There is no way you could monitor them or exercise control over them there. In the area, there are tribes which straddle both sides. They can give them (the hijackers) sanctuary and will not hand them over."

One recalls how the Khalistanis, who hijacked the Indian Airlines plane to Lahore, more than two decades ago, were kept in a bungalow after they were tried and 'sentenced' by a Pakistan court. They were never sent to jail. They are now free persons. The arrest of hijackers, who also murdered an Indian passenger, does not mean much in Pakistan. They should be handed over to India if the ends of justice are to be met.

Kuldip Nayar