'Critics say the political leadership abandoned the army chief or did not back him. I disagree.'
'Military leaders are trained to take decisions when given a free hand.'
'This was a clear go-ahead from the prime minister to the army chief.'
What exactly did Prime Minister Narendra Modi do in those crucial hours during the China stand-off in 2020, and did his leadership leave it to the then army chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane to take a decision on his own, as excerpts from his unpublished book seem to suggest?
This question exploded in the Lok Sabha on Monday after Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi cited excerpts published in the latet issue of Caravan magazine from General Naravane's unpublished memoir Four Stars of Destiny and was shouted down by Bharatiya Janata Party MPs.
Gandhi alleged that Modi remained indecisive for nearly two hours and, by telling the then army chief 'Jo uchit samjho woh karo (do what you think is best)', that he passed on the responsibility for a grave national security decision instead of exercising political leadership.
The government has rejected this interpretation, insisting that the prime minister's message -- conveyed through Defence Minister Rajnath Singh -- was not abdication but authorisation, giving the army chief a free hand to respond based on military assessment.
Did this amount to strong leadership or a shifting of responsibility on to the uniformed leadership? Was the delay deliberate caution or dangerous indecision at a moment when Chinese troops were active along the Line of Actual Control, the boundary separating India and China?
"A prime minister sitting in Delhi, without ground-level military appreciation, cannot take such tactical decisions. No political leader can. The prime minister gives a broad framework. The military commanders have to decide what is appropriate," National Security expert Nitin A Gokhale tells Syed Firdaus Ashraf/Rediff in a must-read interview.
How do you view Monday's controversy in the Lok Sabha over Rahul Gandhi's statement citing General Naravane's book Four Stars of Destiny?
Four Stars of Destiny was written, but never published. Why it was not published is the key question.
The government said it was reviewing the book since it contained current operational and sensitive information.
Some of those aspects, the government says, fall under the purview of the Official Secrets Act.
The book dealt with what General Naravane handled as army chief during the Chinese incursions into Indian territories in 2020.
That is why the book was not published, if I remember correctly.
The main point of the Caravan report was that the political leadership left the decision to the army chief during the Chinese incursions.
Now look at the sequence of events.
Something was happening on the border.
The Northern Army commander informed the army chief that something serious was happening and asked for permission to take counter-measures.
The army chief replied that he would seek 'clarity' from higher authorities.
General Naravane, by his account (as published by Caravan) contacted the higher authorities and according to his own writing quoted in the excerpts, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told him 'Jo uchit samjho woh karo'.
That is what the excerpts published in Caravan state. However, this quote is attributed to Prime Minister Modi, conveyed through Defence Minister Singh to General Naravane.
This means the prime minister gave the army chief a free hand to act according to his military assessment of the situation.
Critics say the political leadership abandoned the army chief or did not back him. I disagree.
Military leaders are trained to take decisions when given a free hand.
This was a clear go-ahead from the prime minister to the army chief.
I do not see any controversy here.
The controversy arose because the prime minister reportedly took two hours to respond when the army chief was calling for decision or approval. And during this time, the Chinese army was entering Indian territory.
Yes, but then local commanders and top army leadership doesn't wait for directives from the top. If there is an emergency, they have the right to take action.
Now once leaders are informed, they naturally take time to weigh the consequences.
Decisions about war or opening fire against a stronger adversary in difficult terrain, especially during COVID, require careful thought.
Any political leader will take time to weigh consequences.
General Naravane writes about the incident of August 31, 2020 in the book excerpts. But the final instructions when they came gave a free hand to General Naravane which he acknowledges going by the Caravan report.
But we also have another version from Lieutenant General Y K Joshi, then the Northern Army commander ('Jo', as General Naravane writes). He says the Indian military knew about the situation from August 29, 2020.
In his interview to us at BharatShakti in 2025, which I have posted on my X account (external link).
General Joshi has narrated how the decision was taken and action was carried out.
But as army chief, General Naravane knew the consequences.
Once he was conveyed the prime minister's message, General Naravane has said even he was thinking of the larger picture, was thinking about COVID and its impact on the Indian economy.
If a military leader thinks this way, imagine the responsibility of the political leadership for the nation and economy.
Therefore, whatever time was taken was necessary.
Can we say the prime minister or defence minister was trying to contact their Chinese counterparts during those two hours?
We do not know that.
General Naravane does not mention this in the published excerpts.
