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No action on defence reforms

Forty days after the deadline set for defence reforms by Defence Minister George Fernandes, in uncharacteristic style Chief of Army Staff General Ved Prakash Malik said during a recent university lecture that "there was no action in the integration and restructuring process." He explained that synergisation of defence was key to success in modern warfare. Malik, for that matter other service chiefs, rarely go public over their unhappiness on slated demands and their non-fruition. The only exception is the defence budget which has become a dialogue of the deaf.

Besides being the longest serving and senior-most service chief, Malik is also the Chairman Chief's to Staff Committee, a ceremonial post but notionally powerful when held by the COAS who calls the day-to-day shots.

Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis, barely two months in office, is being seen as a welcome change after the inglorious tenure of his predecessor, Air Chief Marshal S K Sareen. Similarly, Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar, who replaced Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, is also brand new, though he is seen as someone with limited sea time who has come in from the cold. His plight is similar to that of Malik's predecessor who stepped into office on the death of the incumbent. This description of the triumvirate is necessary to measure its freighted weight.

Malik is angry George Fernandes has not been able to keep his promise on the initiation of the reforms package which consists of streamlining higher defence organisation through integration and restructuring. Both have been a bit unrealistic in expecting to change the system so dramatically so soon. Such a call for institutional change has been articulated seriously for the first time in decades though some proposals were made in the past.

This time the initiative for change has come not from the services but the political leadership, specifically George Fernandes, not the least to unburden himself of the tragic Bhagwat case. The stumbling block in the reforms process is the lack of unanimity within the military itself -- the historical aversion to reform by the air force and to a lessor extent, the navy.

The air force fears that its traditional role in tactical support of the army will get enshrined, depriving it of the strategic autonomy it has sought but been unable to achieve. Paucity of air assets and absence of an air doctrine have forced it to play second fiddle to the army and navy. The confusion over the concept of air superiority as part of an integrated air-land battle has also not been cleared. One of the reasons for this is the absence of integrated planning and war fighting.

The history of the air force's equipment acquisition plan, the off-the-cuff induction of the hi-tech Su-30 MK in 1997 in preference to the outstanding requirement of the Advanced Jet Trainer and other aberrations in equipment indications, have cast doubt in the capacity of the Indian Air Force to evolve and promulgate its role in the post-Cold War era. The navy has a similar problem. But that will have to wait.

The main worry in the IAF is that an integrated defence ministry and restructured COSC would give it even less flexibility and operational clout than it enjoys today in the splendour of Vayu Bhavan. ''It would eventually lead to air commands being merged with and subordinated to army and naval commands.''

This is infinitely better than the bizarre example of the disjointed planning and development of the IAF in the location of its operational commands. These are removed at great distances from the army commands they are required to support. For example, the army's eastern command is in Calcutta, whereas the IAF is in Shillong and so on. The piecemeal creation of military assets is wasteful. One hopes the proposed far east naval command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands will flow from the strategic defence review and not the usual knee-jerk reaction.

Another worry for the air and naval chiefs is the proposal to create a permanent chairman COSC or the Chief of Defence Staff -- a fourth four star rank officer. Practically every country with a sizeable armed force has a CDS. India is unique. It hasn't had one for 50 years though there used to be a supreme commander and commander in chief just before Independence.

The unfounded suspicion and fear of the civilian leadership of a military takeover has blocked reforms in defence and national security management. This has resulted in the political leadership missing out on integrated professional military advice and subsequently mishandling security situations. The way out of the present mess is to integrate the COSC and have a joint planning staff, the nucleus for which already exists in the defence planning staff.

The fear of the naval and air chiefs that they will be permanently dwarfed by the COAS is ill-founded. The government should appoint (not as at present, by rotation), the CDS by selection on merit and fitness, the most suitable military officer at the time. This is the system followed the world over.

We may not immediately devolve operational responsibility on theatre commands but let the existing dispensation continue till the first two steps -- merger of the service headquarters with the defence ministry and a restructured CDS -- are operationalised and assimilated. The devolution of financial power, increased autonomy in its internal affairs and a greater say in decision-making are the reforms the military is immediately seeking.

The civilian establishment should not quibble over these demands and give up service turf it has usurped in the first place. This is not going to be easy. Accession to these reforms will streamline, not weaken civilian control. In his book Defending India, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has called for the creation of institutional structures of higher defence organisation for national security management. His plea must add weight to the collective appeal of the military establishment for this.

Firm political direction and not necessarily consensus is the need of the hour.

General Ashok K Mehta