Shiv Shankar Menon is from Palakkad, Kerala. When the Indo-US Civil Nuclear agreement was finally concluded, the Member of Parliament representing Palakkad in the last Lok Sabha (also a Menon but from the CPI-M -- the party that was the most vociferous in opposing the agreement) called him. "You've done Palakkad proud," he told the foreign secretary who could only smile. If only the CPI-M had heeded its MPs, it might have made Menon's job easier.
Still, Menon managed to steer diplomacy through the political minefield that accompanied the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with a rare skill and deftness. So it is a mystery that he could have allowed himself to be embroiled in a controversy about the drafting abilities of the Indian establishment.
In line with the generic conviction of most Indians that Pakistan waits for India to trip itself up and India obliges each and every time, MPs, including those from the ruling party, were exercised that India had given up too much to Pakistan in the historic joint statement by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the Non Aligned Movement meeting at the Egyptian resort of Sharm El Sheikh earlier this month.
The points exciting people were three phrases:
(1) 'Terrorism is the main threat to both countries; sharing real-time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats';
(2) 'Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed';
(3) 'Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas'.
Decoupling terrorism from the peace process and the insertion of Balochistan were seen as capitulation, surrender, sellout and so on in India while Pakistan, which was pushing for resumption of the composite dialogue, regarded it as a victory.
In this environment, when MPs asked him questions, Menon's reply was: "You could argue about the drafting [of the statement], it could have been better. But you can't fault the intention."
Immediately an MP shouted, "Then why did you draft it like this?" Menon hastily replied: "These things happen, what can we do?"
Perhaps Menon thought it was okay to make this extraordinary statement because, from the Ministry of External Affair's point of view, the joint statement was not wholly its baby nor did it reflect MEA proclivities.
This is true. On the morning of 16 June, when the Foreign Secretary and the National Security Advisor exchanged notes the general sense was that there was going to be no joint statement.
At 9.30 am, Manmohan Singh met his host, Egyptian President Hosni Mobarak. Scheduled for 10.30 am was the meeting with the Pakistani prime minister. The plan was that after the meeting, Dr Singh would hold a press conference to brief reporters. He would then proceed to the concluding session of the NAM conference and fly back home.
Things began going wrong just about then. An accident on the main Sharm el Sheikh road caused a traffic pile-up, forcing the prime minister to take another route to his hotel where Gilani was coming to call on him. Then, the cars reached the wrong gate, causing another delay. Just as the protocol chiefs on both sides were ready to strangle their respective teams, the Indian side called the Pakistanis and told them there would be a ten-minute delay. All this is incidental but it added to the generally fraught environment.
The two prime ministers met and then retired for a one-on-one meeting -- with no note-takers. They were closeted for 50 minutes to an hour. After that, the two foreign secretaries were called in and told to prepare a joint statement -- with elements the MEA had not anticipated -- and they retired to an adjoining room to prepare the draft of the joint statement. This took almost two hours.
It was only after this that the delegations from both sides met. Interestingly, Manmohan Singh noted early on the presence of one individual on the Pakistani delegation: Anusha Rahman from the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). She represented the political consensus in Pakistan on the fact that Kashmir was not the only issue defining India-Pakistan relations anymore and that the Pakistani political establishment as a whole considered the Taliban a threat.
At the larger meeting, the two prime ministers indicated nothing of the bombshell that was coming. In fact, Rehman's query about the Panchayati Raj system in India so enthused Dr Singh that he gave her a ten-minute lecture on the subject.
Meanwhile, there was news that the hosts had advanced the concluding session of the NAM meeting. Both prime ministers mulled over the issue and decided their meeting was more important. Junior ministers were asked to stand in at the concluding session. At 5.45 pm, Egypt time, the draft of the statement was finalised -- by the MEA.
It was in this context that Menon made his observations, somewhat distancing himself from ownership of a decision in which neither he nor the NSA establishment had participated.
Menon is set to retire by the end of this month, ending a career that could mark him out as one of India's best foreign secretaries. The fact that he superseded 12 seniors to be appointed to the post in 2006 when his equally capable predecessor Shyam Saran retired has more than paid off. As India's envoy in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and China, and while handling Nepal in New Delhi, he chose the JN Dixit approach of 'neighbourhood first'. As a middle-level officer in Vienna and later as the MEA representative in the Department of Atomic Energy, he found no difficulty in getting his mind around complex disarmament and proliferation issues.
And while it is true that simplistic judgements frequently do not reflect the complexities of India-Pakistan relations, Sharm El Sheikh has slightly, and probably unfairly, dulled the end of a glittering career.