It is a matter of eternal regret that foreign policy is not dependant on the sound bites of either the vegetable sellers or fashion designers of Islamabad. Had it been so, India would have coupled its joy over Finance Minister Jaswant Singh's pre-election bonanza with the additional reassurance that the carefully vetted voices for peace we heard on the news channels constituted the definitive Pakistani perception of what President Pervez Musharraf called his 'deal' with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
It is a 'deal' India has absolutely no reason to be displeased with. The sticking point at the Agra summit in 2001 was India's insistence that Pakistan repudiate the jihadi terrorism mounted from camps across the Line of Control. Now, with the US breathing down its neck for its undercover export of nuclear technology to rogue regimes, Pakistan was undeniably
beleaguered. It needed a respite, a little bit of breathing space. Forever the guerrilla commander in search of openings and opportunities, Musharraf knew that this was the moment to effect a retreat. India has reason to be grateful to both Vajpayee and Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra that they seized the moment.
Diplomatic niceties and a sense of generosity have propelled India's assertion that the joint statement that commits Pakistan to ending State-sponsored terrorism in return for a composite dialogue on all outstanding bilateral issues is a win-win for both sides. Yet the fact remains that this agreement to allow negotiations to prevail over armed conflict constitutes a negation of everything Pakistan has stood for since the Kashmir valley erupted in 1989. It is a U-turn that is far more awesome in scope than Musharraf's decision after 9/11 to abandon the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
If the joint statement does mark a change, history will view Vajpayee's Isamabad visit in the same light as President Nixon's journey to Beijing and Menachem Begin's hop to Cairo.
Of course, it is unlikely that the manifestations of a Pakistani retreat are going to be felt immediately. Musharraf's comment that he will not accept the LoC as the international border is an early indication that Pakistan will want to be seen to shift the focus from terrorist strikes to hard bargaining. It is significant that the pro-Pakistan faction of the Hurriyat Conference, led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, has also chosen to shift to a negotiating mode.
Yet, this is not the time to add enduring peace to the growing 'feel better' mood that is overwhelming the country. Vajpayee and Mishra didn't take any great risk by limiting the final bout of negotiations to themselves. At best, only Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani and External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha were in the loop. After all, what India was seeking was
completely in line with existing policy.
The only real differences within the BJP was over the question of beginning serious negotiations with Musharraf now or after the general election had given Vajpayee a renewed mandate. In short, the debate within India were centred on tactics and the extent of accommodation.
The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of Pakistan. All indications suggest that the decision to disavow terrorism in Kashmir was taken by General Musharraf personally, with Tariq Aziz and General Hamid Javed being the only others involved. The wider military establishment, the all-powerful ISI and the fledgling political authority were not consulted.
It is safe to hazard the guess that had the consultation process been enlarged, Vajpayee would have returned from Islamabad without anything more than the multilateral free trade agreement.
Last month, when Musharraf first indicated on an interview to BBC that he was willing to 'set aside' the 1948 UN Security Council resolution, there was the spectacle of his words being disowned by the rest of the Pakistani establishment.
It may sound deliciously ironic, but it cannot be denied that Musharraf demonstrated exemplary statesmanship in Islamabad last week. At the same time, he has exposed himself to grave risks. Unless he is able to sell the 'deal' with Vajpayee to the wider military establishment in Pakistan, including the ISI that operates a parallel State apparatus, India cannot afford to let its guard down.
Let us not forget that Nawaz Sharif too displayed amazing courage by negotiating the Lahore agreement with Vajpayee in 1999. Pakistani sources have indicated that the formal agreement was also supplemented by an unwritten understanding that Kashmir would be put on the backburner. This may explain why Sharif was brutally undermined and then ignominiously ousted by a military establishment that believed Kashmir could be liberated by war and terrorism. It was Musharraf who was the chief conspirator against his prime minister.
It is possible that the changed reality of the post-9/11 world has dawned on the whole of Pakistan but it would be risky to proceed on the assumption it has. As yet, there is no evidence to suggest that there has been a fundamental review of Pakistan's broader strategic goals in Kashmir. The shift cannot happen overnight. All India needs to constantly monitor is that a beginning has been made by Pakistan to accommodate the international revulsion against terrorism.
In addition, Musharraf has the reputation of being an Artful Dodger who is immodest enough to claim he has nine lives. That claim will be tested in the coming months. For the moment, India will have to cautiously assess whether the trust reposed in Musharraf's ability to stick to the letter and spirit of the Islamabad agreement is justified.
For the past two years, India has berated the US for reposing exaggerated faith in Musharraf's ability to steer Pakistan away from jihadi madness. After last week's agreement, India too has developed a vested interest in his political survival.