The Bush administration apparently has no problem with the new Pakistani government's peace deal with militant groups in that country's North West Frontier Province, including Waziristan that have been sympathetic and allied with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It has even given the tentative agreement its cautious blessings.
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher said, "Negotiating with the tribes in this area is not something new. President Musharraf's government did it, previous Pakistani governments did it, British governments did it".
"Go back as far as you can and you find out that there has always been an element of negotiation, an element of force, an element of development," he said. "In a way, that's Basic Counterinsurgency 101. If you look at how anybody's operating in those kinds of situations, you see that you have to talk to people".
Boucher said consequently, "That is the approach that all of us share," and pointed out that "as far as we understand it, the agreement says that they will not resort to violence -they will abandon violence. They will stop supporting violent elements. And, whatever they want to advocate, they will advocate peacefully".
The past agreement between some of these groups and the Musharraf government was a dismal failure and resulted in the ceasefire between the Pakistani security forces and these groups being used by the latter to recoup and taken on the Pakistani forces with new vigour and also signalled the resurgence of the Taliban.
At the time President Bush and senior Administration officials had a hard time trying to defend Musharraf's actions and the continued military and economic largesse the US continues to provide Pakistan, including several billions of dollars to fight terrorism in these areas that are the breeding grounds for cross-border forays into Afghanistan as well as Pakistan itself.
Boucher however, argued, "Getting the tribes on your side is important. Getting people who have been involved in violence in the past, to abandon violence and take on a peaceful path is important".
He said, "To us, negotiations are a tactic. They're part of the whole picture. One of the keys is to have enforceable agreements, enforceable negotiations and a willingness to make sure these things are followed".
"The results are what matter. The outcome is what matters," he added.
Boucher reiterated, "There has to be less violent activity. There has to be an end to the Al Qaeda elements, who are very dangerous, who are up there plotting and planning, not so much in the case in the Swat Valley but certainly in the cases of Waziristan, where there's negotiations going on. And that's the outcome that matters, and everybody has to be focused on that".
Asked if the new Pakistani government had taken the Bush Administration into confidence before it started these negotiations with the militant groups, Boucher was circumspect.
He said, "We generally kind of know what's going on. So I'd just say generally we're much aware of the ideas and plans the Pakistani government makes, to try to solve the problems in the tribal areas. We're supportive".
Boucher argued that earlier agreements with these groups had not worked because they were simply paper agreements and unenforceable accords that didn't have any teeth to them. "Previous agreements in these areas have put on paper things like no Taliban activity, no 'Talibanisation,' no Al Qaeda activity, no cross-border activity".
He said, "Where these agreements have failed is not in what they put on the piece of paper, not the understandings reached with the militants or the tribes. It was the understandings were not kept and that no one made clear that they had to be enforced. It was a lack of enforcement that I think was the real problem there".
Boucher acknowledged however, "In the end, it's the outcome that matters. Are these agreements going to produce an end to the cross-border infiltration, an end to the suicide bombers that head into other parts of Pakistan as well as into Pakistan, an end to the plotting and planning of Al Qaeda from this area?"
"In the end, any particular agreement can only be judged by whether it stops militant activity and produces the safest situation for all".