Atalji@100: Vajpayee's Unmatched Legacy

It was good fortune for India to have Atal Bihari Vajpayee lead the government at a crucial moment in our history. He avoided India meeting the fate of Iraq or Ukraine, asserts military historian Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).

December 25, 2024 marks the birth centenary of one of India's illustrious sons, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

It is difficult to even imagine the situation prevailing in early 1998 when Vajpayee was in charge of India's destiny as prime minister.

India then faced a grim proxy war in Kashmir. It was under intense American pressure to 'cap, roll back and eliminate' its nuclear programme and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

American officials had the temerity to suggest that China should 'manage' South Asian affairs.

Powerful forces in the world had combined to force a permanent 'second class' status on India, heir to a 5,000-year-old civilisation.

REVOLUTION OF MAY 1998

India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru had realised the potential of atomic Eenergy for economic development in an energy starved country.

Under the able leadership of Dr Homi J Bhabha, India over time built up an impressive and complete capability in the nuclear field.

Nehru, as a pacifist, was against nuclear weapons, yet he kept the Indian nuclear programme 'independent' of foreign curbs with the aim that should India does need nuclear weapons at some future date, it must have the infrastructure ready.

Indira Gandhi, reacting to the pressure created with the Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968, carried out the first nuclear test in May 1974, signalling Indian resolve.

In the then prevailing Cold War and 'balance of terror' between the two superpowers, India did not feel it necessary to go any further. The Soviet Union's support kept the Chinese threat under check.

The demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, rapid economic strides taken by the Chinese and the first Gulf War of 1991 totally changed the security environment for India.

The Gulf War demonstrated American power, and this was reinforced with its actions in Yugoslavia.

At think-tanks like Inpad, we urged successive governments to take the decision to go overtly nuclear. But fear of an economic embargo and lack of political will made India back out at the last moment.

A clause on 'entry into force', inserted at the urging of China, meant that even if India did not sign the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), it will have to comply with the treaty.

A time would come when it would be difficult for India to defy world opinion and carry out a test explosion.

It was imperative for India to make up its mind and carry out the minimum number of test explosions now.

On May 11, 1998, three underground nuclear detonations took place at Pokhran. This was followed on May 13 by another two detonations.

These tests confirmed that India could manufacture thermonuclear warheads and carry out sub-critical computer controlled nuclear testing.

Vajpayee declared that India's nuclear weapons were for purely defensive purposes and issued a unilateral 'no first use' pledge.

America slapped economic sanctions on India. Technological sanctions had been imposed in 1974; these were further tightened.

In retrospect it seems clear that the Pokhran tests came not a day too soon. The coming difficulties were there for all to see.

In 1991, the West changed its non-proliferation policy to one of a more aggressive 'counter proliferation'.

It was India's good fortune to have Vajpayee lead the government at this crucial moment in our history. He saved India from meeting the fate of Iraq or Ukraine.

Like a good general, Vajpayee anticipated Pakistan's nuclear tests and the subsequent American pressure to tie India's nuclear programme with our small neighbour.

By linking Indian nuclear tests to the Chinese threat, India neutralised any such future pressure and the constant attempt by the West to equate India with Pakistan.

MENDING FENCES: LAHORE PEACE INITIATIVE, INDIA-US DIALOGUE.

'You can choose your friends but not neighbours. India and Pakistan are neighbours and that cannot change. Now the issue is would we like to live like good neighbours or continue to fight.'

It was this unassailable logic of geography that led Vajpayee to embark on the Lahore Peace initiative on February 19, 1999.

The groundwork for this was carefully prepared. In the latter of half of 1998, due to the sanctions Pakistan was on the verge of economic collapse.

At that time Vajpayee seized the moment and bought sugar worth $200 million from Pakistan. A grateful Nawaz Sharif was thus won over.

To give a fillip to people to people contact, the Pakistan cricket team toured India in January 1999 and received a standing ovation in Chennai when they won a well deserved victory.

Through his 'bus diplomacy', Vajpayee began his quest for peace. He visited the Minar e Pakistan as a symbolic gesture to ally Pakistani fears that India had not accepted Partition and Pakistan's existence.

Vajpayee's initiative was based on the harsh reality of nuclearisation. The truth is that nuclear weapons are too dangerous, a nuclear war cannot be 'WON' and therefore must never be fought! It was believed that this was understood in Pakistan.

Also many in India felt that now that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, its sense of insecurity would be reduced and therefore this was the right psychological moment to begin the peace process.

Essentially the crux of the Lahore initiative was to improve India-Pakistan relations to such a pitch that the resolution of Kashmir issue should become possible. There were storm signals as well.

The right wing Jamaat e Islami indulged in violence and even more significantly, General Pervez Mushrraf, then the chief of Pakistan's all powerful army, absented himself from the welcoming ceremony. The Lahore bus was soon stuck on the peaks of Kargil!

Having established the Indian position as a nuclear weapon power to balance China in Asia, Vajpayee moved quickly to mend fences with the sole superpower, the US.

At his initiative, his able and astute colleague and confidant Jaswant Singh met then US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott on July 10, 1998 to begin a long running dialogue between the largest and the most powerful democracies of the world.

From July 1998 to September 2000, in what was the most extensive dialogue ever between the United States and India, Talbott and India's external affairs minister Jaswant Singh met 14 times in seven countries on three continents.

They discussed both the immediate items on the security and nonproliferation agenda as well as their wider visions for the US-India relationship and the potential for economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries.

NEXT: VAJPAYEE, THE WAR TIME LEADER

Colonel Anil A Athale (retd) is a military historian whose earlier columns can be read here.

Photographs curated by Manisha Kotian/Rediff.com
Feature Presentation: Rajesh Alva/Rediff.com