Though Pakistan suffered in the division of the provinces and the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed came to be the armed forces

The British did not want to annoy Nehru who wanted "a certain variation of the boundary line." It was argued that the boundaries were determined as a result of "the judgement of an eminent lawyer," who had "no conceivable axe to grind" in Indian politics. But the honourable member of the British Bar "departed from the tradition of British justice, perhaps, because the matter was not judicial but political."

As for the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Mountbatten's initial Partition plan had given these to the proposed free state of Bengal. But since June 3 Plan had given East Bengal to Pakistan, Jinnah laid a claim to these islands. He argued that the islands were never a part of India and the population consisted of tribes who were not connected with the people of Indian by ethnic, cultural or religious ties.

He pointed out that the only channel of communication between East and West Pakistan was by sea and these islands occupied a strategic position on that route and provided refueling bases. Jinnah also desired to discuss the future of these islands before August 15, from a defence point of view. The viceroy was, however, advised against negotiations with the Indian leaders on defence matters before that date. Naturally, this strategy led to the handing over the islands to India.

The problem of the princely states was even more complicated. The Mountbatten Plan had envisaged that the withdrawal of the British could mean giving a free choice to the states to remain independent or join with either of the successor dominions. Mountbatten, however, saw to it that none of the states would exercise its choice for Independence. It was his policy that they must join one of the two dominions according to their geographical position, conceding at least defence, foreign affairs and communication to the central authority.

The secretary of state for India also advised him that "it was out of question for Britain to do anything to encourage states to stand out completely." The Congress leaders has also asked Mountbatten not to do anything to encourage the states to declare their independence. It appears that the United States had exercised its influence on Britain not to grant independence to the states. Though the British wanted the states to accede to one of the dominions, it appears that, in case of a tie, the government's preference was for India.

The reason, in the words of Mountbatten, was that the Indian Union "consisting nearly three-fourth of India and with its immense resources and its important strategic position in the Indian Ocean" could not be estranged. Naturally, he was found to be "working hard" on the representatives of certain major states to accede to India.

From the viewpoint of Pakistan, the accession of the states of Hyderabad and Kashmir are more significant. The Hyderabad state was about the size of England and Scotland put together, with a population of 17 million and a regular army. It was a land-locked state and was in need of a seaport. On July 1, 1947, Hyderabad issued a farman that after the departure of the British, the state would be independent.

Mountbatten and W T Monkton, the British adviser to the government of Hyderabad, tried their best "in a coordinated plan of campaign," to bring the Nizam to accede to India. Jinnah warned Mountbatten that in case the Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, the hundred million Muslims would "rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India."

Mountbatten, however, hoped that the "Nizam need not fear any armed intervention" and the Congress would be able to disrupt the dynasty from within. The facts proved otherwise. The Congress was unable to wreck the dynasty from within and Hyderabad had to suffer the onslaught of an Indian military intervention immediately after Jinnah's death in September 1948.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is a typical example where all other dictates were sacrificed at the altar of strategic interests of India. From the geographical, historical, demographic, economic and geopolitical points of view, Kashmir should have acceded to Pakistan. But Mountbatten had been emphasising upon certain states, including Kashmir to join the Indian Union because of their geographical location.

As early as June 1947, Nehru had formally asked Mountbatten that though Muslims formed 77.11% of the population in the Jammu and Kashmir state, it should go to India. The foremost reason for his demand was that the state was "of the first importance to India as a whole... because of the great strategic importance of that frontier state." Jinnah publicly indicated that wisdom demanded that the ruler of Kashmir would not ignore, much less hurt, "feelings and sentiments of the Muslims" who formed 80% of the population.

But, in the end, the Mountbatten-Nehru collusion succeeded in bringing the ruler of Kashmir into declaring accession to India. Thus the fate of four million people, more than three quarters Muslim, was settled not by the popular wish but by the whims of one man, with the active encouragement and support of the last viceroy of the British Crown.

Though Pakistan suffered in the division of the provinces and the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed came to be the armed forces. Although the population of Pakistan was about 25% of the Indian subcontinent, its share of the amed forces was about 33%. But the Pakistan army had an initial setback that its forces were neither organised nor all of them available in Pakistan. In fact, Lieutenant General Frank W Messervy, British GOC-in-C of the Northern Command, replied to the viceroy, that out of 67 battalions available in West Pakistan, only 35 would be left there.

Even these were to be at half strength owing to the movement of Hindu and Sikh companies. No Muslim companies were available in Pakistan for any replacement. This was precisely one of the reasons that the Pakistan army could not be used in Kashmir in October 1947 against the Indian military intervention. Later, when the Pakistan army was a little better organised it prevented the Indian forces from occupying the entire state of Kashmir and forced India to seek a cease-fire.

But since the basic tensions remained unresolved, it was natural for the two armed forces to clash, as they did in the 1965 and 1971. And even thereafter the historical, geo-political and strategic compulsions cannot be overlooked as they would continue to determine the course of history in times to come.

Excerpted from Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective, by Dr Noor-ul Haq, Reliance Publishing House, 1997, Rs 395, with the publisher's permission. Readers who wish to buy a copy of this book may write to Reliance Publishing House, 3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi 11 00 08.