China likely to tread carefully on nuclear deal

Dr Srikanth Kondapalli, associate professor in Chinese Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi feels China will tread carefully on the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation issue.

He told Managing Editor Sheela Bhatt that the issue will need deft handling by Indian leaders and a lot of back-room communication.

'Although the Chinese government has not made any explicit statement on the India-US nuclear deal, it is indeed a concerned actor by being a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group two years ago.

When the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements were signed and the possibility of US consent to civil nuclear materials and technology transfers to India brightened, the China factor came into being, albeit marginally.

During the two strategic dialogues between India and China in 2005 and 2006, the then Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran reportedly discussed the issue with his Chinese counterparts.

Subsequently, while expressing reservations on the ongoing US-India negotiations on the issue and its impact on international arms control treaties, article 8 point 27 of the joint declaration of November 21, 2006 between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and visiting President Hu Jintao stated that they agreed 'to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.' It also called for enhancing 'exchanges in the related academic fields.'"

Kondapalli further states that there is the commercial angle which should not be missed while debating China's thinking on the 123 Agreement.

"There was a suggestion that China could benefit in the opening up of the Indian civilian nuclear market. However, since India is looking forward to set up advanced 1,000 MW projects, it is likely, given the Chinese lack of expertise in this field, it could be a loser in the international bidding process.

Nevertheless, China could still benefit in the ancillary fields of raw materials supply, etc. After the release of the text of the Indo-US Agreement on August 1, 2007, intense lobbying could be expected between India and China on this issue, as consent is needed in the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group.

However, article 5 section 6 (b) (iv) of the Indo-US agreement states that if disruptions to nuclear supplies take place, then the US and India 'would jointly convene a group of friendly countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.' This provision is likely to minimise any Chinese pressure."

"Also, China itself was admitted into the NSG with assurances of receiving advanced civilian nuclear technologies in lieu of abiding by non-proliferation regimes. Hence, although China can still resist arriving at a consensus in the NSG through harking back to the United Nations Security Council Resolution No 1172 of 1998 or through another country within the NSG, the extent of such opposition, if any, appears to be limited. Although this could have the potential to stall actual supplies to India in the short term.

Nevertheless, adopting such a non-cooperative posture by China, if any, would have stalled the flowering of 'strategic partnership and cooperation' between India and China signed in April 2005. For this reason, China is likely to tread carefully on this issue with a lot of back door diplomacy in the offing."