'India has experienced any number of doctors, engineers, and individuals from professional backgrounds being implicated in terrorism. This is not a novel development.'
'These are mobilisations of opportunity. One does not exclusively associate with one's own kind. A comprehensive conspiracy requires diverse skill sets.'
'One needs individuals with local community contacts, those possessing physical capabilities, technical expertise -- an entire spectrum of capacities.'
On November 10, a devastating car explosion near Delhi's iconic Red Fort claimed 13 lives and injured more than 20 others.
The blast, which occurred around 6.52 pm near Gate 1 of the Red Fort metro station, was allegedly carried out by Dr Umar Mohammad, a Pulwama native who taught at the Al-Falah School of Medical Sciences in Faridabad.
In the hours preceding the explosion, security forces arrested multiple suspects -- including several doctors -- and recovered roughly 2,900 kilograms of explosive material, along with detonators, timers and firearms, from properties in Faridabad and other locations.
The arrested medical professionals include Dr Muzammil Ahmad Ganai from Pulwama, Dr Adeel Ahmad Rather from Qazigund, and Dr Shaheen Shahid from Lucknow.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah has announced that the National Investigation Agency has taken over the probe.
In this interview with Prasanna D Zore/Rediff on Monday's blast in Delhi, Dr Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management and one of India's foremost counter-terrorism experts, explains the involvement of radicalised professionals, and why India's response options have been dangerously constrained by political rhetoric.
Investigators have revealed that several suspects are medical professionals -- doctors with postgraduate qualifications -- while others include clerics and local businessmen from Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir.
What does this mix of profiles indicate about the nature of this module and the evolving ecosystem of radicalisation?
Nothing whatsoever. This is an entirely conventional mix. We have witnessed this throughout the history of terrorism in India and elsewhere. Consider the precedents: Osama bin Laden was a qualified engineer.
India has experienced any number of doctors, engineers, and individuals from professional backgrounds being implicated in terrorism. This is not a novel development.
These are mobilisations of opportunity. One does not exclusively associate with one's own kind. A comprehensive conspiracy requires diverse skill sets. One needs individuals with local community contacts, those possessing physical capabilities, technical expertise -- an entire spectrum of capacities.
Moreover, recruitment operates on an opportunistic basis. One enlists whoever presents themselves.
Some investigators have begun employing the term 'white collar terror.' Does this module represent a new category of educated network extremism?
Absolutely not. White collar terror is a well-established, historical phenomenon. As I have indicated, individuals from these professional backgrounds have participated in terrorism throughout history. The leadership cadres of terrorist organisations have almost invariably comprised white collar professionals.
But these doctors appear to be ground operatives -- medical professionals actively engaged in bomb-making and deployment.
Indeed, though this too is not unprecedented. I recall -- and would need to verify the records -- a doctor in Mumbai who was implicated in the serial train bombings (of July 2006).
We (The South Asia Terrorism Portal; external link) maintain a 150,000-page Web site replete with such documentation. A comprehensive search would reveal numerous instances of doctors and engineers involved in such activities historically.
Given the arrests spanning Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, are we witnessing a more decentralised, technology-enabled ecosystem -- smaller cells coordinated and radicalised through encrypted communication channels?
This appears to constitute a small unit of associates -- individuals who either commenced their education together or collaborated professionally at some juncture. Regarding this particular group, it is somewhat distinctive.
While doctors have participated in terrorism previously, so many medical professionals converging in a single conspiracy is unusual.
The evidence currently available suggests they were self-radicalised -- radicalised amongst themselves. Their interactions and discourse became progressively more extreme, eventually culminating in a collective decision to engage in terrorist activity.
This resembles a radicalised friendship circle more than a structured recruitment operation.
Authorities have arrested a cleric from Haryana whom they claim was responsible for ideological indoctrination.
Various claims are emerging, but these constitute leaks and planted information. It remains profoundly premature to draw definitive conclusions. As you correctly observed at the outset, there has been no official disclosure. All current information comprises leaks -- some motivated, some speculative.
Some sources suggest these individuals were entirely self-radicalised, while others identify Shaheen as the principal psychological mobiliser with connections to Jaish-e-Mohammed and leadership of the Jaish-e-Mominaat group (Jaish's women's group).
One can advance any proposition at this juncture. I document my assessments meticulously and hold myself accountable for my statements. Consequently, I cannot engage in speculation based on unverified intelligence leaks.
Considering the quantity of explosives recovered and the symbolic significance of the Red Fort location (latest reports state these alleged terrorists were reccing the Red Fort area, do you believe this was intended as a statement strike targeting Delhi's sense of security? And how could these suspects have amassed such substantial quantities of explosive materials?
Regarding the explosives, the actual quantity of ammonium nitrate recovered was just under 360 kilograms. The total of 2,900 kilograms includes fuel oil, detonators, and ancillary material. The ammonium nitrate component represents approximately 360 kilograms.
Regarding procurement, ammonium nitrate is a standard agricultural fertiliser. One can acquire it from any rural supplier. A standard bag contains 50 kilograms. We possess no information regarding the duration -- days, weeks, or months -- they invested in accumulating this material.
If one purchases a 20 kilogram bag every third or fourth day, one can amass 360 kilograms in 18 days. With ten individuals participating, this could be accomplished in merely two or three days.
The critical factor is that ammonium nitrate constitutes a common-use fertiliser. No legal prohibition exists on purchasing bags of ammonium nitrate.
Four doctors appear linked to the Al-Falah Medical College. Does this pattern suggest a deliberate recruitment strategy aimed at infiltrating high-trust positions?
I cannot substantiate such a conclusion. As I have indicated, I would characterise this as a radicalised friendship circle. Four or five individuals within a particular institution, sharing a certain ideological orientation, commenced interacting. They were friends or became friends through their shared radicalised worldview.
At this juncture, I cannot definitively state that a recruitment operation occurred. We do not yet possess evidence that these individuals were actively recruited.
If they self-radicalised -- which appears plausible -- that precludes formal recruitment. They assembled, perhaps began expressing grievances against a particular community, discovered mutual affinity, and expanded their circle by introducing like-minded associates.
From available evidence, this appears to constitute a radicalised friendship circle. Whether this circle subsequently established external contacts or received guidance from other entities remains a matter for investigation and evidence, not speculation.
How does this case expose vulnerabilities in India's counter-terror infrastructure -- whether in digital surveillance or early detection of radicalisation within professional educational institutions?
I do not believe this exposes particular weaknesses in our systems. Someone will inevitably succeed occasionally. Recall the IRA's message to Margaret Thatcher: 'You have to be fortunate all the time. We need only be fortunate once.'
This year alone, 82 individuals have been arrested in India in connection with Islamist terrorism. Last year, 80 were apprehended. This represents a continuous process. Each year witnesses significant arrests, potentially neutralising 50 to 60 conspiracies.
Yet nobody discusses these successes because intelligence work possesses a peculiar characteristic -- one only discusses intelligence during apparent failures. These are not failures; they are natural vulnerabilities.
Countries possessing far superior resources, administrative systems, and policing capabilities experience terrorist incidents. Consider Europe, the Scandinavian welfare States. Even there, terrorist acts occur.
We must comprehend that this particular plot succeeded -- one succeeded. All the other conspirators have been arrested. This individual (Umar Nabi whose i20 car exploded) was most likely compelled to execute this action prematurely because his associates had been apprehended. This represents a natural, residual risk confronting all nations and communities in the contemporary era.
With the investigation now under the National Investigation Agency's jurisdiction, what lessons should counter-terror agencies derive from the speed with which this network spanned states and professions?
Firstly, how do we ascertain the speed of this group's formation? This could have evolved over one week, one month, three months, or years. We possess no definitive timeline.
Every time a significant incident transpires, we search for something novel. Understand that this constitutes a protracted conflict. Considering solely Jammu and Kashmir and Islamist terrorism processes in India, this has persisted for 35 years.
When one is engaged in warfare, one does not question why the adversary is firing upon you each time they discharge a weapon. We understand why -- we are at war. I fire at them; they fire at me.
Novel elements emerge -- new technologies are adopted, new territories are penetrated because established operational areas become increasingly difficult to operate within, which is precisely what is occurring presently.
Kashmir has become exceedingly difficult for terrorist operations. However, these individuals did not relocate from Kashmir because they were active terrorists unable to operate there. They resided in Faridabad and Delhi. Their grievances originated there.
They were located in Faridabad, adjacent to Delhi, and formulated a conspiracy to harm what they perceive as an anti-Muslim community. There is nothing unprecedented here. This constitutes one additional terrorist act.
Unless we declare war on Pakistan, we shall not be discussing this one week hence.
How should India respond without amplifying the ideological objectives of these alleged terrorists?
India confronts a profoundly serious dilemma regarding response options, primarily due to rather ill-considered statements made during and following Operation Sindoor -- specifically, that every act of terrorism will be treated as an act of war. This represented exceedingly immature rhetoric. It was political posturing, but it has been interpreted or translated into national policy and strategy.
Consequently, India finds itself in an extraordinarily difficult position regarding response formulation. Had it not committed to such rhetoric, numerous response options would remain available.
Firstly, there exists the comprehensive policing and justice system response -- managing these individuals through due process. Subsequently, if Pakistani involvement is established, numerous methods exist to target Pakistan without resorting to warfare, without revealing one's hand.
Unfortunately, we insist upon showing our hand before accomplishing anything. The entire purpose appears to be demonstrating to our populace that we have undertaken something extraordinary -- regardless of whether we have actually done so. This creates a fundamental problem.
One need not discuss such operations. One cannot discuss them. By discussing them, one undermines future operational options.
Secondly, one creates substantial international stigma against one's State.
We stand increasingly friendless today. Pakistan sits comfortably in America's lap and simultaneously in China's lap -- the two greatest rivals in the modern world -- and Pakistan maintains excellent relations with both.