BUSINESS

Sayyid Bros. or B S Zafar?

By T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan
July 31, 2004 13:18 IST

The story is told of the dhobi who came to seek redress at Bahadurshah Zafar's court. He was asked to be informed -- by Zafar himself no less -- that the Mughal writ no longer extended to the other side of the Yamuna. Zafar at least had lost the instruments of imperial power. What can we say of this government?

Two weeks ago (July 17/18), this column had argued that the central government is actually imperial in its outlook, rather than being merely colonial, because it possessed the perfect instrument for it -- the Constitution.

Few people realise, by the way, that the Keshavanand Bharati Case (1973), in which the Supreme Court ruled that the "basic structure" of the Constitution could not be changed, also froze the imperial design of the Constitution.

But the intent and design of the Constitution are one thing; the will or ability to act imperially quite another. If from 1947 to 1971 the central government did not behave imperially, it was because there was no need to; but now, when the need is there, it finds itself unable to, which is yet another measure of the ever unfolding Indian political tragedy.

In that sense this government is not very different from Bahadurshah Zafar's. Its writ stops at Vijay Chowk. Just beyond it lies Rail Bhavan, over which Lalu presides. He defies the Prime Minister with impunity. So, sadly, does every minister. But such defiance is not the only issue for worry.

A far worse problem is the devaluation of the office of the Prime Minister. This is something the country can ill-afford. The last time something like this happened was when the Sayyid Brothers were in control of the Mughal Emperor, albeit only briefly. But the effect of that on the prestige of the Emperor was such that the office never recovered from it.

That story is worth recounting because the Mughal Emperor then was like the UPA government now. The story begins with Farrukhsiyar in 1713, who, like the Congress, simply claimed a mandate to rule.

But in the beginning he was totally dependent on the Baraha Brothers, known later as Bade Sayyid and Chote Sayyid. They drew their strength -- like Lalu or Mulayam or the Left do -- purely from clan support.

Farrukhsiyar marched to Delhi from Bengal -- after having crowned himself in Patna -- and faced Emperor Jahandar Shah's army. Jahandar was heavily dependent on the Turanis but treated them the way Atal Bihari Vajpayee had treated the RSS. He viewed them with great suspicion and had distanced himself from them.

As a result, he had earned Turani wrath. So when battle was joined at Agra, the Turanis simply stood by watching. It was exactly as in the last general elections. The Parivar ditched the BJP for exactly the same reasons -- being despised and discarded.

Like Vajpayee, Jahandar Shah gave up office, albeit with considerably less dignity. He got off his elephant and fled.

Farrukhsiyar then appointed the Sayyid Brothers as bakshi and vazir, respectively. But the honeymoon was short-lived, and almost immediately after reaching Delhi, Farrukhsiyar became engaged in a power struggle with them -- just as the Congress has with its coalition partners.

The similarities go further. There was even a Sikh revolt a la Amarinder Singh when Delhi's weakness became palpable. It was quelled when Banda Bahadur was publicly executed. (Yesterday it was reported that the Congress had taken a dim view of the Amarinder Singh rebellion. We await his dismissal.)

Farrukhsiyar had a problem with the Rajputs (read Thakurs), and the Marathas (read Sharad Pawar). He tried to divide them with offers of office (aha!) and even succeeded for a while.

But the contradictions, which were too many and too vicious, were soon out in the open. The Rajputs/Thakurs (the A Singh factor, if you like) proved difficult to pacify.

One Ajit Singh Rathore had been opposing Farrukhsiyar for a long time. Farrukhsiyar therefore sent the Sayyid Brothers to defeat him. At the same time, however, he sent word to Ajit Singh Rathore that he would "find imperial favour" if he defeated the Sayyid Brothers!

But Ajit Singh Rathore was a slimy fellow, and made a deal with the latter. An uneasy peace was cobbled together. This could happen to the Congress if a third front, with an M Singh and A Singh at its core, is formed.

Space constrains me from giving all the details of what went on between then and 1718. I will only recount the final phase here. Suffice it to say that everyone should read up about that period because it shows how little politics in India has changed.

By 1718, relations between the Emperor and the Sayyids had reached rock bottom. It was clear that one of them would have to go.

But the wind was blowing against the Emperor, who had acted without taking the coalition -- Ajit Singh from UP, Nizam ul Mulk from the South, and Sarband Khan from Bihar -- O, it is so delectable -- into confidence. Soon the Marathas joined in, as did a few others.

All these guys ganged up and the Emperor's goose was well and truly cooked. He was defeated in battle and the Sayyid Brothers installed a puppet, Rafi-ud-darjat. (Why did Sonia Gandhi turn up at the airport when Manmohan Singh said there was no need for anyone to see him off? Just to show where the real power resides?)

He was watched all the time, no one listened to him, and the real power, everyone knew, lay elsewhere. He soon quit by dying of TB.

What happened next is also very instructive. The Sayyids, in order to hold on to power, simply made deals with everyone so that they could continue to divide and rule. Governance, as I said in my article on July 17, was the main casualty.

But the Mughal nobility was not willing to tolerate them and eventually they were thrown out and killed. They were accused, amongst other things, of following a communal policy that favoured Hindus!

There are three lessons from this short history lesson.

One, if you have an imperial form of government, as we seem to do, then the central government must behave imperially.

Two, when central authority diminishes visibly, corrective action must be taken by taking exemplary action, if necessary by force.

Three, compromises made purely for surviving in office are not an option open to imperial powers. That way lies disaster.

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