What appeared to be a generous act of friendship was, in truth, a manoeuvre within a much larger strategic game.
The United States used the 1962 war not just to aid India but to test how far it could be pulled into the Western fold, points out Dr Kumar.
In the chill of November 1962, as India reeled from the shock of Chinese incursions across the Himalayas, an unexpected warmth arrived from across the Pacific.
US military transport aircraft began landing in Calcutta, quietly offloading crates of supplies marked for Indian forces.
At first, the operation was shrouded in secrecy. Then, at the American ambassador's insistence, the news was made public, and headlines hailed a new partnership, portraying Washington as India's steadfast friend in its darkest hour.
For many in New Delhi, it appeared as though a long-awaited reconciliation was unfolding. The world's oldest democracy had come to the aid of the largest.
It seemed to mark the beginning of the most favourable phase in India-US relations. Yet, beneath the headlines and handshakes, there lay a carefully calculated strategy that served Washington's larger geopolitical design far more than India's immediate needs.
Was America's embrace truly an act of solidarity, or an exercise in strategic manipulation?
A Calculated Pause Before The Aid
The turning point came in the first week of November 1962, when V K Krishna Menon resigned as defence minister under mounting political pressure.
His exit was not merely an internal development; it was the signal Washington had been waiting for.
The United States began dispatching military aid to India almost immediately after Menon's resignation.
This timing was no coincidence. For years, Menon had been viewed in Washington as dangerously close to Communist ideology, a sharp critic of Western powers, and an architect of India's non-aligned posture.
The question that most unsettled Washington was 'who after Nehru?', and in Menon, they saw a potential successor whose ideological leanings threatened to align India firmly with Moscow.
To Washington, that was an unacceptable outcome.
Hence, the US chose to wait. Military supplies and logistical plans were prepared but held back. Only after Menon's departure did the aircraft begin to arrive in Kolkata.
What appeared as timely assistance to a beleaguered nation was, in fact, a calculated decision to ensure that credit for American aid would never attach to a man they distrusted.
Washington viewed Menon's resignation not as a question of right or wrong, but as a strategic move to ease political friction.
A Complicated Relationship Before 1962
To understand this sudden burst of goodwill involving military assistance, one must recall the long and uneasy history between the two democracies.
Since 1949, Washington had sought India as a partner in the Cold War. But Nehru's insistence on non-alignment frustrated the Americans, who saw neutrality as a luxury in a divided world.
The relationship soon became one of ideological friction and strategic disappointment.
By 1950, the United States had already chosen Pakistan as its principal ally in the region. Pakistan's leadership, eager for recognition and assistance, aligned itself quickly with American interests.
Over the decade, Washington cultivated its military and political elite, training officers and supplying modern weapons.
When political instability gripped Pakistan in the late 1950s, the US quietly backed the military takeover, seeing General Ayub Khan's regime as more predictable and compliant.
For India, the consequences were stark. The US-Pakistan alliance tilted the regional balance sharply against India, which until then had depended heavily on the West for aid and technology.
But when Washington withheld critical transfers, New Delhi turned to the Soviet Union to fill the gap.
India, meanwhile, sought to preserve cordial ties with China through the 1950s, conscious that it could ill afford hostility on two fronts.
However, the turmoil in Tibet and the Dalai Lama's asylum in India fundamentally altered that equation.
America's Early Attempts To Woo India Away from Communism
Despite the growing distance, the United States made several attempts to court India through economic and diplomatic channels.
The formation of the Aid India Consortium in 1958 aimed to showcase Western support for India's development model.
The PL-480 grain shipments helped alleviate India's food shortages but also created a form of economic dependence.
Presented as development assistance, American economic aid was in fact a foreign policy instrument, enabling Washington to exercise subtle influence over India's strategic direction.
The financial crisis of 1957-1958 marked a low point in India's economic stability. Facing a severe balance-of-payments crunch, India turned to the United States for help.
Washington used the situation to its advantage, withholding immediate support and compelling India to appeal to the International Monetary Fund.
It was only after the US intervened that the IMF approved the loan package. The message was unmistakable: India's access to international financial aid was contingent upon American approval.
President Eisenhower's visit to India in 1959, the first by a sitting US president, was part of this broader effort to draw India away from the Communist orbit.
His charm and personal diplomacy softened Nehru, but substantive convergence remained elusive. The ideological gap between the two democracies persisted.
The Pakistan Factor And The Search For Unified Bloc
If India remained a difficult partner, Pakistan was the willing one. Under the SEATO and CENTO alliances, Pakistan received vast quantities of military aid and training.
Yet Washington never entirely abandoned the dream of a united South Asia aligned with the West.
The logic was straightforward: A cooperative subcontinent would serve as a more formidable barrier against Communist expansion.
This reasoning guided American diplomatic mediation between India and Pakistan through the 1950s.
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, brokered under the auspices of the World Bank, became a notable achievement of this approach.
It reinforced the perception of the US as a peace broker while keeping both nations within its sphere of influence.
In practice, the US policy tilted in Pakistan's favour militarily while keeping India bound to Western economic assistance.
Still, India sought to walk a careful middle path, engaging with both the West and the Communist bloc.
1962: The Turning Point
The Sino-Indian conflict of October 1962 altered these dynamics overnight. As Chinese troops crossed the Himalayan frontier, Washington saw a historic opportunity to reposition itself in South Asia.
When Moscow initially leaned toward Beijing, the US stepped forward to fill the vacuum.
In a significant diplomatic gesture, it recognised the McMahon Line as the legitimate boundary, aligning itself publicly with India's territorial claim.
President Kennedy acted swiftly. American aircraft delivered emergency supplies, communications equipment, and winter gear. Teams of military experts arrived to assess India's requirements.
The correspondence between Kennedy and Nehru reflected an unusual warmth, with both leaders invoking shared democratic ideals and mutual respect.
For India, this was a moment of reassurance. After years of distance and doubt, the United States seemed finally to understand India's strategic concerns.
The Appearance Of Friendship
Optimism soon spread through India's political and media circles. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith became a familiar figure in Delhi's corridors of power, symbolising a new phase of cooperation.
Military collaboration deepened, and discussions began on future defence arrangements.
American assistance was presented as an act of solidarity, a coming together of democracies against aggression.
Yet behind the cordial gestures and public sympathy, Washington's approach was guided by cold calculation.
Intelligence coordination, policy planning and diplomatic communication from that period reveal a consistent objective: to draw India away from Moscow and Beijing, reshape the regional balance, and expand American influence in South Asia.
Conclusion: The Embrace Before the Twist
What appeared to be a generous act of friendship was, in truth, a manoeuvre within a much larger strategic game.
The United States used the 1962 war not just to aid India but to test how far it could be pulled into the Western fold.
The conflict itself, Menon's resignation, the timing of aid, and the careful orchestration of political optics were all part of this design.
As India welcomed the open hand of friendship, few realised that Washington's overtures were shaped more by global strategy than by goodwill.
The real question was not whether America helped India in its hour of need, but what it hoped to gain from that embrace; a question that Part II will unravel.
Please click here to read V K Krishna Menon's resignation letter to then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru
Dr Kumar is a Research Scholar who has extensively researched the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and the Cold War dynamics.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff