'N-deal will advance US needs in Asia'

Two Indian-American scholars -- South Asia expert Sumit Ganguly and young rising star Dinshaw Mistry -- have taken on the 'godfather' of the non-proliferation lobby in the US, Gary Milhollin, who has slammed the US-India civilian nuclear agreement, claiming it is bad for security.

Ganguly, professor of political science at Indiana University in Bloomington, and Mistry, associate professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati and a one-time student of Ganguly, writing in the November issue of the prestigious Current History Journal, acknowledged that the deal's effect on the non-proliferation regime would be mixed. They said it 'might undermine an important non-proliferation norm on nuclear energy transfers.' However, they also argued that 'this negative impact can be reduced by appropriately framing the exemption for India.' If this is done, they argued the accord 'could bring non-proliferation benefits.'

'Stronger US-India strategic ties resulting from the pact would lessen India's need to greatly expand its nuclear arsenal and would bind Indian governments more firmly to norms against nuclear testing,' they wrote.

But if there is no agreement, 'the strategic gains would be forfeited and, while the proliferation concerns would not arise, the non-proliferation benefits would also not materialise. Thus, the overall benefits of the agreement outweigh those that would flow from not implementing it.'

They said 'by removing barriers to technology cooperation with India in the nuclear area, the nuclear agreement is intended to lay the foundations for greater strategic cooperation,' between Washington and New Delhi and 'such cooperation with India would advance US security objectives in Asia and beyond.'

First, Ganguly and Mistry predict, 'a stronger partnership with New Delhi would help Washington balance a rising China whose economic and military power many American policy makers harbor misgivings about. And, while New Delhi's relations with Beijing have improved substantially in recent years, India retains some anxieties about a resurgent and possibly revisionist China,' the article said.

Acknowledging that 'Washington cannot realistically expect to use Indian military bases in the event of a conflict with China,' the authors contend that 'it can reasonably expect India to share critical intelligence about Chinese military capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean and its littoral states.

'Given the significance of the region to India's maritime interests, the growing Chinese presence in Burma has generated considerable misgivings in Indian military circles.'

Ganguly and Mistry also argue that 'a viable strategic partnership with India could bring military and political benefits for Washington,' and point out that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 'Indian naval vessels helped patrol areas in the Indian Ocean littoral in concern with the US Navy.'

'More recently, in the aftermath of the 2004 Asian tsunami, India coordinated relief efforts with the US Navy from Sri Lanka to Indonesia. These two ventures were made possible because the two navies had developed prior habits of cooperation through a series of naval exercises.'

The authors also pointed out that India 'has started to work in concert with the United States on international security issues that extend well beyond South Asia,' and recalled that 'after considerable deliberation, for example, India chose to align itself with the United States on referring Iran to the UN Security Council in September 2005 and again in February 2006. New Delhi would not have aligned with Washington had a nuclear cooperation agreement not been under consideration at the time.'

'Overall,' Ganguly and Mistry said, 'under a stronger strategic relationship, the scale of US-India military cooperation, security and foreign policy coordination, intelligence sharing, and arms sales could all increase.'

The paper noted that 'in the past few years, these activities have proceeded apace despite a change in government in India from the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition to a more left-of-center Congress party administration.'

The authors reiterated their warning that 'on the other hand, if the nuclear agreement fails to materialise, the substantial improvement that has taken place in US-India relations over the past decade will suffer a significant setback. Many of the strategic initiatives under way could face reconsideration.

'Key individuals and groups within the Indian political arena who are virulently opposed to the improvement of US-India ties would exploit the failure to realise the nuclear deal as evidence of American perfidy and the ruling Indian government's ineptitude and naiveté. Consequently, the strategic significance of the nuclear agreement for advancing US-India bilateral relations cannot be overstated.'

Suggesting how India could be exempted and the non-proliferation regime still not be undermined, Ganguly and Mistry argued that any country may be allowed to 'win exemptions from the full-scope safeguards rule after being subject to this rule for some 20 to 30 years -- as is the case with India -- and only if they adhere to major non-proliferation rules.

'In this case, the carrot-and-stick NPT approach would still be affirmed, because India incurred important costs, being denied civilian nuclear imports for three decades, before receiving an exemption from this approach. Further, New Delhi only received an exemption because of its good export control record, and it would retain its exempt status only as long as it complies with non-proliferation norms such as those against nuclear testing,' the paper said.

Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, writing in the same issue, however, argues that 'so far, debate on the Bush administration's proposal has emphasised diplomacy and trade with India. [But] the most important question, however, is strategic. And the answer, I'm afraid, is that the legislation will not make the United States or the world safer. Instead, it will put everyone at greater risk.'

According to Milhollin, international security would be compromised by this deal because 'it's impossible to weaken export controls for India without weakening them for everyone else. The 'everyone else' includes Iran, Pakistan and even terrorists -- working through a national government or not -- who might want to buy the means to make weapons of mass destruction.'

'Indeed,' he warns, 'if Washington does weaken export controls for everyone, which is bound to happen if it weakens them for India, it may hasten the day when a nuclear explosion destroys a US city.'

Milhollin notes that 'the great flaw in the administration's proposal is that it considers India an isolated case. That is simply impossible. It contradicts the fundamental principles on which export controls are based. The controls today are administered through international regimes.'

He predicted that 'if the United States decides to drop controls to help one of its friends --in this case India -- other supplier countries will do the same for their friends. China will drop export controls on Pakistan, and Russia will drop controls on Iran. There will be no way to convince either China or Russia not to do that. They will say that what is good for your friend is good for mine. If you want to develop your market in India, I want just as much to develop my market in Pakistan or Iran. No country will give up a market unless other countries do the same. That is the way international regimes work.'

Milhollin states that 'once the United States starts tinkering with the non-proliferation regimes, they could unravel quickly,' and notes that one Pentagon expert had told him that 'they are like a spring-loaded box. If you raise the lid, you may never get it closed again. What he meant was that Washington has always set the standard for export controls, and other countries have often taken a long time to follow the US lead in strengthening them. But if the United States decides to loosen the controls, it will take only an instant for other countries to follow. The lid will fly off, and it may be impossible to ever get it back on.'

He also raised the spectre of the US-India deal and Washington's refusal to offer Pakistan the same kind of deal and its campaign against Iran as being perceived as anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic.

Milhollin said earlier this year when he visited Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, where he helped provide training and information in improving exports controls, one of the first questions he was asked was, 'What about India? Why has the United States decided to export [nuclear technology] to India? There is no way I, or any other American, can answer that question in a credible way in a Muslim country. India, Pakistan, and perhaps Iran all decided to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear cooperation.'

He argued that 'from this standpoint, they are indistinguishable. Why punish Pakistan and Iran but not India? They are all guilty. There is no persuasive reason for treating them differently. India is no different today from what it was in 1998, when it tested a nuclear weapon.'

Milhollin says while 'none of us wants to think of the word religion, it is a word that is in the minds of Muslim countries. If the United States is only against proliferation by countries it does not like, which now appears to be the case after the deal with India, why does it like some countries but not others?'

He also dismisses the strategic value of the US-India deal, asserting that of the three countries that have refused to sign the NPT -- India, Israel and Pakistan, 'India is the least important strategically to Washington.'

'Pakistan is essential to the United States' ongoing military and political efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan is also essential to the campaign against Al Qaeda. Pakistan is also a leading power in the Muslim world, a world with which the United States needs better relations.'

According to Milhollin, 'In any competition for strategic favour from the United States, India finishes a distant third.'

He also said that India is not going to sour its relations with China 'simply from a vague desire to please the United States.'

Ganguly told rediff India Abroad that "non-proliferation purists" like Milhollin "fail to recognise at least three important features of this deal.

"First, they must think that 30 years of punishing India without commensurate benefits is a desirable policy. Did this policy of technology denial give us any special purchase with the Indian nuclear weapons program? If anything, it had the effect of making the Indians more self-sufficient and we -- the United States -- lost all leverage with India.

"Second, they are still trying to close the barn door after the horse has bolted. India tested nuclear weapons in 1998. They will not shut down their program despite threats or cajolery. Continuing efforts to isolate and sanction India will not yield any particular benefits," he said.

Finally, Ganguly argued, "Non-proliferation is not our only policy objective as far as India is concerned. India is a rising power in Asia despite its myriad problems. It will continue to rise with or without our assistance."

Consequently, he said, "It behoves us to see that India will align with us as it flexes its muscles in Asia and beyond. The nuclear deal is a critical stepping stone to that end."

Ganguly said as expected, the non-proliferation purists were now trying to use the North Korean development, where Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon as a means to torpedo the US-India deal.

"I just hope that for once the President and his allies in Congress have sufficient political capital left to see this deal through," he said.