ELECTION 99
COLUMNISTS
DIARY
SPECIALS
INTERVIEWS
ELECTIONS '98
CAPITAL BUZZ
REDIFF POLL
DEAR REDIFF
THE STATES
YEH HAI INDIA!
ARCHIVES

Search Rediff

Look out!

After becoming a nuclear weapon-state and scoring a military victory in Kargil, India's security compulsions appear cut out for the new government. The mere possession of nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan from launching a limited military operation it calculated was even below the conventional, leave alone the nuclear threshold. The Taliban masquerade, however, failed because of the severity of Indian military response. Pakistan's bid to test Indian resolve has backfired and is the root cause of the fourth military takeover in Pakistan.

The lesson from Kargil is that a calibrated low intensity conflict astride the LoC will continue pending the resolution of Jammu and Kashmir dispute, though a wider war can be ruled out. Consequently, nuclear weapons have made the Indian subcontinent more, not less, secure as western security pundits had predicted. The Line of Actual Control with China, on the other hand, will remain stable as both countries start later this year a new security dialogue, paving way for a final settlement of the vexed border issue.

New serious internal tensions are likely in Tibet and Sinkiang provinces of China, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. India will not escape from their ripple effect. A Maoist insurgency and other internal disorders in Nepal and a democracy movement in Bhutan are bound to spill over into India. These new sources of instability and terrorism will gravitate towards the Indian heartland.

Given the likelihood of a settlement of the northern and western borders in the next 10 to 15 years, India's primary security concern will be internal stability, its longevity connected with trans-border support and easy access to weapons of violence. Hence, proxy wars will be mainly in border states.

Besides other resource-related and environmental threats, the dangers from demographic intrusion and influx of refugees will increase. Modern armed forces and an effective internal security apparatus coupled with good governance and diplomacy will hold the key to de-coupling external threats from internal ones. The safety and security of the state and the citizen will no longer be divisible.

The BJP had made national security a key plank of its 1998 election manifesto. It promised reform and reconstruction of defence and national security. The principal achievements of the BJP-led government were all security-related: Making India a nuclear weapons state, establishing a national security council and a national security advisory board, winning back Kargil, framing draft nuclear doctrines, engaging in strategic nuclear dialogue over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Fissile Material Control Treaty and Missile Technology Control Regime, initiating some reforms in defence services and creating a national security awareness.

On the negative side, they put the cart before the horse. It did all the above without first conducting a strategic defence review which is likely to be finalised later this year. It will no doubt fit some of its strategic security decisions into the chapter of dealing with future uncertainties.

But the more difficult decisions at management and operational levels have been shelved. These will have to be taken by the NDA government. Inter-service and civil military relations are at a new low following the dismissal of the previous chief of naval staff and the politicisation of the armed forces during Kargil and in the run up to the election. An integrated defence command and a chief of defence staff can no longer be wished away. Equally the armed forces can also no longer be kept out of the ministry of defence and the decision-making loop.

Kargil brought up major operational deficiencies in early warning, surveillance, combat equipment and force-multipliers, which were traced back to a 10-year recessed defence budget pegged below 2.5 per cent of the GDP. The government has identified this lacuna and is committed to gradually raising defence spending to a minimum of 3 per cent of the GDP. It has also to decide who -- the army or paramilitary forces -- will fight counterinsurgency operations and maintain internal stability, after which the long-delayed structural reforms in the services must follow. Having put the jawan on a pedestal during Kargil, the government cannot ignore his legitimate demands in pay, welfare and respect.

In Kargil, Pakistan had set out to test the will of the Indian State. It got a drubbing on the battlefield as well as in the diplomatic arena. It was a humiliation comparable to 1971. It will keep Pakistani hawks quiet for some time. This interregnum has to be used to bolster internal and external security without which there can be no political stability and economic security. At the same time, India has to design its nuclear ambitions in the context of its future role as a regional and international player.

There can be no stability in the subcontinent till Pakistan is tamed. The army coup in Pakistan is a setback to the Lahore process. In the meantime, besides anti-terrorism diplomacy, military diplomacy, so far unexplored, holds out some promise in building bridges with the armies in Pakistan and China.

General Ashok K Mehta