In the short run, the Trump presidency has already ensured one thing: The assumptions of the past can no longer guide the strategies of the future, points out Manish Dabhade.
As US President Donald J Trump marked six months in office last week, the seeming political spectacle of the first six months of his presidency signalled more profound geopolitical consequences.
Far from being a fleeting populist moment, Trump's first six months portends a fundamental rearranging of the premises of American foreign policy, and the post-war world order more broadly.
In this very short span, Trump has acted with much haste and sheer boldness unprecedented in recent presidential history.
Alliances have been brought into question, worldwide agreements abandoned, tariffs threatened, and diplomacy recrafted with the tough-knuckled language of bargaining.
Even as the means have looked erratic, the grand strategy is more apparent than most would admit: Trump is looking to create a new world order in which the United States reclaims primacy through a more transactional, nationalist approach.
For India, a country long invested in rules-based order, open markets, and multilateralism, this disruption provides both risks and opportunities.
Trump's agenda draws inspiration from the belief that the world order fashioned and created by America after the Second World War has run its course of utility.
In his narrative, it is an order more rewarding for other countries -- China, countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, and even to partner India, than it is for America.
Trump's essential foreign policy story is one of grievance. America for him is the victim of its own benevolence -- its trade agreements too generous, its alliances too one-sided, its military engagements too burdensome.
Where previous presidents saw American leadership as the global public good, Trump sees sunk cost.
The shift is paradigmatic. Bilateralism replaces multilateralism. Negotiation replaces norms.
And commercial leverage is more and more enmeshed with diplomacy. Trump is not bothered about sustaining chimeric ideals like the liberal world order.
He is more interested in deal-making -- computed not in distant stability, but in short-term gains for America.
Trump pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement the day he assumed office this January on the grounds that it unfairly curbed American growth.
Time-tested engagement through the form of NATO was questioned with European capitals chastised for not carrying their 'fair share'.
Amidst its trade talks with US, South Korea is rattled by Trump's interest in reviving his 'beautiful relationship' with the North Korean dictator.
Despite a massive trade deal with the US announced just days ago, Japan continues to be unnerved with Trump accusations against Japan for making a 'fortune' out of the US.
To its friends no less than its enemies, word went loud and clear that everything is on the table, and no commitment is sacred.
Trump's programme is not without a rationale. There are legitimate criticisms of globalisation and of American overstretch.
For decades, the United States provided defence guarantees to countries that had enormous trade surpluses against it.
Trump has simply asked the question all of Washington whispered but never spoke aloud: What's in it for America? The risk is that this approach rejects more often than it builds.
America long provided global stability by being predictable, imperfect as it may have been.
That stability enabled countries to hedge, to partner, and to plan within broadly cooperative parameters.
Trump's rejection now of that model leads to a world that will be more anarchic, more competitive, and more prone to miscalculation.
His tilt towards bilateralism also raises structural concerns.
Smaller and medium-sized powers like India depend on multilateral frameworks to negotiate from the position of collective bargaining power.
If such frameworks are eliminated, the equation turns to favor larger powers and a zero-sum competition.
The most significant area of the Trump administration's new strategic direction is the US-China relationship.
What Trump seems to grasp, either wittingly or not, is that the post-Cold War engagement of China economically as part of the world economy with the hope that it would liberalize politically hasn't succeeded.
China has grown economically and militarily more powerful but not by embracing the norms or values of the Western liberal order.
Trump's strategy has been to flip this engagement into a confrontation.
There is the danger, though. The more the United States enforces its stand in trade, gthe South China Sea and Taiwan, the greater it is increasing the threat of miscalculation.
If the trade tensions spiral into the broader strategic rivalry, the world might witness a 'new' Cold War or worse yet, actual hot war between the two great powers of the 21st century.
For India, the first six months of Trump are a mixed bag. On the plus side, he is as sceptical as Delhi is about the ascendance of China and its aspirations.
His administration has been firmer behind the Indo-Pacific concept, and there is convergence on strategic issues like counter-terrorism and defence.
India has witnessed at close range Trump's unpredictability, be it from vitiated visa rules for Indian IT professionals to sporadic trade barbs.
On the bigger map, if multilateralism falters, India loses one of those essential forums where its diplomatic influence has increased.
If the US-China equation turns sour, India may find itself caught between the crossfire of the rapidly bipolar world.
What India therefore needs to accomplish is two things. First, strengthen its own economy and security resilience so it is more capable of withstanding the world that will become less regulated.
Second, step forward with like-minded nations such as Japan, Australia, and the EU to have some form of order globally while the United States gives up its role for the short-term.
The first six months are not a detour -- these are a fundamental re-evaluation of the manner America wields its power.
If this turmoil leads to more balanced order or to global chaos is up to the second act.
Short of a new US-China strategic equilibrium, accepting rivalry but not war, the tumult of the first six months of the Trump presidency may eventually create a firmer balance.
If disruption persists with minimal accommodation, the globe can slip into perils of fragmentation.
India, like any other country, must prepare for both scenarios. In the short run, the Trump presidency has already ensured one thing: The assumptions of the past can no longer guide the strategies of the future.
Manish Dabhade is an Associate Professor of Diplomacy at the School of International Studies, JNU, and Founder of The Indian Futures.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff