Indicative of the influence wielded by the US over Pakistan, General Yahya Khan had in March 1969 informed President Richard Nixon of his decision to impose martial law and sought Washington's goodwill, understanding
and support.
Explaining that since the civil administration and constitutional authority in Pakistan had become ineffective, Khan told Nixon he had no option but to place the country under martial law and assume all powers as chief martial law administrator.
In documents declassified by the State Department, Khan said it would be his endeavor to restore as soon as possible normal conditions in Pakistan as a preliminary to early restoration of democratic rule and civilian government elected on the basis of adult franchise.
In his letter routed through the then secretary of
state William P Rogers, Khan assured the American president that there would be no change in Pakistan's policy, which sought friendship with all countries.
In its assessment, the US Mission in Pakistan wrote to the State Department contending that the principal reasons for clamping of martial law was to protect the existing power structure in West Pakistan and to prevent East Pakistan from
obtaining national political power proportionate to population.
The communication spoke of the need to support Khan while at the same time seeking to expand US leverage in pushing for a satisfactory political solution.
It was also made clear that Washington could not continue support to a regime which became alienated from the populace. The US saw the possibility of such a situation developing particularly in East Pakistan.