Key provisions of the Indo-US nuclear deal

Following are the key provisions of the US legislation to implement the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal reconciled by the House-Senate Conference Committee:

•   The Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 will secure India's:

  a) Full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

  b) Formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles of such initiative.

  c) Public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the guidelines, procedures, criteria and control lists of the Wassaenaar arrangement.

  d) Demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph (c).

  e) Ratification of or accession to the convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997.

• It will secure India's full and active participation in the United States' efforts to dissuade, isolate and if necessary sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability, the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

• The bill states that it is the sense of Congress that the US should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under United States law.

• The US will seek to halt increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.

• The US will ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the US except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

• The US will encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

• Ensure that any safeguards agreement or additional protocol to which India is party with the International Atomic Energy Agency can reliably safeguard any export or re-export to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.

• Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.

• In the binding sections, the bill asks the President to determine that India has provided the US and the IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programmes, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.

• The President shall submit to the Congress a summary of the plan provided by India to the US and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programmes. He shall also submit the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration.

• The President will give to the Congress a description and assessment of the specific measures that India has taken to fully and actively participate in United States and International efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

• He will also provide a description of the steps taken to ensure that the proposed US civil nuclear cooperation with India will not in any way assist India's nuclear weapons programme. -- Termination of Nuclear Transfers to India.
  
• Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and pursuant to this title, exports of nuclear and nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian persons of:
  (1) Nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that is no consistent with Nuclear Supplier's Group guidelines or decisions.
  (2) Ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines, unless that President determines that cessation of such exports will be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States Nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeoparadise the common defence and security.
  
• The President may choose not to terminate exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology of India under subparagraph (a) if:
  (1) The transfer covered under such subparagraph was made without the knowledge of the government of India.
  (2) At the time of the transfer, either the government of India did not own, control, or direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the Indian person that made the transfer is a natural person who acted without the knowledge or any entity described in subparagraph (b) or (c) of section 110 (5).
  (3) The President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of India has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian person with respect to such transfer.
  
• Requirements for Approvals -- exports, re-exports, and retransfers may only be approved if:
  (1) The end user is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved programme to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities or is a facility participating in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities or retransfer is associated with, bilateral or multinational programme to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle.
  (2) Appropriate measures are in place at any facility refereed to in clause (1) to ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology, as defined in section 4 (5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, will be diverted to any person, site, facility, location, or programme not under IAEA safeguards.
  (3) The President determines that the export, re-export, transfer, or retransfer will not assist in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices or the production of fissile material for military purposes.
  
• The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India, including any material noncompliance on the part of the Government of India with:
  (1) The nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the joint statement of July 18, 2005, between the US President and the Prime Minister of India.
  (2) The separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on May 11, 2006.
  (3) A safeguards agreement between the government of India and the IAEA.
  (4) An Additional Protocol between the government of India and the IAEA.
  (5) An agreement for cooperation between the government of India and the United States government arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of such Act.
  (6) The terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding the export or re-export of nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment, or technology.
  (7) United States laws and regulations regarding such licenses.
  
• The President shall also keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India, including:
  (1) The construction of a nuclear facility in India after the date of the enactment of this title
  (2) Significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced.
  (3) Changes in the purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
  
• Implementation and Compliance report: Not later than 180 days after the date on which an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 enters into force, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including:
  (A) A description of any additional nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the government of India has placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards.
  (B) A description of any signficant nuclear commerce between India and other countries, including any such trade that is not consistent with applicable guidelines or decisions of the NSG or will not meet the standards applied to exports or re-exports of such material, equipment, or technology of United States origin. He will also give an estimate of:
  (A) The amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year.
  (B) The amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices.
  (C) The rate of production in India of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices and nuclear explosive devices.