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Differences crop up between BSF, army in Kashmir

Chindu Sreedharan in Srinagar

A battle of sorts is on within Kashmir's security apparatus. And at blame is the Kargil conflict.

The counter-insurgency operations in the state are coordinated by the unified headquarters, which comprises the chief minister, the top brass of the paramilitary outfits including the Border Security Force, the state police chief, and the commander of the army units. The UH is different from the unified command concept practiced in the north-eastern states. And that precisely is the reason behind today's trouble.

Which, if put in simple terms, is an ego clash: the BSF, it would appear, has a thing about taking orders from an army officer.

The result? Well, the paramilitary outfit is now pushing strongly in Delhi to be given sectors independent of the army.

Under the UC concept, the army is the unquestioned boss of all security operations. In Kashmir, however, though Lieutenant General Krishan Pal of the 15 Corps is the security advisor to Chief Minister and UH chairman Dr Farooq Abdullah and, by virtue of that post, swings more weight than the rest, he is technically not in the driver's seat.

"This creates problems," say defence sources, "For instance, if you want to move a BSF battalion from one place to another, it doesn't happen immediately as it would in the case of an infantry unit. The BSF may want to check with higher authorities in Delhi etc. So there is an element of time loss, which you cannot afford in a fluid situation like that in Kashmir."

Though the police outfits did not take too kindly to orders from Lt Gen Pal, the friction was minimal till the Kargil conflict. Then, all infantry units engaged in security operations were pulled out from the valley and sent to the border. Some 20-odd paramilitary battalions came in to fill the vacuum. Lt Gen Pal was relieved of his charge at the unified headquarters and was replaced by Rashtriya Rifles Director General Lt Gen Avtar Singh.

The paramilitary outfits, of course, found it more difficult to swallow orders from the chief of RR, which, technically, is not part of the regular army. Plenty of friction, a series of militant attacks and two months later, Lt Gen Pal was brought back.

But the BSF had by then decided it would rather be on its own.

Army officers, for their part, do not feel the paramilitary outfit should be given independent sectors. For one, they argue, unlike the infantry, the BSF is trained for defence more than offence. And offence is what a situation like Kargil demands.

In fact, many feel the recent spate of violence in the valley -- blatant attacks on army camps, increased blasts on the road etc -- was because the paramilitary personnel who were brought in during the Kargil conflict failed to fill the army's shoes.

"They went into a sort of defensive crouch," an officer explains, "They were content with defending their positions. What was needed was to be on offense - you know, more patrolling into sensitive areas etc."

The army claims the situation has improved since Lt Gen Pal came back. As proof, they offer statistics: "Unofficially General Pal had taken over on August 19 (on record he returned on August 26). Between then and September 13, 78 militants have been killed. Only 8 soldiers died in those operations.

''When the paramilitary was in charge, for every two militants killed we were losing a person. But now we are back to the earlier ratio of 1:8/9."

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