China's dilemmas in Af-Pak region

The developments in Af-Pak region, particularly the fall out of Pak political paralysis, would make President Xi Jinping’s task a little more complicated, says Colonel R Hariharan.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan to be scheduled along with his visit to India this month has been cancelled. It was strategically a very important visit for both China and Pakistan and a lot of preparation had gone into it.

Evidently, the cancellation was related to the political paralysis in which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government finds itself. It has so far been over three weeks since the Imran Khan-Tahirul Qadri duo laid siege to the parliament calling for the resignation of the Nawaz government.

The crisis in Pakistan highlights the arc of instability in the Af-Pak region which could become a major game-changer in the strategic scene in South Asia. This region poses a major dilemma for Xi when he holds formal talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to build a win-win relationship between the two countries, as both India and China have competing strategic interests in the region.

Even before the political crisis in Pakistan, the Af-Pak was heading for a period of instability due to the expected resurgence of jihadi terrorism after the last of the American troops thin out by the end of 2014.

Pakistan had been using terrorists operating from its soil to strategically ‘bleed’ India. Like India, Afghanistan also has been ‘bled’ by fraternal jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan. So, political crisis in Pakistan would affect the Af-Pak region much more than developments elsewhere.

Both the Asian giants would need greater convergence in their actions to successfully handle developments which affect them both. Both Modi and Xi will be required to take some hard decisions on this count without compromising their national interests if the talks are to make meaningful progress.

However, the Chinese leader’s dilemmas appear more complex than India’s as China has invested heavily in creating strategic assets in its Western border regions, Pakistan, as well as Central Asia. According to a September 2013 assessment 'China has come to displace both the United States and Russia as the great power with the most influence in Central Asia'.

At the moment, Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, looks more unstable. Democracy is on a precarious perch after the Sharif government was compelled to seek the help of the army when thousands of followers of two opposition groups -- Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek -- entered the secure area of the national assembly and the secretariat.

The army’s lukewarm response to the situation followed by the breach of security zone by agitators has raised serious doubts about the role of its role in triggering the crisis.

The two opposition parties demanding the resignation of the Nawaz Sharif government are suspected to be proxies of the Pakistan army. Even in the early stages, Pakistani columnists considered it a sort of soft coup.  

Political parleys have yielded no results, as leaders of both sides do not appear to be willing to give in. A prolonged paralysis of the government which enjoys a 209-seat majority in the 342-member parliament would help justify army intervention. Though the army has denied any such intention, the chances for it are increasing with the continuing political gridlock.

In this context, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s timely reiteration of China’s support to Pakistan ‘realise national security, stability and economic development’ on August 27, 2014, when a Pakistan Peoples’ Party delegation called upon him, is interesting.

On the occasion he also said China also ‘supports Pakistan's efforts to safeguard its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, while hoping it can ensure the safety of Chinese projects and people there.’

These are probably not merely words of solidarity but an affirmation of China’s strategic interest in Pakistan’s political stability for other countries (particularly India) to take notice.

On the occasion, Li also ‘vowed to work with Pakistan to build an economic corridor between the two countries, and promote the construction of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ with countries in the region to push forward regional economic integration.’

China had been promoting the 'One Belt and One Road' as it refers to the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ concepts ever since Xi spoke about them during his visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in 2013.

In fact, President Xi was supposed to sign investment agreements worth $32 billion with Pakistan during his visit. The cash-strapped Pakistan economy badly needs the Chinese investment for a revival. Politically, the cancellation of the visit was ‘insulting, disgraceful and a big diplomatic and economic blow’ as described by Minister Ahsan Iqbal, who blamed the two opposition leaders for it.

When Li visited Pakistan in May 2013, he mooted the proposal for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Both countries are now fleshing it out. China sees it as ‘a driver for connectivity between South Asia and East Asia.’

Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain, in his maiden visit to Beijing in February 2014, focused on this project which he said was ‘a monument of the century…’ benefitting ‘not only Pakistan and China, but also the whole region with billions of people.’

The CPEC envisages linking Kashgar in Xinjiang with Gwadar Port in Pakistan coast. The link involving the Karakoram Highway (1,300 km), the Indus Highway (1,264 km) and the Makran Coastal Highway (653 km) is being constructed by China. A parallel high speed railway system is also part of the CPEC.

