What Maharashtra Win Means For Modi

'Undeniably, Modi's position has stabilised and he has staged a comeback of sorts from the weeks after the Lok Sabha results.'

'Coalition partners are likely to be more tolerant of Modi... The forthcoming elections in Delhi and Bihar will determine whether this continues or not.'

'To win Delhi and Bihar, Modi will have to work in conjunction with the RSS.'
'However, because of the 'truce' that has been worked out within the Sangh Parivar, Modi will have to be more consultative than he has been in the past ten years,' reveals Modi biographer Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay.

There were several factors behind the spectacular performance of the Mahayuti alliance, the three-party coalition of the Bharatiya Janata Party, Eknath Shinde's Shiv Sena, and the Ajit Pawar-led Nationalist Congress Party, in Maharashtra.

But while most of them, firstly cash resources, deployed through the state government for the Laadli Bahin Yojana, as well as for usual reasons during campaigning, were on anticipated lines, the biggest factor was the success with frenetic 'repairs' carried out within the Sangh Parivar.

But before examining the success with this challenging task the party faced on its internal front, let us cast a glance at the BJP's regular tactics.

Firstly, it is well-known that the BJP has raised a formidable electoral machinery, adept at figuring the correct caste profiles while selecting candidates.

Secondly, it is also well-known that whenever the BJP appears to be in either a spot of bother, or when it is unsure of its standing, it resorts to harnessing the divisive issue of communalism.

In this elections too, the 'batenge to katenge' refrain was first introduced by Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath and thereafter by most leaders of consequence despite reservations of some allies like Ajit Pawar and some even from within the party.

But none of these was the principal reason for the BJP outdoing even its own expectations.

These tools, after all, were deployed even during the parliamentary polls, especially after Narendra D Modi green signaled party colleagues and cadres to deploy the communal card with his speech on April 21 in Banswara, Rajasthan.

What made the biggest difference to the BJP's performance in this round of elections was that Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh cadres were out in full strength to campaign for party candidates after its 'indifference' during the hustings for the Lok Sabha.

It is worth recalling that after the verdict on June 4, RSS Sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat made several critical remarks.

While he never named the target of his ire, there was no doubt that the taunts were aimed at Modi.

Last month at the conclusion of the Akhil Bhartiya Karyakari Mandal session in Mathura, the Sarkaryavah (general secretary) of the organisation, Dattatreya Hosabale, confirmed that passions within its brass had been calmed down and curtains had been drawn on an acerbic phase of relationship between the ideological fountainhead and Modi alongside core aides.

Modi, however, had to pay a 'price' for this truce which had been in the works for long and was first visible in Haryana.

RSS foot soldiers marked a return to the campaign trail. Quite clearly, the Sangh leadership has pressured Modi to tone down his political 'presence', as evident during the polls in Haryana and in Maharashtra this time too.

In response to the criticism of putting the individual before the organisation with his 'Modi Ki Guarantee' slogan, he reduced the number of his election rallies drastically.

He was also forced to 'accommodate' satraps who had either not been his choice originally, Yogi Adityanath, or had fallen out with him -- Devendra Fadnavis, for instance, who also re-established close ties with the RSS leadership.

Despite the emphatic victory of the BJP and its allies in Maharashtra, the Hindutva fraternity will have to examine the reasons for the setback in Jharkhand.

Here too, fair assessment will establish that the party leadership antagonised tribal voters by first going after Chief Minister Hemant Soren, on what the people considered as trumped up charges of corruption.

Secondly, the tribal voter also did not wish the possible return of any non-tribal leader as CM, like in 2014 when the BJP in a clear strategy in Maharashtra, Haryana and Jharkhand chose someone from the non-dominant community, for instance, Raghubar Das.

This appeared a certainty with the sharply polarising campaign of the BJP and sustained pitch of its leaders that 'foreigners' were taking over Jharkhand.

The party's offensive advertisement, which even the Election Commission of India found difficult not to ban, contributed to propagating the impression that the party would destroy tribal culture if it came to power once again.

Thirdly, the BJP needlessly engineered Champai Soren's defection from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha despite the fact that the stop-gap CM did not have adequate political standing to damage the JMM's prospects.

Undeniably, Modi's position has stabilised and he has staged a comeback of sorts from the weeks after the Lok Sabha results when the BJP lost majority for the first time under Modi's leadership.

Coalition partners are likely to be more tolerant of Modi because he heads the biggest coalition partner and also less assertive because the BJP has to a considerable extent halted its electoral slide down since June.

The forthcoming elections in Delhi and Bihar will determine whether this continues or not. To win these polls, Modi will have to work in conjunction with the RSS.

However, because of the 'truce' that has been worked out within the Sangh Parivar, Modi will have to be more consultative than he has been in the past ten years.

It has to be borne in mind that unlike the template within which Atal Bihari Vajpayee worked, especially during the early years of his tenure, beginning 1998, Modi was completely non-consultative as far as the RSS and other affiliates were concerned from when he became Gujarat chief minister.

He remained at loggerheads with then sanghchalak of the region -- Manmohan Vaidya -- as well with Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader Pravin Togadia.

For the last decade too, Modi kept the RSS completely out of loop on issues related to governance and policies.

Obviously there cannot be formal consultations hereon, but regular informal interactions are likely to be seen as during the Vajpayee years.

Over the next forty odd days, by early January, a decision has also to be taken on the next BJP president.

If the events over the past six months had not taken place and the BJP's tally in Parliament was according to Modi's '400 paar' expectations, the party chief would surely have been unilaterally chosen by him.

But in the changed circumstance, the process will necessarily be more consultative.

One can expect elements of a tug of war in this process and both sides are likely to reach a compromise because while Modi can no longer ride roughshod over the RSS, the organisation's leaders have to be mindful that Modi still remains the most charismatic electoral mascot of the fraternity.

But while this is not an immediate issue that has to be decided, the BJP leadership, also in consultation with the RSS has, to first settle a more pressing matter: Who shall be Maharashtra CM -- does the party continue with Shinde, or appoint someone from within its own ranks?

Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay is an author and journalist based in Delhi-NCR.
His latest book is The Demolition, The Verdict and The Temple: The Definitive Book on the Ram Mandir Project.
He is also the author of Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times.

Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff.com