He only mentions making a round of calls to the leadership. They may have consulted among themselves. This is an assumption on my part.
After that, the prime minister must have given the go-ahead.
Rahul Gandhi says that by saying 'Jo uchit samjho woh karo' the prime minister put the burden on the army chief and avoided responsibility instead of showing strong leadership. He implies the prime minister should have ordered an attack on China.
No, India was not attacking China. India was reacting to a situation.
The question was, what response was appropriate to the Chinese military movement.
A prime minister sitting in Delhi, without ground-level military appreciation, cannot take such tactical decisions.
No political leader can.
The prime minister gives a broad framework. The military commanders have to decide what is appropriate.
The unwritten guideline was that India would not fire first, but would respond if China fired.
This is the unwritten rule.
General Naravane told (Northern Army Commander) Lieutenant General Joshi that India would not open fire unless China fired first.
One would expect the prime minister to order retaliation if China enters Indian territory, isn't it?
Is his response not clear enough? He told the army chief, do what you think is right.
After instructions that 'Jo uchit samjho woh karo', the judgement about what appropriate action would deter the Chinese is purely a military decision, not of political leaders.
Is there an unwritten rule that the Indian Army cannot retaliate against China, unlike Pakistan?
No, nothing like that.
You should listen to my interview with Lieutenant General Y K Joshi.
I did two interviews with him, one in February 2021 and another in 2025.
He explained the QPQ, or Quid Pro Quo action.
This means if the Chinese occupy Indian territories, India responds by occupying Chinese territory elsewhere to force them into negotiations.
The Kailash Range operation described by General Naravane was exactly this.
The QPQ action forced China to come to the negotiating table.
You can listen to the seven minute excerpt here (external link).
There is no doubt the Indian Army was surprised in 2020, as described by Lieutenant General Joshi and General Naravane themselves.
The situation was stabilised through QPQ action.
That was the correct military response.
The military must help itself.
Political leaders cannot fight battles.
Is it true that Indian troops are told not to fire on the China border whereas they are free to open fire on the Pakistan border?
On the China border, firing is not routine.
On the Pakistan border, exchange of fire is common.
If firing has not happened for 40 to 50 years on the China border, one has to be cautious.
That is the difference between the China and Pakistan border situation.
What about then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's role in the 1962 War with China? Did his 'throw them out' approach lead to defeat?
China blamed Nehru's forward policy for the 1962 War.
Under this policy, Indian soldiers were placed in isolated posts without support or roads. This was done in NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh.
There is debate over whether Nehru said 'throw them out'.
He also reportedly said that not even a blade of grass grows in Aksai Chin. But don't take these remarks in isolation. The context and the geopolitical situation then were different.
The fact remains that India lost 30,000 sq km in Aksai Chin in 1962.
In his book, General Naravane has also praised Prime Minister Modi.
I have not read the book.
If he has praised the prime minister, then what is the controversy about?
The allegation is that Prime Minister Modi was indecisive and was incommunicado for two hours.
Did he disappear? I have not seen or read any such input.
He weighed his options, carried out consultations is my guess.
He made a decision by saying, 'Jo uchit samjho woh karo'.
No prime minister can order specific military attacks. That must remain a military decision.
The problem is that the government has blocked publication of General Naravane's book, which creates suspicion.
On that you can have two views.
One is a candid recounting of events helps in improving SOPs (standard operating procedure) and decision-making.
The other is: The operation was ongoing, negotiations with China were also in progress when the book was supposed to be published in January 2024. Revealing sensitive details during such a phase would have been deterimental to India's position.
Should General Naravane have been more discreet? And patient? Perhaps. But in his judgement he was not doing anything wrong. That's where it rests.
In hindsight, should General Naravane have written the book?
He should have been more discreet. And should have waited. That's my view.
But for the sake of history, is it not important to know?
Yes, very important, but after a gap.
In the US, such information is declassified after decades.
Time must pass. You cannot publish such details while negotiations are ongoing.
I will give you my own experience.
I wrote (founder, Research and Analysis Wing) R N Kao's biography in 2019. It was based on his papers, on five declassified files. However, three other files (on Bangladesh, the Sikkim merger and Indira Gandhi's assassination) based on his own papers remain classified to date.
He had left instructions that they be declassified only in 2025. The files are lying in the Prime Minister Museum and Library.
In 2025 I requested access, but it was denied due to current sensitivities on Bangladesh. I had no option but to accept that decision. For now.