When completed, the CPEC would radically change China’s strategic capability not only in South Asia, but West Asia as well. It would add more muscle to China-Pakistan strategic alliance in this region.

The CPEC is expected to spark economic boom in Xinjiang where China is making big investments in infrastructure and industry. But the success of CPEC is possible only if the Af-Pak region is terrorism free and Pakistan remains politically stable.

China has the ability to weather tectonic changes in Pakistan politics as it enjoys a lot of goodwill in all constituencies (including pro-Taliban right-wing elements). In the words of Oslo-based analyst Qandeel Siddique, Sino-Pak relations are strongest in diplomatic and defence collaboration ‘rooted in over-lapping geo-strategic interest and threat perceptions.’

He identifies India as ‘one common adversary’ of united China and Pakistan and ‘arguably remains the germane reason for Sino-Pak alliance.’

China’s ‘all weather’ friendship is one of the three aspects -- the other two being the nuclear bomb and the claim on Kashmir -- in which Pakistani people are unanimously agreed. According to a recent poll, 81 per cent Pakistanis consider China favourably.

So far, this environment has probably enabled Pakistan to satisfy China’s concerns about the presence of Uighur extremists of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in Pakistan. Pakistan has conveniently blamed outsiders (obviously from the United States and India) as the root cause even for the attacks on Chinese workers in Gwadar.

Pakistan had also been taking quick action to apprehend and repatriate Uighur extremists wanted by China. A case in point was the repatriation of ETIM co-founder leader Memetuhut Memetrozi, 41, who is now serving a life sentence in Xinjiang.

China had generally been playing down Pakistan links of ETIM though the establishments in both countries are aware of them.

However, the present understanding between China and Pakistan on handling Uighur terrorists may well be tested as the scale and spread of Uighur extremist attacks in China has increased in the last 18 months.

China is seriously concerned about its spillover as far as Beijing and Kunming in Yunnan. It is evident that the worsening Uighur insurgency is of serious concern to China.

The rare public revelation carried in Chinese media on August 27 on Pakistani links to Uighur militancy in reporting Memetuhut’s confession of his indoctrination by extremists at a madrasa in Pakistan was probably intended to send a message to Pakistan to clean up its act.

Perhaps sensing China’s increasing concerns, when Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain met Xi in May 2014, he called the East Turkestan ‘terrorism forces’ a common enemy of Pakistan and China and vowed to make joint efforts with China to combat them.

Xi said China backed Pakistan in practising a counter-terrorism strategy based on its ‘national conditions’ and was willing to enhance bilateral security cooperation ‘to safeguard the peace and stability of the two countries and the region.’

It is evident China views counter-terrorism as part of its overall strategic security cooperation with Pakistan.

India faces a more complex terrorist threat from Pakistan-based terrorists. Pakistan army’s intelligence arm Inter-Service-Intelligence’s involvement with Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayiba terrorists is well-established. Their activity in Jammu and Kashmir has continued to be aided and abetted by the ISI, regardless of Pakistan’s political pronouncements.

In Afghanistan, potential for political instability has increased with the simmering post-presidential election confrontation between the president-in waiting Ashraf Ghani and the defeated rival Abdulla Abdulla. This could turn into the beginning of yet another ethnic confrontation between Pashtuns and Tajiks. And that could be hastened when Taliban terrorism blows up once again after the US troops are pulled out of Afghanistan.

India has serious concerns about China’s forays into South Asia and Indian Ocean Region which have strong strategic connotations for India’s security and national interest. And the developments in Af-Pak region and China’s likely response to them remain in the realms of speculation. 

In spite of this, Modi has now provided China an opportunity to broad-base its relationship with India. China’s dilemma would be how to handle India without jeopardising its strategic interests as well avail the opportunity to promote better strategic and trade ties with India.

The developments in Af-Pak region, particularly the fallout of the political paralysis in Pakistan, would make Xi’s task a little more complicated. He has to manage it successfully when he talks to Modi to make its silk route strategies a success. China simply cannot ignore India because of its sheer size and strategic domination of South Asia.

Col Hariharan, a former military intelligence officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group.