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Testing times for Kumaratunga

Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga's failure to get the new constitution passed in Parliament resulted in early dissolution of the House and fresh elections. This was seen as a personal political defeat for her. It came about after she had made sure she would get the numbers required to usher in a new constitution. This defeat comes on top of a military disaster that could have destroyed her politically had the LTTE not been stopped at the gates of Jaffna.

Elections have been called for October 10 which, despite her troubles, she will make sure her party wins. The power of incumbency is very strong in Sri Lanka. There is no doubt that the next election will be the most violent and vicious in Sri Lanka's history, with the LTTE's shadow over Colombo and breathing down the army's neck in Jaffna.

If the Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher has changed the fortunes of war alternately in favour of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Army, in that order, the familiar suitcase device of India could not give Kumaratunga the defectors necessary to garner the magic figure of 150 votes which would have altered the course of Sri Lankan history.

Two parallel and complementary wars are being fought in Sri Lanka. Neither had been going well for Kumaratunga, especially the one in Jaffna. That is, not until the infusion of new battle-hardened commanders like Major Generals Janaka Perera and Sanath Fonseka and additional firepower like the Pakistan-supplied MBRL which stemmed the rot and halted the contagion among the SLA of panic withdrawals against the LTTE's Operation Ceaseless Waves.

The SLA has not won a major victory since it captured Jaffna in 1995 which is now within the grasp of the Tamil Tigers. While ordinary Sri Lankans are asking why their army, reinforced with Rs 12 billion and awesome firepower, can't finish off the terrorists, military commanders are divided over their capability to hold back the Tigers. Some retired officers were suggesting that besides bad leadership, corruption and no training, the lack of offensive spirit in the 120,000-strong army was due to a disease called Funk-itis which the late President Jayawardene had acknowledged as bhaya (fear). Fear not just of 10,000 Tamil Tigers but the spectre of another 60 million Tamils just 17 km from Jaffna.

The present lull in Jaffna is not being attributed to any gallant action by the SLA but is due to the LTTE running out of steam. Never before were the LTTE so close to a victory that would have made the dream of Eelam come true. On the ground there is a stalemate which is far from being stable. Senior commanders in charge of 35,000 soldiers in Jaffna were not writing off the 3500-strong enemy. On the other hand, they gave the Tigers who have punched a strategic salient close to Jaffna an even chance of recapturing at least the town. This became more likely as both the so-called saviours and defenders of Jaffna peninsula, Generals Perera and Fonseka, were given their marching orders after just three months in command and while the situation is still very fluid.

Shuffling commanders is a favourite pastime of the establishment. The day the news of Janaka Perera's removal was made public, there was a minor uproar in Colombo with Buddhist monks demanding his reinstatement. Not since Sri Lanka's war hero General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, who was killed in a landmine blast in 1993, has SLA produced a soldiers' general till Perera appeared on the scene with a string of gallant actions behind him. Many motives were being given for his sudden removal, chiefly his alleged connections with the opposition, UNP.

During the panic and crisis days of a possible evacuation from Jaffna, Perera is reported to have told his commanders that there would be no withdrawals, adding that in that event "we will become fertilizer for Jaffna's soil." The last ditch battle for Jaffna is still to be fought. That battle will come before the end of the year which is the deadline set by the Tiger chieftain Prabhakaran for taking back Jaffna.

Two battle scenarios are possible: One, that the war will go on certainly till Jaffna town has been retaken and the 1995 ground positions are restored. This is Prabhakaran's declared objective and could happen to coincide with the elections. When that happens, the LTTE may be prepared to join the peace talks. The second and more likely post all-of-Jaffna scenario would see the war escalate and spread to the south and east to force an Eelam. That however, is, beyond the current capability of the LTTE.

The other war over devolution and constitutional reform was intense and fought more robustly by the government against Sinhala chauvinists and the Buddhist clergy. The constitutional reforms package had been on the backburner for some time. The fright of a military catastrophe in Jaffna in June forced the government to hastily wrap up the package and put it to parliamentary test after which it was to be presented to the LTTE. The UNP has rejected the new constitution on several counts: that it will lead to the division of the country; the executive presidency has not been abolished; and without the LTTE, it is like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.

The fact is, the UNP has its own model of a new constitution and following the established political tradition of Sri Lanka, as the opposition party it will never support any bill proposed by the ruling party. The high priests of the Malwatte and Asigiriya chapters have also rejected the new constitution.

The government is offering the present constitution as a peace treaty, as a means of dealing with terrorism, providing constitutional rights for Tamils and for conflict resolution. The non-LTTE Tamil groups which have given up arms and their demand for an independent state are all agreed on two issues -- Chandrika Kumaratunga is the first Sinhalese leader who is sincere and determined to end the ethnic conflict; and the devolution package, albeit imperfect, is the best offered so far to the Tamils. She has assured her Tamil political allies that she would be able to improve on the devolution package by and by.

The main Muslim party in the East is the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress which has threatened to break away from the People's Alliance over seat distribution. It has been part of the ruling alliance since it came to power in 1994. The Muslims plan to carve out a Muslim region in the east in case a referendum stays the merger of the north and east. They also want to provide safeguards to Muslims in other parts of the northeast.

The main sticking points that remain in the devolution proposal are about the temporary merger of the north and the east, control over land, and the structure of the interim administrative council. The devolution bill provides for an automatic demerger of the two provinces in case a referendum is not held within five, extendable to ten, years in the east in Batticaloa and Trincomalee. The inclusion of a board of ministers and an executive committee in the nominated interim council for the northeast together with key subjects being assigned to the two Sinhalese and Muslim deputy chief ministers is seen as repugnant. These and other objectionable provisions in the bill were sought to be removed by moving amendments. The dilution in devolution has evolved under pressure from a wide spectrum of opposition to reforms.

Clearly, Kumaratunga is determined to share power with the Tamils in as equitable a manner as she will be allowed to by her fellow Sinhalese. India cannot remain aloof to the political and military developments in Sri Lanka and has to be seen, even in south India, to be influencing events which are in India's national interests. And of course, in Sri Lanka's interests too.

General Ashok K Mehta