The amendments proposed in Congress to the Indo-US nuclear deal will not constitute a 'serious challenge' to the July 2005 agreement, a senior strategic expert has said.
Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation in the Clinton administration, is currently senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
He also said the bill could be passed before Congress adjourns if the Bush administration and Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist want to do it so.
"The Senate is a less predictable place than the House. The Senate has all kinds of rules that protect minority prerogrative and so you can have a small number of Senators standing up and raising problems. But if the administration really pushes, it will be done before this Congress adjourns," Einhorn said.
"The House and the Senate attached various amendments. I don't think any of them constitute a serious challenge to the July 2005 agreement, but nonetheless attracted a lot of criticism and opposition in India. There is all kinds of stuff in there but we in Washington know how to read that," he said.
"I think 75 percent of the changes made by the House and the Senate have no real consequences. It is somewhat irritating of course, but basically Congress did not lay a glove on this deal," he said. "I do not know how good this is going to come out but my guess is that the Bush administration is not going to struggle very hard to strip out all of the objections raised by India," Einhorn said.
He was participating in a seminar 'A Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia'.
Einhorn brushed aside the notion that potential investors in India are going to be scared away by the tough language of the Bill - "No I don't think so. The investors are hard headed people. They know the difference between statements and policy and tough restrictions."
In an apparent reference to India's agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the consensus that is to be obtained at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Einhorn said there were indeed other elements of the deal that will have to fall in place before the accord fully fructifies.
"It will ask India, will ask Manmohan Singh specifically to show leadership and to say on balance that even though this Bill is still not perfect from an Indian perspective, we have got most of what we want and this is really not bad," he said.
He argued that there were countries in the NSG that support the the deal but also do not support transferring enrichment process technology.
On the issue of terminating the deal if India were to test nuclear weapons, Congress will have to stay within the confines of domestic laws, he said.
"What if India conducts a test and US terminates assistance? Should the US go around to France, Russia and others and say 'you've got to step in'? The idea that the American executive branch people essentially go around trying to circumvent US laws - I can't imagine that would happen," Einhorn said.
"But I cannot frankly imagine India being the first to resume testing. So I think this situation will never arise. But if India is the first to break this global moratorium, I think that will have adverse effect for India internationally and I don't think India would do it," he said.
"Indian nuclear weapons experts will have to make peace with the fact that Indian nuclear arsenal will not be as fully protected as they would like, but no nuclear establishment believes that they have done enough testing," Einhorn said.
He doubted the possibility of any country objecting to the deal in the NSG - "I doubt it. What will most likely happen in the NSG is that China will stand up and say, 'I am not comfortable with this deal but I am willing to go along with it provided that it is applied equally so that Pakistan can be a beneficiary in exchange'."
Einhorn brushed aside the Bush's administration's characterisation of the nuclear deal as being a net gain for non-proliferation - "I strongly disagree with that." He, however, emphasised that while the gains may be modest, the risks were 'substantial'.
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