India was reluctant to accept Russia's 'bear hug'

India and Russia may have discussed far-reaching nuclear and defence cooperation behind the closed doors of Hyderabad House during Vladimir Putin's visit on March 12. But according to sources in both the establishments, the Russian offer, still being kept under wraps in India, was almost not signed during Putin's visit.

Until the night before the summit meeting between the two prime ministers, the Indian establishment was extremely reluctant about committing itself to the Russian bear hug, whether in the nuclear energy, defence or space sectors.

The offer on nuclear cooperation, however, was wide-ranging and generous. As part of the inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in nuclear energy and the road map for the construction of nuclear power plants, signed in the presence of the two prime ministers, Russia promised to 'go beyond' the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Speaking to the Russian media after Putin's visit to Delhi, Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Russia's nuclear energy agency, Rosatom, said Russia offered to build 16 nuclear power plants at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu and Haripur in West Bengal, design and build a nuclear fuel fabrication facility in India under IAEA safeguards and set up a joint venture to explore and mine uranium in Russia that would be used in India and third countries.

The joint venture would likely operate at the Elkon uranium field in Yakutia, in Russia's mineral-rich Siberian landmass, Interfax, the Russian news agency reported.

The Russian state-owned mining company ARMZ Uranium Holding Co, or AtomRedMetZoloto, holds the licence to the Elkon field which is estimated to hold 344,000 tonnes of uranium or 5.3 per cent of the world's recoverable reserves.

Kiriyenko, in fact, told Russian reporters back in Moscow that Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation would go much beyond building nuclear reactors and fabricating fuel for use in the several units at Kudankulam and Haripur. Moscow had also offered to jointly manufacture nuclear power equipment, which factories could be located in India.

Strategic nuclear analyst G Balachandran told Business Standard that the Russian offer, if it came to pass, would mean that the mined enriched uranium from Yakutia could be used to fabricate nuclear fuel for the Russian nuclear power plants in India. He pointed out that Moscow's offer of reprocessing rights for the spent fuel, at least for the moment, went beyond the offer from any other country, including the US.

"It's a good offer to help out India," Balachandran said, adding, "Once several nuclear power plants are in the process of being built, large amounts of fuel will be needed for them."

Balachandran also pointed out that the Indo-US nuclear fuel reprocessing pact, said to be in the last stages of finalization, would have to be submitted to the US Congress for approval before it could come into force.

"There is no prior consent for reprocessing US-origin fuel without US Congressional approval. And when this pact goes to the Congress, the House or Senate members could add their own conditionalities to it," Balachandran said.

It now transpires that Russian first deputy prime minister Sergei Sobyanin as well as Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko were closeted with National Security Adviser Shivshanker Menon almost until noon on March 12, only a couple of hours before the two PMs were to start their conversations in Hyderabad House, pleading with him that India sign the Road Map as well as the IGA.

Menon is believed to have told the Russian side that India did not want to commit itself to the Russian-inspired road map because the current Five-Year Plan was coming to an end in 2012 and India did not want to make any promises beyond that period.

But the Russians, mandated by Putin to deliver a "big agreement" with India, told Menon that they were willing to make a compromise: Let India sign the road map in the presence of the two prime ministers in Hyderabad House that afternoon, and it could later back out of any understandings envisaged in the document.

Sobyanin, who had to leave the Menon meeting to accompany his prime minister to a meeting with Congress President Sonia Gandhi, asked another Russian nuclear expert to replace him at the meeting with Menon. Kiriyenko stayed on and the deal was done.

According to Indian sources familiar with the subject, Delhi did not want to be seen to be getting into a cinch with the Russians, especially since the US had done most of the heavy lifting by pushing through the nuclear deal in 2008 and had so far not got any "benefit" out of it.

Moreover, the road map, which envisaged the building of another two nuclear power plants at Kudamkulam (two are coming on-stream this year and 2011, respectively, and construction for another two will begin soon), totalling six plants, also included the possibility of expanding the Kudamkulam site to accommodate another four to six plants.

Meanwhile, there was the Haripur site in West Bengal, where the Russians were offering to build an additional four to six nuclear plants.

With the Indo-US reprocessing pact in its last lap and the Prime Minister readying to travel to Washington DC to attend US President Barack Obama's nuclear summit, Delhi perhaps felt the time was not ripe to publicise nuclear cooperation with the Russians.

In fact, at the Putin visit, agreements on the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the multi-role transport aircraft also did not see the light of day. And when Russia offered that Glonass, the Russian global positioning system, be extended to military signals for Indian use, Delhi demurred. That deal was not signed either, although the Indian side promised to do so later.